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Abstract 
 
China became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 
2001.  This  historical  event  has  impact  on  both  China  and  the  WTO.  As  an 
observer noted, ‘The WTO will change China, but China will also change the 
WTO’.
1 This thesis is an example how the WTO will change China. It examines 
the WTO’s impact on the formulation of China’s first comprehensive competition 
law, the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007). The formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has 
generated unprecedented interest within and outside China due to the sheer size 
of the Chinese economy and trade.  
Despite this significance, there is a lack of studies on the WTO’s impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Against this background, this study 
examines  whether,  and  if  so,  how  the  WTO  could  have  had  impact  on  its 
formulation, and to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
has reflected such impacts. To this end, it focuses on four aspects: 
a.  consistency: the content of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 needs to be 
consistent with the WTO rules; 
b.  obligation:  the  enactment  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  could 
help China implement its WTO commitments; 
c.  enabling:  WTO  rules  could  have  enhanced  the  case  for  China 
seeking  to  combat  anticompetitive  practices  through  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; and 
d.  peer pressure: the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 could 
have been influenced by the peer review system—the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism.  
These four aspects are examined in Chapter Three, Chapter Four, Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six respectively. These four chapters constitute the main part of 
this thesis. 
 
 
                                         
1 Observation made by C. Christopher Parlin at the Georgetown University Law Center Course on 
WTO Law and Policy for MOFTEC Officials, 19-30 June 2000. 3 
This thesis concludes by noting that (1) the WTO could have had impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) such  impact could have been 
reflected  through  four  aspects;  (3)  the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law 
2007 has been influenced by the WTO. 4 
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Introduction
1
 
1  Purpose 
This study aims to examine the impact of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007).
2 
Competition  law  aims  to  prevent  or  remedy  anticompetitive  practices  and 
protect competition.
3 One of the first two pieces of competition legislation in 
the modern era
4 is the American Sherman Act which was enacted in 1890.
5 The 
American  Supreme  Court  claimed:  ‘The  Sherman  Act  was  designed  to  be  a 
comprehensive  charter  of  economic  liberty  aimed  at  preserving  free  and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade’.
6 Since World War II, most of the 
world’s developed countries, particularly all members of the Organisation for 
Economic  Co operation  and  Development  (OECD),  and  many  developing  and 
                                         
1 In this study, the titles of the Chinese articles, journals, newspapers, and books cited are 
translated into English along with their original Chinese ones and Pinyin, and quotes from these, 
are unofficially translated into English. So are the Chinese publishers. Not all pieces of the 
Chinese legislation mentioned in this study have official translations. In the case where there is 
no official translation, the translation is provided by the author. All Chinese names mentioned in 
this study are given in the Western order, the family name being last and first name being first. 
All websites quoted in this study were last visited on the 1
st September 2007. 
2 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
3 The objectives of competition law vary in different countries during different times as well. See, D. 
Valentine, ‘US Competition Policy and Law: Learning from a Century of Antitrust Enforcement’, 
in Y.-C. Chao, G. San, C. Lo and J. Ho, eds., International and Comparative Competition Law 
and Policies, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, (2001), 71, p. 72. 
4 H. Harris argued that competition laws existed in many countries in ancient times. See, H. Harris, 
ed., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Competition Laws Outside of the United States, (2001), pp. 
6-7. 
5 Canada has the oldest competition law in modern terms, which was adopted in 1889. 
6 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4, 78 S. Ct. 514, 517, 2 L. d. 2d 545, 
549 (1958). Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 19 
transitional  economies  have  enacted  laws  of  one  sort  or  another  to  control 
anticompetitive practices. In addition to these national competition laws, the 
European Union (EU) has its own competition rules effective in its twenty seven 
Member States.
7 
 
China’s significance in the world economy and trade grows dramatically each 
year. So does the importance of its competition related legislation. Before the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, China had several pieces of legislation 
dealing with some types of anticompetitive practices. These competition related 
provisions  were  scattered  in  several  laws,  regulations  and  sector  rules  at 
national level. 
 
China started to draft its first comprehensive competition law, the Antimonopoly 
Law, in the late 1980s.  After nearly 20 years of formulation, the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 was adopted by the Standing Committee of the 10
th National People’s 
Congress (NPC) on the 30
th August 2007. Once it comes into force on the 1
st 
August 2008, it will unite all the current competition related legislation in China 
into one place and bring some coherence to the Chinese competition regime. It 
will provide a systematic legal basis for combating anticompetitive practices. 
The increasingly significant role played by China in the global economy and trade 
means that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will inevitably have international reach. 
As one journalist claimed, adopting an antimonopoly law in China is ‘another 
sign that China is reshaping the way that global business works, this time as a 
regulator’.
8 Due to the significance of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the process 
of  formulating  it  has  attracted  unprecedented  interest  from  academics, 
multinational companies, organisations, and other governments. 
 
The  WTO  was  founded  on  the  1
st  January  1995  by  the  Marrakesh  Agreement 
Establishing  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (hereinafter  the  Marrakesh 
Agreement).
9 It is the inheritance and development of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed by 23 nations on the 30
th October 1947. It is ‘the 
                                         
7 The EC consisted originally of six member states, and has grown through accession to the 
present level. Further states are in various stages of negotiations towards accession. 
8 F. Kempe, ‘China the Antitrust Power’, Wall Street Journal, 3
rd November 2005. 
9 The Marrakesh Agreement is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 20 
only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between 
nations’.
10 It is considered ‘the most ambitious and far reaching international 
trade  agreement  ever  concluded’.
11 Currently,  there  are  150  members  in  the 
WTO.
12 Due  to  the  significant  role  played  by  the  WTO  in international  trade, 
China  joined  the  WTO  on  the  11
th  December  2001,  after  fifteen  years  of 
negotiations.
13 
 
One of the most important characteristics of the WTO is that it is a rule oriented 
organisation. Under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter the Dispute Settlement Understanding), an 
affected  WTO  Member  has  a  right  to  appeal  to  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body 
against other WTO Members who fail to implement their commitments.
14 Based 
on the ruling of a Panel or the Appellate Body, the Dispute Settlement Body can 
authorize  the  affected  WTO  Member  to  retaliate  against  the  offending  WTO 
Members. Thus, the WTO principles and rules are legally enforceable and binding 
through the dispute settlement system.
15 Therefore, WTO Members must take 
into  account  the  WTO  principles  and  rules  while  making  their  trade related 
policies.
16 Bing Zhang argued: 
Clearly, in the setting of the WTO, international law is intermingling and 
penetrating into the Members’ domestic formal institutions and playing a 
                                         
10 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm. 
11 P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and 
Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), p. 45. 
12 All members are listed at the WTO website. 
13 For more details of the history of China’s accession to the WTO, see Chapter One. 
14 The text of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm. 
15 P. Sauve, ‘Assessing the General Agreement on Trade on Services’, Journal of World Trade, vol. 
29(4), 125, p. 141. 
16 A concern of national sovereignty arises. C. Oman argued that a diminished national policy 
sovereignty was one of the results of globalization. See, C. Oman, Globalization and 
Regionalisation: the Challenge for Developing Countries, Paris: Development Center, OECD, 
(1994), pp. 33-34. Also see the discussion presented by G. Winham, ‘The World Trade 
Organization: Institution-building in the Multilateral Trade System’, The World Economy, vol. 
21(3), (1998), 349. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 21 
much  more  important  role  in  national  policy making  processes  than 
before.
17 
There  are  at  least  four  aspects  where  the  WTO  could  have  impact  on  the 
development of its Members’ domestic legislation:  
(ii)  consistency:  WTO  Members’  domestic  legislation  needs  to  be 
consistent with WTO rules; 
(iii)  obligation:  the  adoption  of  domestic  legislation  could  help  WTO 
Members implement their WTO commitments; 
(iv)  enabling:  the  WTO  rules  could  enhance  the  case  for  WTO  Members 
seeking to act in the way permitted by the WTO; and 
(v)  peer pressure: the WTO peer review system, the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism  (TPRM),  could  contribute  to  the  development  of  WTO 
Members’ domestic legislation. 
As a WTO Member, China is no exception. In other words, the WTO could, in 
theory,  influence  China’s  domestic  legislation,  particularly  trade related 
legislation.  Based  on  this  assumption,  this  study  aims  to  explore  the  WTO’s 
impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. To this end, the key 
research questions examined in this study are: 
(1) whether the WTO could have had an influence on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; 
(2) if so, how the WTO could have had an influence on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; and 
(3) to  what  extent  the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  has 
reflected the WTO’s influences. 
These  three  questions  are  clearly  linked. The  answer  to the  second  question 
depends  on  the  answer  to  the  first  question,  while  the  answer  to  the  third 
question is based on the answer to the second question.  
 
 
 
 
                                         
17 B. Zhang, ‘Assessing the WTO Agreements on China’s Telecommunications Regulatory Reform 
and Industrial Liberalization’, (2000), p. 4, http://www.tprc.org/abstracts00/assesswtopap.pdf. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 22 
2  Structure and Scope 
2.1 Structure 
This study is structured in six chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion. 
Chapter  One  and  Chapter  Two  aim  to  provide  the  necessary  background  and 
foundation on which this study is based. To this end, Chapter One examines some 
general issues surrounding the WTO, national competition law and China, such as 
the  evolution  of  competition related  provisions  under  the  GATT/WTO  system, 
whether China’s WTO commitments are binding on China and, if so, how China 
implements such commitments. Chapter Two examines the history and the status 
of  competition related  legislation  in  China  before  the  adoption  of  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  and  the  reasons  and  the  history  of  adopting  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Chapter  Three  to  Six  constitute  the  main  part  of  this  thesis.  Together  they 
explore whether, and if so, how the WTO could have had an influence on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, and to what extent the formulation 
of this Law has reflected such influences. To this end, Chapter Three examines 
the influence of the WTO national treatment principle. Chapter Four examines 
the  influence  of  Articles  VIII  and  IX  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in 
Services (GATS), and Section 1.1 of the Telecommunications Reference Paper on 
Regulatory Principles of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (the 
Reference Paper). Chapter Five examines the influence of Articles 8.2, 40 and 
31(k)  of  the  Trade Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS). 
Chapter Six examines the influence of the TPRM. 
 
Finally, this thesis concludes that (1) the WTO could be seen to have had impact 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) the WTO could have had 
such impact through the WTO national treatment principles, Articles VIII, IX of 
the GATS, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the 
TRIPS,  and  the  TPRM;  (3)  such  impact  can  be  illustrated  by  examining  the 
changes made to some provisions in the drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
during the process of formulating the law. 
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2.2 Scope 
2.2.1 Competition-Related WT Rules 
In  more  than  a  half century  of  evolution,  the  GATT/WTO  regime  includes 
numerous  treaties.
18  Although  it  is  approximately  fifteen  pages  long,  the 
Marrakesh  Agreement  embraces  four  annexes  which  include  altogether  about 
16,000 pages of text, schedule commitments, and other matters. Competition 
related WTO principles and rules are scattered in these annexes without being 
integrated into a coherent body of competition rules. It is not possible for this 
study to examine all these principles and rules due to the limitation of space and 
time. Rather, it focuses on the WTO national treatment principle, Articles VIII, 
IX of the GATS, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, Articles 82, 40 and 31(k) of 
the  TRIPS  and  the  TPRM  since  they  are  the  most  relevant  to  a  national 
competition law. 
 
2.2.2 Competition Law 
In general, competition law can be divided broadly into three areas of focus: 
restrictive agreements, abuses of dominance, and anticompetitive acquisitions 
and  mergers.
19  However,  anticompetitive  acquisitions  and  mergers  are  not 
                                         
18 The results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is usually referred to as the 
WTO Agreements which comprises a large number of agreements of which the GATT is an 
integral part, referred to as GATT 1994. For explanations of the WTO Agreements, see J. 
Jackson, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1999); the WTO Secretariat, Guide to 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, (1999) (As the official WTO explanation of the Uruguay Round 
treaties, this guide provides a detailed explanation of the legal significance of the agreements 
coming out the Uruguay Round of negotiations). In addition, R. Bhala provided a clear and 
thorough explanation of the GATT provisions, see, R. Bhala, Modern GATT Law, London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, (2005). 
19 This category has been used by many academics as a framework of competition law analysis. 
See, e.g., A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3
rd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2007). Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 24 
directly covered by the current WTO agreements.
20 As Frédéric Jenny pointed 
out: 
[W]hen trade policy makers address the issue of competition, they are 
less  interested  in  international  mergers  because  such  mergers  rarely 
create  an  international  trade  problem.  They  tend  to  focus  more  on 
international cartels because such cartels nearly always create a trade 
and competition problem.
21  
Mitsuo Matsushita also observed: 
Mergers and acquisitions in the scope of the WTO should be put off for 
future  consideration until  such  time comes  when  national  markets  will 
have been so globalised that they are integrated into one world market 
and  the  distinction  between  domestic  policy  and  international  trade 
policy will have been blurred so much that convergence of merger policy 
is essential to maintain the integrated world market… [I]tems such as the 
convergence of filing requirement in mergers and acquisitions is a very 
important  issue.  This  should  be  dealt  with  in  the  appropriate  forum. 
However, taking into account the objective of the WTO, one may say that 
this is outside its scope.
22 
Even  the  failed  proposals  which  aimed  to  include  a  competition  agreement 
within the WTO framework did not include the issue of cross border acquisitions 
and mergers.
23 Therefore, this study only focuses on anticompetitive agreements 
                                         
20 Despite the fact that the rules on investment could be relevant to anticompetitive mergers and 
acquisitions, there is no agreement on investment under the current WTO framework (though 
some current WTO Agreements mention investment issues). 
21 F. Jenny, ‘Competition, Trade and Development Before and After Cancun’, in B. Hawk, ed., 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2003, New York: Juris Publishing 
Inc., (2004), 631, p. 641. 
22 M. Matsushita, ‘Reflections on Competition Policy/Law in the Framework of the WTO’, in B. 
Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 1997, New York: Juris 
Publishing, (1998), 31, pp. 34-38. 
23 However, some scholars do propose a uniform pre-merger review system within the WTO. For 
example, Eleanor M. Fox proposed a uniform international competition law for pre-merger 
review within the WTO as a supranational enforcement agency. See, E. Fox, ‘Toward World 
Antitrust and Market Access’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 91, (1997), 13. Andre 
Fiebig recommended an international pre-merger review within the WTO as a super-
clearinghouse with authority to dictate which national competition regimes have sufficient nexus 
to a particular transaction so as to justify pre-merger notification filings. See, A. Fiebig, ‘A Role Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 25 
and  abuses  of  dominance.  In  other  words,  the  Chinese  legislation  on  merger 
control is not examined in this thesis. 
 
3  Literature Review 
There are three research areas that are relevant to this study: the WTO rules 
which are relevant to competition issues, the WTO’s impact on China, and the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. What follows is a brief review of all 
three areas. 
 
3.1 Literature Review of Studies on Existing Competition-
Related WTO Rules 
The  WTO  set  up  the  Working  Group  on  the  Interaction  between  Trade  and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP) during the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996.
24 
Over  more  than  seven  years,  the  WGTCP  provided  several  reports  on  such 
issues.
25 During the same period, many WTO Members, particularly the US and 
the  EU  also  contributed  to  this  debate.  Indeed,  they  made  about  250  study 
reports on such issues.
26  In addition, there are also rich literatures on these 
competition related WTO rules in particular, and competition issues within the 
WTO in general carried out by organisations and academics.
27 In particular, the 
                                                                                                                             
for the WTO in International Merger Control’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business, vol. 20, (2000), 233, pp. 247-251. 
24 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, (1996), para. 20, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. 
25 WGTCP, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy Annual 
Reports for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, WT/WGTCP/1, WT/WGTCP/2, 
WT/WGTCP/3, WT/WGTCP/4, WT/WGTCP/5, WT/WGTCP/6, and WT/WGTCP/7, respectively. 
26 All these contributions are documented as WT/WGTCP/W/* in the WTO and available at 
www.wto.org. 
27 See, e.g., OECD, Competition Elements in International Instruments, Background Document for 
a Joint Roundtable of the Trade and Competition Law and Policy Committees held on 15 April 
1994, Paris: OECD, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)35, (1994); OECD, The Note of Discussions held 
at the Joint Roundtable of the Trade and Competition Law and Policy Committees held on 15 
April 1994, Paris: OECD, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)76, (1994); E.-U. Petersmann, Competition 
Policy Aspects of the Uruguay Round: Achievements and Prospects, Paris: OECD, (1994); B. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 26 
paper titled ‘Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post 
Uruguay Round Overview of WTO Agreements’ gave an excellent analysis of the 
competition elements of the existing WTO agreements.
28 James H. Mathis and 
Misuo Matsushita reviewed the relevance and possible application of the WTO 
core principles to closer multilateral cooperation on competition.
29 Furthermore, 
Claus Dieter  Ehlermann  and  Lothar  Ehring  explored  the  extent  to  which  the 
existing  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  would  be  suitable  in  resolving 
competition related cases.
30 There are also extensive studies on the interaction 
between WTO principles and competition policy.
31 
                                                                                                                             
Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, ‘Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT’, The World 
Economy, vol. 17, (1994), 121; E. Fox, ‘Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging 
the Links of Competition and Trade’, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, vol. 4(2), (1995), 1; E.-U. 
Petersmann, ‘International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business’, 
Journal of World Trade, vol. 30(3), (1996), 5; B. Hoekman, Trade and Competition Policy in the 
WTO System, Discussion Paper 1501, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, (1996), 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/1501.html;  M. Matsushita, (1998), note 22, 31; OECD, 
Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round Overview of 
WTO Agreement, Paris: OECD, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1998); OECD, 
‘Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements’, in OECD, Trade and Competition: 
Policies for Tomorrow, Paris: OECD, (1999); P. Marsden, A Competition Policy for the WTO, 
Oxford: Cameron May, (2003); M. Matsushita, ‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of 
Competition Policy’, Washington University Global Study and Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 363; 
and A. Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case for A Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A 
Developing Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 9, (2006), 293, 
pp. 295- 299. 
28 OECD, (1998), note 27. 
29 See, J. Mathis, ‘WTO Core Principles and Prohibition: Obligations Relating to Private Practices, 
National Competition Laws and Implications for A Competition Policy Framework’, Geneva and 
New York: the United Nations, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2003/2, (2003); also see, M. Matsushita, 
(2004), note 27, 363. 
30 C.-D. Ehlermann and L. Ehring, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the 
Perspective of the Appellate Body’s Experience’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 26, 
(2002), 1505. 
31 See, e.g., WGTCP, Communication from the European Community and its Member States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/115, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from Switzerland, WT/WGTCP/W/117, 
(1999); WGTCP, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/119, (1999); WGTCP, 
Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/120, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from the 
United States, WT/WGTCP/W/131, (1999); and E.-U. Petersmann, ‘WTO Core Principles and 
Trade/Competition’, in B. Hawk, (2004), note 21, 669. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 27 
 
To  date,  these  studies  focus  on  two  issues  broadly:  (1)  whether  the  existing 
competition related  WTO  provisions  are  sufficient  to  deal  with  trade related 
anticompetitive  practices;  and  (2)  if  not,  how  to  regulate  trade related 
anticompetitive practices at the international level. However, no studies have 
explored the impact of the WTO principles and rules on WTO Members’ domestic 
competition laws. 
 
3.2 Literature Review of Studies on the WTO’s Impact on 
China 
China’s  accession  to  the  WTO  is  a  milestone  in  the  process  of  its  economic  reform.  As  Karen 
Halverson argued, ‘Perhaps in no other country has WTO accession had such a 
profound impact on economic, legal, and political change as in China’.
32 Thus, 
the  impact  of  China’s  WTO  membership  on  its  economic,  legal  and  political 
system obviously has become an important research topic in recent years. There 
are thousands of articles in regard to the WTO’s impact on China published in 
China’s  academic  journals.
33 There  are  also  many  articles  published  in  the 
academic journals outside of China. For example, Karen Halverson provided a 
comprehensive  analysis  of  the  unparalleled  influence  of  the  WTO  on  China’s 
economic,  legal,  and  political  system.
34 In  addition,  there  are  also  numerous 
books examining the WTO’s impact on China. For example, China and the World 
Trading System - Entering the New Millennium, analysed the key issues relating 
to the impact of China’s WTO membership.
35 Ching Cheong and Ching Hung Yee 
examined, from the economic aspect, China’s WTO commitments and the WTO’s 
                                         
32 K. Halverson, ‘China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications’, Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 27, (2004), 319, p. 322. 
33 According to D. Liu’s research, over 2,300 articles regarding the WTO impact on China had been 
published in China’s academic journals by 2002. See, D. Liu, WTO and State Sovereignty 
[WTO 与国家主权, WTO yu Guojia Zhuquan], Beijing: People’s Publisher [人民出版社, Renmin 
Chubanshe], (2003). 
34 See, K. Halverson, (2004), note 32, 319. 
35 D. Cass, B. Williams and G. Barker, eds., China and the World Trading System: Entering the 
New Millennium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2003). Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 28 
impact on China.
36 Supachai Panitchpakdi and Mark L. Clifford examined both the 
WTO’s impact on China and China’s impact on the WTO.
37 The unprecedented 
amount of studies regarding the WTO’s influences on China demonstrates the 
significant impact of China’s WTO membership on the development of China’s 
economic, cultural and legal system. 
 
3.3 Literature  Review  of  Studies  on  the  Formulation  of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
China is the second largest economy in the world after the US measured on a 
purchasing power parity basis and the third biggest trading power after the EU 
and the US.
38 It attracts more foreign capital than any other developing country. 
Chinese companies have also increased their activities in overseas markets. Due 
to these facts, the formulation of China’s first comprehensive competition law 
has generated unprecedented analysis from academics, companies, professional 
associations,  foreign  governments,  governmental  organisations,  and  non 
governmental  organisations.  As  H.  Stephen  Harris  pointed  out,  ‘Though  many 
jurisdictions have adopted competition laws in recent decades, none of these 
laws  has  engendered  the  level  of  interest  sparked  by  China’s  proposed  Anti 
Monopoly  Law’.
39 China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  is  ‘the  most  hotly debated  and 
closely followed  legislation’  in  China.
40  Its  drafts  have  generated  numerous 
comments both inside and outside of China. Hundreds of articles in regard to the 
drafts and the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 have been published in 
China’s academic journals. And the number of such articles has been increasing 
rapidly  in  recent  years.  Most  of  these  articles  are  comparative  studies.  In 
                                         
36 C. Ching and H.-Y. Ching, Handbook on China’s WTO Accession and Its Impacts, London: 
World Scientific, (2003). 
37 S. Panitchpakdi and M. Clifford, China and the WTO: Changing China, Changing World Trade, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., (2002). 
38 The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ. 
39 H. Harris, ‘The Making of An Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China’, Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 7, (2006), 169, p. 169. 
40 Y. Jung and Q. Hao, ‘The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition 
Regime?’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol. 24, (2003), 107, p. 109. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 29 
general,  they  introduce  other  competition  regimes  and  analyze  how  an 
antimonopoly law could be drafted in China based on the experience of these 
competition regimes. 
 
There are also dozens of articles in this area published in the academic journals 
outside  of  China.
41 In  particular,  the  International  Bar  Association  and  the 
American  Bar  Association  have  provided  article by article  comments  and 
recommendations on several drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law.
42 Youngjin Jung 
                                         
41 See, e.g., B. Song, ‘Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: The Case of China’, Stanford 
Journal of International Law, vol. 31, (1995), 387; S. Snell, ‘The Development of Competition 
Policy in the People’s Republic of China’, New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, vol. 28, (1995), 575; M. Williams, ‘Competition Law Developments in China’, Journal of 
Business Law, May 2001, 273; X. Wang, ‘The Prospect of Antimonopoly Legislation in China’, 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 1, (2002), 201; Y. Jung and Q. Hao, 
(2003), note 40, 107; X. Wang, ‘Issues Surrounding the Drafting of China’s Antimonopoly Law’, 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 285; L. Chen, ‘The Current 
State and Problems of Antimonopoly Legislation in the People’s Republic of China’, Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 307; B. Owen, S. Sun, and W. Zheng, 
‘Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility’, Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics, vol. 1(1), (2005), 123; M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005);  M. Furse, ‘Competition 
Law Choice in China’, World Competition, vol. 30(2), (2007), 323.  
42 See, e.g., the International Bar Association’s Antitrust Committee, Comments on the Draft Anti-
Monopoly Law of The People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Draft of 27 July 2005), 23
rd August 
2005, http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/IBA%20Submission.pdf; the American Bar 
Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law, Joint Submission of the American 
Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice on the Proposed 
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, July 2003, 
www.abanet.org/antitrust/comments/2003/jointsubmission.pdf; the American Bar Association’s 
Sections of Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property Law and International Law, Joint Submission of 
the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law, intellectual Property Law and 
International Law on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, 19
th 
May 2005, 
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/antitrust/chinacommentsantimono
poly.pdf; American Bar Association, Proposed Revisions to Selected Articles of The April 8, 
2005 Revised Draft of The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, In 
Supplementation of the Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s Sections of 
Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property Law and International Law, On the Proposed Law, dated 
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http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/antitrust/jointcomments05supple
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and  Qian  Hao  published  an  excellent  article  based  on  two  drafts  of  China’s 
Antimonopoly  Law.
43  Their  article  analyzed  the  basic  features  of  an 
antimonopoly  law  in  China  by  comparing  different  competition  regimes 
worldwide  and  their  relevance  to  China’s  idiosyncrasies  in  the  forthcoming 
Antimonopoly Law. It also promoted a better understanding of China’s emerging 
competition  regime  by  providing  illustrative  comments.  In  addition,  it 
highlighted the far reaching innovations in the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly 
Law which were prompted by the extraordinary challenges that China had to 
face. It concluded that an antimonopoly law in China could ‘incidentally provide 
“a third way” of framing competition law that provides a tremendous example 
particularly  for  developing  countries  in  which  legal  and  administrative 
monopolies are rampant’.
44 An article by Kevin X. Li and Ming Du provided an 
analysis  on  the  issue  of  whether  China  needed  a  competition  law.
45 Through 
comparing EU and UK competition law, it argued that the existing competition 
related legislation in China was far from sufficient to combat anticompetitive 
practices  because  China’s  economy  had  transferred  from  a  centrally  planned 
model  to  a  free  market  model.  Thus,  it concluded  that  it  was  necessary  for 
China to adopt a comprehensive competition law.  
 
3.4 Literature Review of Studies on the WTO’s Impact on 
the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Despite the existence of a wealth of material on issues of competition and the 
WTO, and the WTO’s impacts on China, there are very few studies touching upon 
the issue of the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
The lack of studies on this topic does not imply that it is not important. On the 
contrary, it is a very significant topic. Several conditions contribute to the lack 
of studies on this topic. First, both the WTO and competition legislation are new 
areas for both Chinese academics and the Chinese government. A decade ago, no 
Chinese universities taught competition law, while the teaching of WTO law was 
only at an early stage. Even now, it is still hard to find expertise in these two 
                                         
43 See, Y. Jung and Q. Hao, (2003), note 40, 107. 
44 Id., 107, pp. 169-170. 
45 K. Li and M. Du, ‘Does China Need Competition Law’, Journal of Business Law, March 2007, 
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areas, particularly in competition law. There are even fewer Chinese scholars 
who have expertise in both areas. Therefore, not many Chinese scholars are able 
to  carry  out  the  study  on  the  WTO’s  impacts  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  In  the  case  of  foreign  academics,  some  are  not 
interested in this topic, while others are simply unable to pursue this topic due 
to language barriers
46 and the interdisciplinary nature of this topic 
 
One of the few articles which touch on the issue of the WTO’s influences on the 
formulation  of  China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  is  entitled  ‘Entering  WTO  and  the 
Legislation of China’s Antimonopoly Law’ by Professor Xiaoye Wang, who is  a 
leading competition law expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and one of 
the designers of the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law.
47 It argued that China 
urgently needed a competition law because the WTO would hasten the process 
of China’s economic reform. Thus, it focused on the economic aspect of the 
WTO’s impacts on the formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law. However, it did 
not  provide  a  systematic  study  on  the  WTO’s  impact  on  the  formulation  of 
China’s Antimonopoly Law, from a legal point of view.   
 
A second article is entitled ‘Legislate China Antimonopoly Law according to WTO 
Rules’ by Chaopeng Chen.
48 It touched upon some legal issues in regard to the 
WTO’s impacts on the formulation of a Chinese antimonopoly law. First, it argued 
that  the  enactment  of  a  competition  law  could  be  helpful  for  China  to 
implement some of its WTO commitments. Second, it pointed out that China’s 
first competition law had to be consistent with WTO rules, such as the WTO non 
discrimination principle. However, it did not comprehensively examine the legal 
impacts of the WTO on the formulation of a Chinese antimonopoly law because it 
has about 3,700 Chinese characters.  
 
                                         
46 Sometimes, translation of Chinese research papers and legislation is not reliable. 
47 X. Wang, ‘Enter WTO and the Legislation of China’s Antimonopoly Law’ [入世与中国反垄断法的
制定, Rushi  Yu Zhongguo Fanlongduan Fa de Zhiding], Journal of Law [法学杂志, Faxue 
Zazhi], No. 2, (2003). 
48 C. Chen, ‘Legislate China Antimonopoly Law according to WTO Rules’ [根据 WTO 规则制定中国
反垄断法, Genju WTO Guize Zhiding Zhongguo Fanlongdua Fa], China WTO Tribune [WTO 经
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Professor Xianlin Wang, who is arguably a leading scholar in this area in China, 
has published a book entitled WTO Competition Policy and China Antimonopoly 
Legislation.
49 This  book  is  based  on  his  previous  paper  ‘Two  Issues  on  the 
Formulation  of  China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  against  the  Background  of  China’s 
Accession to the WTO’.
50 It examined the effect of the WTO competition policy 
on  China’s  competition  legislation.  However,  the  links  between  the  WTO  and 
China’s Antimonopoly Law were poorly examined in this book. In fact, they were 
only occasionally mentioned. Moreover, there are few explanations as to why 
and how these links exist. Thus, it seems that this book examined two separate 
issues  instead  of  one:  the  competition  policy  under  the  WTO  and  China’s 
Antimonopoly Law. 
 
To  date, therefore, there  are  no  comprehensive  and  thorough studies  on the 
issues of whether, and if so, how the WTO could have influenced the formulation 
of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  and  to  what  extent  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected such influences. The absence of literature 
in  this  area  leaves  a  great  deal  of  room  for  innovative  work.  Against  this 
background, this study aims to fill the gap left by other scholars and examines 
these key questions.  
 
4  Research Methodology 
This study focuses on analysing both primary and secondary sources in regard to 
the impact of the WTO on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In 
doing  so,  four  different  types  of  research  methods—explanatory,  descriptive, 
comparative  and  prescriptive  analyses  are  used.  In  particular,  comparative 
analysis is used widely in this thesis to explore the changes of different drafts of 
China’s  Antimonopoly  Law.  Explanatory  and  descriptive  analyses  are  used  to 
                                         
49 X. Wang, WTO Competition Policy and China Antimonopoly Legislation [WTO 竞争政策与中国反
垄断立法, WTO Jingzheng Zhengce Yu Zhongguo Fanlongduan Lifa], Beijing: Peking University 
Press, (2005). 
50 X. Wang, ‘Two Issues on the Formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law Against the Background 
of China’s Accession to the WTO’ [ “入世”背景下制定我国反垄断法的两个问题, Rushi Beijing Xia 
Zhiding Woguo Fanlongduan Fa de Liangge Wenti ], http://www.law-
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examine the WTO rules by which the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
has been influenced.  
 
The  primary  sources  in  this  study  mainly  comprise  of  a  number  of  pieces  of 
Chinese competition related legislation, the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law, 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the WTO agreements, cases, the annual reports of 
the Trade Policy Review Body, and the documents regarding China’s first trade 
policy review. It has to be accepted that some pieces of Chinese competition 
related  legislation  are  not  available  in  English.  During  the  process  of  the 
formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law, numerous drafts were circulated and 
commented on. The drafts examined in this thesis are
51: the 1999 Draft,
52 the 
February 2002 Draft,
53 the April 2002 Draft,
54 the October 2002 Draft,
55 the 2004 
Submitted Draft,
56 the April 2005 Draft,
57 the July 2005  Draft,
58 the November 
2005 Draft,
59 the June 2006 Draft,
60 the June 2007 Draft,
61 and the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. Comparing other primary sources, these drafts and the Antimonopoly 
                                         
51 More about these drafts, see Chapter Two. 
52 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. An outline of this draft can be seen from M. 
Williams, (2005), note 41, pp. 177-191; and X. Wang, (2002), note 41, 201, pp. 224-225. 
53 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. An English edition is on the author’s file. 
54 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. There is a discussion article based on this draft, 
see, Y. Jung and Q. Hao, (2003), note 40, 107. 
55 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. There is a discussion article based on this draft, 
see, Y. Jung and Q. Hao, (2003), note 40, 107. 
56 An English edition is available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Questionnaire%20-
%20final.pdf. 
57 An English edition is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/China%20Antimonopoly%20Law%20April%208%2020
05%20Draft%20-%20English-v1.pdf. 
58 An English edition is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Draft%20of%2027%20July%202005.pdf. 
59 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. An English edition of this draft is on the author’s 
file. For an overview of this draft, see H. Harris, (2006), note 39, 169. 
60 An English edition is available at http://www.buyusa.gov/asianow/270.pdf. 
61 This draft is not available to public. However, the differences between this draft and the June 
2006 Draft are highlighted on the NPC website. See, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/flzt/index.jsp?lmid=15&dm=1520&pdmc=ch. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 34 
Law 2007 are particularly significant in this thesis because analysing the changes 
in different drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is one of the major methods 
used to illustrate how and to what extent the WTO influenced the formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007. The WTO agreements are available in English at the 
WTO website. 
 
The cases used in this study are mainly from China, the EU, the GATT/WTO, the 
UK, and the US. It has to be borne in mind that cases are treated differently in 
these regimes. Cases are considered as sources of law in the UK and the US, 
while they are not considered as sources of law in China. In practice, Chinese 
judges do not cite previous cases in their judgements.  In the EU whose legal 
system has the characters of both civil law system  and common law system, 
cases are also arguably considered as sources of law. In the GATT/WTO, cases 
are not considered as source of law, though Panels and the Appellate Body do 
cite previous findings.  
 
In addition, some annual trade policy review reports by the Trade Policy Review 
Body are cited in this study, particularly in Chapter Six. These annual reports are 
available on the WTO Website. The documents regarding China’s first WTO trade 
policy review, such as the Secretariat Report, which are also used particularly in 
Chapter Six, are also available on the WTO website. 
 
Secondary  sources  include  comments  from  academics,  governments  and 
organisations regarding the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law. As mentioned, 
each draft of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has generated numerous comments. 
Some  of  them  are  available  in  English,  while  others  are  only  available  in 
Chinese.  Some  of  them  are  available  on  the  websites  of  some  professional 
associations,  such  as  the  American  Bar  Association,  and  governmental 
organisations, such as the OECD.  
 
5  Defining Terms 
It is not only significant but also necessary for the purpose of this study to define 
some terms that is used. 
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5.1 Competition Law  
There are two definitions of competition law depending on the scope: broad 
definition and narrow definition.
62 The broad definition means that competition 
laws  are  the  laws  which  seek  to  promote  competition  by  prohibiting  both 
anticompetitive  practices  and  unfair  competition  practices,  while  the  narrow 
definition refers to the legislation that prohibit anticompetitive practices only.  
 
The  differences  between  unfair  competition  practices  and  anticompetitive 
practices  are  huge,  despite  both  of  them  being  aimed  at  protecting  market 
competition and consumer welfare. According to a study by the OECD, unfair 
competition refers to ‘the sort of fraudulent behaviour or misapporpriation of 
property  rights’.
63 Unfair  competition  practices  normally  include  commercial 
bribery, misleading advertising, deception (by ‘passing off’ and other means), 
defamation of competitors, and misuse of trade secrets. Thus, combating unfair 
competition focuses on ‘protecting enterprises from such dishonest practices by 
their competitors’.
64  
 
A few countries adopt the broad definition of competition law. Germany and 
China are in this group. In Germany, Wettbewerbsrecht (competition law) refers 
to  both  unfair  competition  and  anticompetitive  practices,  while  Kartellrecht 
(cartel law) refers to all types of anticompetitive practices rather than cartels 
only.
65 In China, the term ‘competition law’ refers to both unfair competition 
and anticompetitive practices. For example, Competition Law, which is one of 
                                         
62 See, e.g., X. Wang and P. Wang, ‘Research and Proposals on the Regulating Scope of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law’ [中国反垄断法调整范围的思考与建议, Zhongguo Fanlongduan Fa De 
Tiaozheng Fanwei De Sikao Yu Jianyi], Law Science Magazine [法学杂志, Faxue Zazhi], No. 1, 
2005, 31, p. 31. 
63 OECD, The Role of Competition Law and Policy, Paris: OECD, CCNM/CHINA(2001)15, (2001), 
p. 28. There is a short discussion of unfair competition in the EU and its Member States, see, B. 
Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and 
United Kingdom, 2
nd ed., London, Sydney, Portland and Oregon: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
(2001), pp. 26-27. 
64 See, OECD, (2001), note 63, p. 29. 
65 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, (1998), p. 4. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 36 
the leading textbooks on competition law for postgraduate law students in China, 
includes  both  unfair  competition  and  anticompetitive  practices.
66  The  only 
textbook of Chinese competition law in English
67 also adopts the broad definition 
and includes both unfair competition and anticompetitive practices.
68 
 
However,  the  major  competition  regimes  adopt  the  narrow  definition  of 
competition law. Many countries, such as South Korea, have separate legislation 
in regard to unfair competition practices and anticompetitive practices. When it 
is used in these countries, the term ‘competition law’ refers to anticompetitive 
practices  only.  Even  in  countries  with  a  single  legislative  act  including  both 
unfair  competition  and  anticompetitive  practices,  such  as  Australia,  Hungary, 
and Russia, the term ‘competition law’ only refers to anticompetitive practices. 
In  one  of  its  studies,  the  OECD  clearly  points  out  that  ‘it  is  important  to 
understand  that  bans  of  unfair  trade  practices  or  unfair  competition  are  not 
generally referred to as being a part of “competition law”’.
69 This study adopts 
the  narrow  concept  of  competition  law.  In  this  study,  therefore,  the  term 
‘competition law’ does not include unfair competition legislation.  
 
5.2 Nomenclature 
The names of competition law (narrow definition) are not universal,
70 despite the 
                                         
66 X. Wang, Competition Law [竞争法学, Jingzheng Faxue], Beijing: Social and Document [社科文
献, Sheke Wenxian], (2007). This book is divided into three parts. The first part is a general 
introduction. The second part deals with the prohibition of unfair competition. And the third part 
deals with anticompetitive practices. 
67 C. Jin and W. Luo, Competition Law in China, New York: William S. Hein & Co., (2002). 
Currently it is the only book providing a thorough and comprehensive discussion on Chinese 
competition law in English, although there are several books in English which explored Chinese 
competition law, such as Mark Williams discussed China’s competition law in M. Williams, 
(2005), note 41 and M. Dabbah and P. Lasok, eds., Merger Control Worldwide, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, (2005), (which has one chapter discussing China’s merger 
control). 
68 It refers to anticompetitive practices as ‘antitrust’ because the authors used to study in the US. 
69 See, OECD, (2001), note 63, p. 29. 
70 Most competition regimes use ‘competition law or act’ as the title for their competition legislation. 
See, e.g., X. Kong, The Principles of Anti-monopoly Law [反垄断法原理, Fanlongduan Fa Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 37 
fact that most of the competition regimes aim to preserve competition and free 
markets against anticompetitive practices and use much the same means. The 
name of competition legislation generally reflects the emphasis of the nation’s 
objectives. For instance, competition legislation in the US is called antitrust law 
although not all anticompetitive practices that subject to the US antitrust laws 
involve illegal trusts. The reason why competition legislation is called antitrust 
law in the US is that the US had to deal with widespread trusts when it enacted 
its first competition legislation, the Sherman Act, in 1890. From the illustration 
of its name, someone might think that China’s Antimonopoly Law only prohibits 
monopolistic practices.  However,  it  also  prohibits  anticompetitive  agreements 
and anticompetitive mergers.  
 
5.3 Competition Policy 
The terms competition policy and competition law are different, although they 
are often used synonymously.
71 Competition policy can be defined as ‘spanning 
the  broader  set  of  measures  and  instruments  that  may  be  pursued  by 
governments to enhance the contestability of markets’,
72 while competition law 
can refer to ‘the set of rules and disciplines maintained by governments relating 
either to agreements between firms that restrict competition or to the abuse of 
a dominant position (including attempts to create a dominant position through 
merger)’.
73 From this point of view, therefore, competition policy is broader than 
competition law and ‘will therefore encompass within it a system of competition 
law’.
74 Except competition law, competition policy can also include actions to 
                                                                                                                             
Yuanli], Beijing: China Legal Publishing [中国法制出版社, Zhonguo Fazhi Chubanshe], (2001), 
pp. 2-7. 
71 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, (2007), note 19, p. 2; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, Economic 
Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organisation, Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. 2917, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, (2002), p. 4. 
72 B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, (2002), note 71, p. 4; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, 
Competition Policy, Developing Countries, and the World Trade Organisation, Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 2211, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, (1999), p. 3. 
73 B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, (1999), note 72, p. 2; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, 
(2002), note 71, p. 4. 
74 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, (2007), note 19, p. 2; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, (1999), note 
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privatize  state owned  enterprises,  deregulate  activities,  reduce  licensing 
requirements for new investment or entry, cut firm specific subsidy programmes, 
and trade liberalization.
75  
 
5.4 Exceptions and Exemptions 
An  exemption  refers  to  a  provision  within  a  domestic  competition  law  that 
provides  non application  of  substantive  or  procedural  standards  that  would 
otherwise apply. Sometimes, the term of ‘exemption’ is distinguished from the 
term of ‘exception’.
76 Exemptions are considered to be broader in scope than 
exceptions that tend to be ‘determined on a case by case basis’.
77 In this study, 
however,  these  two  terms  are  interchangeable  since  they  both  have  similar 
impacts on international trade and competition. 
 
5.5 China 
Politically, China includes Mainland China (communist China), Hong Kong Special 
Administrative  Region  (hereinafter  Hong  Kong),  Macau  Special  Administrative 
Region  (hereinafter  Macau)  and,  arguably,  Taiwan  Province.  Article  31  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (hereinafter  the  Chinese 
Constitution  1982)  provides:  ‘The  state  may  establish  Special  Administrative 
Regions  when  necessary’.
78  Hong  Kong  and  Macau  have  their  own  political, 
                                         
75 B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, (1999), note 72, p. 3; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, 
(2002), note 71, p. 4. 
76 See, e.g., S. Khemani, Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions, Geneva and 
New York: United Nations, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, (2002), pp. 1-2. 
77 Id., p. 2. 
78 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国宪法; Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xianfa] is the highest law within the Chinese legal system. The current version was 
adopted by the NPC on the 4
th December 1982 with amendments in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 
2004. Three previous state constitutions-those of 1954, 1975, and 1978-were superseded in 
turn. The Chinese Constitution 1982 has five sections: the preamble, general principles, the 
fundamental rights and duties of citizens, the structure of the state, and the national flag and 
emblems of state. For explanations of the Chinese Constitution 1982, see, J. Chen, Chinese 
Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development, The Hague: 
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economic and legal systems distinct from Mainland China. Their legal rights are 
defined by the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Basic Law of Macau respectively. 
These Basic Laws are Constitutions for Hong Kong and Macau. Article 1 of the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong provides that Hong Kong ‘shall exercise a high degree of 
autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power’. The 
Basic Law of Macau is similar to Hong Kong’s Basic Law. The final interpretation 
of the Basic Laws belongs to the NPC and its Standing Committee. In regard to 
competition  legislation,  both  Hong  Kong and  Macau have  the power  to  enact 
their own competition law. In theory, their competition regimes are separated 
from  the  competition  regime  in  Mainland  China.
79  The  case  of  Taiwan  is 
complicated. Mainland China regards Taiwan as an integral part of China. The 
Chinese Constitution 1982 provides: ‘Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the 
People’s Republic of China’.
80 However, it has a separate competition regime. In 
this  thesis,  therefore,  ‘China’s  competition  regime’  only  refers  to  the 
competition regime in Mainland China. For the purpose of the WTO, China, Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan are treated as separate members. They have their own 
representatives in the WTO. Due to these reasons, China only refers to Mainland 
China in this study.  
 
6  China’s Legal System, Hierarchy of Chinese Law 
and the Chinese Law-Making Process
81 
Before examining the WTO’s impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007, it is necessary to explain the Chinese legal system, hierarchy of Chinese 
law and the law making process in China. 
 
                                         
79 Currently Macau does not have a competition law. 
80 See preamble to the Chinese Constitution 1982. 
81 For a basic understanding of the laws and institutions in China, see, E. Chua, ‘The Laws of the 
People’s Republic of China: An Introduction for International Investors’, Chicago Journal of 
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6.1 China’s Legal System 
The Chinese legal system is similar to the civil law systems of Japan, France and 
Germany.
82  The primary sources of law in China are written legislation. Cases 
cannot be cited as legal sources in Chinese courts. The judgements are normally 
very short (about one page in most cases). They are not available in English. 
6.2 Hierarchy of Chinese Law
83 
The  Legislation  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (hereinafter  the 
Legislation Law 2000) lays down the general rules of the hierarchy of Chinese 
law.
84 Under the Legislation Law 2000, legislation can be divided into at least 
seven  different  categories:  the  Chinese  Constitution  1982,  national  law, 
administrative regulation, local decree, autonomous decree and special decree, 
administrative  and  local  rule.  The  Chinese  Constitution  1982  has  the  highest 
legal authority.
85  National law is enacted by the NPC or its Standing Committee. 
It can be divided into two sub categories: basic laws and others. There is no 
clear definition what laws can be basic laws. The Legislation Law 2000 does not 
clearly provide that basic laws are higher than other national laws. In practice, 
however,  basic  laws  are  generally  considered  more  important  than  other 
national  laws.  Administrative  rules  are  issued  by  the  ‘various  ministries, 
commissions,  the  People’s  Bank  of  China,  the  Auditing  Agency,  and  a  body 
directly  under  the  State  Council  exercising  a  regulatory  function’.
86  Local 
Decrees, Autonomous Decrees and Special Decrees, and administrative rules are 
enacted by the People’s Congress of a province, an autonomous region, or a 
                                         
82 For China’s legal system, see, D. Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in 
A Nutshell, St. Paul, MN: West Group, (2003); also, C. Hsu, ed., Understanding China’s Legal 
System, New York: New York University Press, (2003). 
83 See, Chart Introduction-1: The Hierarchy of Chinese Legal System. 
84 See, Chapter Five Scope of Application and Filing of the Legislation Law of People’s Republic of 
China which was adopted by the 3
rd Session of the 9
th NPC in 2000. An English translation is 
available at http://www.novexcn.com/legislat_law_00.html. 
85 The Legislation Law 2000, Art. 78. 
86 Id., Art. 71. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 41 
municipality directly under the central government.
87 Local rules are enacted by 
the local governments at province level. The hierarchy of these laws, regulations 
and  rules  is  as  follows:  national  law  has  higher  legal  authority  than 
administrative  regulations,  local  decrees  and  administrative  or  local  rules. 
Administrative  regulations  have  higher  legal  authority  than  local  decrees  and 
administrative  or  local  rules’.
 88 Administrative  rules  and  local  rules  have  the 
same  legal  authority  and  are  implemented  within  their  respective  scope  of 
authority.
89 But the autonomous decrees that are issued by autonomous regions 
and special decrees that are issued by special economic zones can vary from 
national  laws  due  to  some  historic  reasons.
90 There  is  no  clear  definition  of 
decisions and orders of the State Council in the Legislation Law 2000.
91  But it 
does  provide  administrative  rules  have  to  be  consistent  with  ‘decisions  and 
orders of the State Council’.
92 From this view, decisions and orders by the State 
Council are higher in China’s legal hierarchy than administrative rules. 
6.3 Law-Making Process in China 
The  legislative  body  of  highest  authority  is  the  NPC,  which  consists  of 
approximately 3000 deputies who only meet for ten days every March. The NPC 
Standing Committee consisting of 150 members is elected by the deputies of the 
NPC and is responsible to it.
93 Only deputies of the NPC can serve on the NPC 
Standing Committee. The members of the NPC Standing Committee are full time 
and regularly meet for about ten days every two months. A small subcommittee 
handles day to day matters. A number of bodies, such as the State Council, the 
Central  Military  Committee,  the  Supreme  People’s  Court  (SPC),  the  Supreme 
                                         
87 Id., Art. 63. 
88 Id., Art. 79. 
89 Id., Art. 82. 
90 Id., Art. 81. 
91 The State Council is the highest executive organ of the People’s Republic of China. For the 
functions and organizations of the State Council, see, 
http://english.gov.cn/links/statecouncil.htm. 
92 The Legislation Law 2000, Art. 71. 
93 The Chinese Constitution 1982, Arts. 65, 66, and 68. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 42 
People’s Procuratorate, have the power to introduce a bill.
94 However, most laws 
are drafted by ministries and submitted by the State Council. This was the case 
for the submission of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Section 2 (about the legislative process of the NPC) and Section 3 (about the 
legislative  process  of  the  NPC  Standing  Committee)  of  Chapter  II  of  the 
Legislation Law 2000 stipulate the national law making process.
95 As mentioned 
above,  national  law  can  be  divided  into  two  sub categories:  basic  laws  and 
others. The basic laws can only be enacted and amended by the NPC.
96 When the 
NPC is not in session, its Standing Committee can amend and supplement basic 
laws ‘provided that any amendment or supplement may not contravene the basic 
principles of such national law’.
 97 However, the NPC Standing Committee has no 
power to enact basic laws. The law, other than basic laws, can be enacted and 
amended by the NPC Standing Committee.
98 The Legislation Law 2000 provides 
neither a list of what national laws can be basic laws nor a clear definition of 
the concepts of basic laws and other laws. A bill is normally deliberated three 
times before it is enacted, although it is possible that a bill is enacted after only 
being deliberated once.  
 
The Antimonopoly Law 2007 was adopted by the 10th NPC Standing Committee 
on the 30th August 2007, after it was deliberated three times. Under Sections 2 
and 3 of the Legislation Law 2000, therefore, it is not a basic law but a normal 
national law. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
94 The Legislation Law 2000, Arts. 12 and 24. 
95 More about Chinese lawmaking process, see, B. Owen, S. Sun and W. Zheng, (2005), note 41, 
pp. 136-137; also see, S. Ko, ‘Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: An Introduction to Chinese 
Legislation’, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 267, pp. 271-
274. 
96 The Legislation Law 2000, Art. 7. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Introduction, 43 
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Chapter One:                                                  
The WTO, Competition Law and China 
This  chapter  examines  some  issues  surrounding  the  World  Trade  Organisation 
(WTO), national competition law and China. To this end, it is structured into two 
sections.  The  first  section  examines  some  issues  surrounding  the  WTO  and 
competition law, while the second section focuses on some issues surrounding 
the WTO and China. These issues serve as the basis of this study. Thus, it is 
necessary  to  explore  them  before  examining  the  impact  of  the  WTO  on  the 
formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China 
(hereinafter Antimonopoly Law 2007).
1  
   
1  The WTO and Competition Law 
First,  this  section  examines  the  interaction  between  international  trade  and 
competition  policy.  Second,  it  explores  the  evolution  of  competition specific 
provisions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO system. 
Third, it examines whether WTO Members’ national competition laws could be 
challenged under the existing WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
1.1 International Trade and Competition Policy 
The relationship between international trade and competition law and policy has 
been extensively examined and remains mainly undisputed.
2 Thus, it is not the 
                                         
1 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
2 The OECD and WTO committees charged with studying competition policy issues have produced 
a wealth of material on the interaction of competition policy and international trade, which is 
available in their publications and on their respective websites. In addition, many scholars have 
also contributed to this topic. See, e.g., G. Bercero and S. Amarasinha, ‘Moving the Trade and 
Competition Debate Forward’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 4, (2001), 448; the 
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 45 
purpose of this sub section to explore comprehensively this relationship. What 
follows  explains  briefly  how  anticompetitive  practices  could  have  adverse 
effects on international trade. It is necessary to explain these effects because 
they are some of the reasons why China’s competition law matters to the WTO 
and its Members, and they explain why the WTO could have had impacts on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007.  
 
1.1.1 The Impacts of Anticompetitive Practices on International 
Trade 
What  follows  explains  briefly  the  impacts  of  anticompetitive  practices  on 
international trade.
3 
 
1.1.1.1  Horizontal Restraints 
Horizontal restraints are agreements or other forms of collusion among actual or 
potential  competitors.
4  Although  horizontal  restraints  are  generally 
anticompetitive,  they  could  have  pro competitive  efficiency  effects.
5  Some 
types of horizontal agreements, such as agreements to fix prices, rig bids, limit 
output, divide markets by allocating customers or territories (these agreements 
are  normally  referred  to  as  hard core  cartels),  normally  have  a  significant 
                                                                                                                             
General for Antitrust, Washington D.C.: US Department of Justice, (2000), pp. 201-279, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/chapter5.pdf. 
3 For comprehensive studies on the impact of anticompetitive practices on international trade, see, 
e.g., the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP), 
Communication by the European Community and Its Member states - Impact of Anti-
Competitive Practices on Trade, WT/WGTCP/W/62, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from 
Argentina - Opening-up of Markets to International Trade and Mark Competition - The Argentine 
case, WT/WGTCP/W/63, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from Norway - Revision, 
WT/WGTCP/W/65/Rev.1, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from the United States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/66, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/68 (1998); 
WGTCP, Communication from Canada, WT/WGTCP/W/70, (1998); and WGTCP, 
Communication from Turkey, WT/WGTCP/W/77, (1998). 
4 For a general discussion of horizontal agreements and competition law, see, R. Whish, 
Competition Law, 5
th ed., London: LexisNexisUK, (2003), pp. 453-582. 
5 See, S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement, London: Sweet & Maxwell, (2002), para. 5.57. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 46 
impact in limiting effective competition.
6 Thus, they are considered as serious 
infringements under any competition regime.
7 These agreements could also have 
negative impacts on international trade by limiting market access and raising 
barriers to entry by foreign firms. For example, if a group of domestic firms with 
market  power  agrees  to  boycott  foreign  products,  the  consequence  of  that 
horizontal cartel agreement could be to inhibit foreign firms from gaining access 
to  the  market.  Another  example  is  that  companies  from  different  countries 
could form an international cartel to fix the prices of their products, control the 
amount of production, or divide markets. Such a cartel could have an adverse 
impact  on  international  trade  and  offset  the  benefit  of  trade  liberalization 
achieved by the WTO. This has been illustrated in a number of well known cartel 
cases, such as the National Lead case,
8 the ICI case,
9 the Uranium Cartel case,
10 
and the Sugar Cartel case.
11 
 
Other  types  of  horizontal  agreements,  such  as  joint  ventures,  licensing 
agreements  between  firms  and  co operative  standards  setting,  can  have  pro 
competitive efficiency effects under certain circumstances.
12 Thus, they are not 
per se illegal and are normally dealt with according to the rule of reason.
13 Like 
hard core  cartels,  however,  these  agreements  could  have  negative  impacts  on 
                                         
6 For a general discussion of cartels and competition law, see, e.g., M. Guerrin and G. Kyriazis, 
‘Cartels: Proof and Procedural Issues’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: 
Fordham Corporate Law 1992, New York: Juris Publishing Inc., (1993); J.M. Joshua, ‘Attitudes 
to Anti-Trust Enforcement in the EU and US: Dodging the Traffic Warden, or Respecting the 
Law?’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law1995, New 
York: Juris Publishing Inc., (1996); and M. Jephcott and  T. Lübbig, Law of Cartels, Bristol: 
Jordans, (2003). 
7 See, R. Whish, (2003), note 4, p. 453. 
8 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.1945). 
9 United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
10 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
11 Cooperatieve Vereinigung ‘Suiker Unie’ UA and Others v. Commission [1975] E.C.R. 1163. 
12 For a general discussion of these agreements and competition law, see R. Whish, (2003), note 
4, pp. 545- 582. 
13 It is a method of competition analysis in which the court is permitted to make a detailed inquiry 
concerning the effect on price and output of a certain practice in order to determine whether 
consumers have been harmed. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 47 
market access and thus lead to an increase of barriers to entry by foreign firms. In 
other words, horizontal restraints could limit market access and substantially raise 
barriers  to  entry  by  foreign  firms  even  though  they  are  not  considered 
anticompetitive under some competition regimes. 
 
1.1.1.2  Vertical Restraints 
Vertical  restraints  are  agreements  made  between  firms  operating  at  different 
levels  of  the  market.
14 These  restraints  include  exclusive  dealing  or  purchase 
agreements,  exclusive  financing  agreements,  territorial  restrictions  and  resale 
price maintenance. Although there are a variety of types of vertical agreements, 
vertical restraints can be divided in general into two categories: pricing vertical 
restraints  and  non price  vertical  restraints.  Like  horizontal  restraints,  vertical 
restraints can have various positive and negative impacts on competition.
15 Pricing 
vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance, are prohibited per se in most 
competition  regimes,  particularly  in  the  Members  of  the  Organisation  for 
Economic Co operation and Development (OECD). However, it is not the case for 
non pricing  vertical  restraints.  Non pricing  vertical  restraints  such  as  exclusive 
territories  and  exclusive  dealing  agreements  can  have  a  variety  of  effects  on 
competition.  Such  vertical  restraints  can  also  have  a  variety  of  effects  on 
international trade. For example, vertical restraints on exclusive territories could 
have  parallel  positive  effects  in  increasing  market  access.  Similarly,  exclusive 
dealing may, for instance, facilitate new entry by a foreign firm which may find it 
helpful to offer such an arrangement as an incentive to a potential distributor in a 
new  market.    However,  vertical  restraints could  also  have  negative  effects  on 
international trade because they create or enhance barriers to entry by foreign 
firms.  For example, a group of domestic manufacturers with market power could 
threaten to cut off sources of domestic supply to domestic distributors unless 
the latter agree not to handle competing imported products. 
 
                                         
14 B. Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and 
United Kingdom, 2
nd ed., London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, (2001), p. 171. 
15 For a general discussion of vertical restraints and competition law, see, e.g., B. Rodger and A. 
MacCulloch, (2001), note 14, pp. 171-201; S. Bishop and M. Walker, (2002), note 5, paras. 
5.36-5.48; and R. Whish, (2003), note 4, pp. 583-653. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 48 
1.1.1.3  Abuses of Dominant Positions 
Abuses  of  dominant  positions  include  excessive  pricing,  price  discrimination, 
discounts and rebates, tying and binding, predatory behaviours, and refusal to 
supply.
16  These  abuses  could  have  a  significant  impact  on  both  trade  and 
competition, in particular if they involve the exercise of market power in order to 
deter  or  foreclose  actual  or  potential  competition.
17 Under  most  competition 
regimes,  exclusionary  practices  by  dominant  firms  could  constitute  an 
infringement  of  competition  law.  Different  approaches  may,  however,  persist 
about  such  issues  as  the  assessment  of  the  relevant  product  and  geographical 
market, the relevant criteria to define what constitutes a dominant position, the 
role of barriers to entry etc.  
 
From the international trade perspective, an abuse of a dominant position could 
raise  problems  in  international  trade.  For  example,  if  a  manufacturer  with 
market power in a domestic market prevents its distributors and retailers from 
dealing in imported goods that compete with the goods supplied by the company, 
access to such markets will be blocked or denied. Another example is the tie in 
contract. A tie in contract could exclude imports, because foreign suppliers are 
deprived  of  the  opportunity  to  sell  competing  products.  An  international 
dominant company could also leverage into export markets and engage in price 
predation.  These  practices  could  lead  a  nullification  of  the  benefits  of  trade 
liberalization. Due to such potential adverse impacts on trade liberalization by 
abuses of dominant positions, the Plan of Action that emerged from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) X conference, which 
was held in Bangkok from 12 to 19 February 2000, noted: 
While dominant market positions are not anti competitive in themselves, 
                                         
16 For a general discussion of abuses of dominant positions and competition law, see, R. Whish, 
(2003), note 4, pp. 653-732. 
17 M. Janow explored the circumstances under which abuses of dominance can raise problems of an 
international or transborder nature and compared trade and competition policy approaches to the 
issue under certain scenarios e.g. (i) denial of market access by a dominant firm and (ii) 
leveraging into export markets and price predation. See, M. Janow, ‘International Perspectives on 
Abuse of Dominance’, in OECD, Abuse of Dominance And Monopolisation, OECD/GD(96)131, 
(1996), 33, pp. 40 ff.  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/61/2379408.pdf. For the impact of abuses 
of dominant positions on competition, see S. Bishop and M. Walker, (2002), note 5, paras. 6.71-
6.127. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 49 
certain practices applied by companies enjoying such positions can limit 
international  competition  and  market  entry  by  competitors.  Anti 
competitive  practices  raise  import  costs  and  limit  market  access  and 
market entry.
 18 
Despite this consensus that an abuse of a dominant position could have an adverse 
impact on international trade, it is not unanimous among different countries on 
what  types  of  abuses  of  dominant  positions  should  be  condemned  due  to  the 
‘considerable  divergence  among  jurisdictions  about  the  range  of  practices’  of 
abuses of dominant positions.
 19 
  
1.1.2 Trade Liberalization Commitments Could Be Nullified or 
Impaired in the Absence of An Effective Competition 
Regime 
Thus  far,  some  anticompetitive  practices  could  have  adverse  impacts  on 
international trade under certain circumstances. Anticompetitive practices could 
hamper the ability of firms to gain access to or compete in foreign markets. As 
formal governmental barriers to international trade are reduced or eliminated, 
international  attention  is  turning  more  to  anticompetitive  practices  occurring 
within nations that affect international trade. As Eleanor M. Fox pointed out, ‘As 
the trade barriers fall like a waterline, the low tide reveals rocks and shoals  
which are the private restraints and uncaught government restraints’.
20 
 
Many  of  these  anticompetitive  practices  are  prohibited  in  most  competition 
regimes in the world. From the point of view of international trade, therefore, 
an  effective  application  of  competition  laws  by  national  authorities  will  have 
positive effects on international trade. As the EU claimed, ‘competition laws that 
are effectively enforced will support autonomous trade liberalization measures 
                                         
18 The Plan of Action that emerged from the UNCTAD X conference, TD/386, 18
th February 2000, 
para. 69, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ux_td386.en.pdf. 
19 M. Janow, (1996), note 17, 33, p. 48. 
20 E. Fox, ‘Toward World Antitrust and Market Access’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 
91, (1997), 1, p. 3. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 50 
taken by countries’.
21 In the absence of a sound competition regime, the benefits 
from trade liberalization and regulatory reform would not be delivered—at least 
not to their fullest extent. Where no competition law and policy is in place or 
there is competition law and policy but such law and policy is not effectively 
enforced,  it  is  impossible  for  a  country  to  prevent  anticompetitive  practices 
from replacing former state monopolies and thus raise the barriers for entry by 
foreign firms. This is clearly reflected in the Plan of Action that emerged from 
the UNCTAD X conference, which states: 
RBPs  [restrictive  business  practices]  should  not  impede  or  negate  the 
realization of benefits arising from the liberalization of tariff and non 
tariff barriers affecting world trade, particularly those affecting the trade 
and development of developing countries. Efforts to tackle the negative 
effects  of  RBPs  are  also  necessary  to  attain  greater  efficiency  in 
international  trade  and  development  by,  inter  alia,  promoting 
competition,  controlling  concentration  of  economic  power  and 
encouraging innovation. There is a need to prevent enterprises from re 
establishing  market  barriers  where  governmental  controls  have  been 
removed.
22 
 
The Argentine government even carried out 18 empirical studies which provided 
concrete  evidence  to  support  this  argument.
23Following  comprehensive  trade 
liberalization, the presumption was that prices of certain products would tend 
towards  import  parity  levels  in  Argentina.  However,  these  studies  discovered 
that in a number of cases this had not occurred due to some anticompetitive 
practices. Based on these studies, the Argentine representative argued, during 
the  discussions  of  the  Working  Group  on  the  Interaction  between  Trade  and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP), that an effective competition regime was needed 
in order to ensure that the benefits from trade liberalization were not nullified 
by anticompetitive practices.
24 
 
                                         
21 WGTCP, Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/1, (1997), pp. 2-3. 
22 UNCTAD, TD/386, note 18, para. 70. 
23 See WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/63, note 3. 
24 Id. For example, WGTCP, Submission from Korea, WT/WGTCP/W/56, (1997). Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 51 
Similarly, during the discussions of the WGTCP, the EU also argued: 
The case, from a trade policy point of view, for an effective application of 
competition  policy  is  clear.    A  country  that  has  undertaken  trade 
liberalization measures has every interest in ensuring that the welfare and 
efficiency benefits arising from such measures are not lost due to anti 
competitive practices by firms.  Avoiding the nullification or impairment 
of trade liberalization commitments, as a result of such practices, is also 
a matter of legitimate concern for trading partners.  Competition laws 
and  policies  do  not  normally  have  specific  trade  objectives,  such  as 
promoting market access.  However, in pursuing the goals of promoting 
economic  efficiency  and  consumer  welfare,  an  effective  application  of 
competition  law  is  essential  for  tackling  barriers  to  entry  set  up  by 
business in the market or other anti competitive practices which affect 
both  foreign  and  domestic  producers.    As  stated  by  Brazil  at  the  16 
September  [1997]  meeting:  ‘Competition  policy  can  suppress  barriers 
where trade policy is less effective.  It is possible to imagine a country 
that  strictly  follows  GATT  rules  but  where  cartels,  exclusivity 
arrangements  and  other  forms  of  restrictive  practices  prevail  impeding 
market penetration. In that hypothetical case, competition policy could 
be very helpful to improve market access.
25 
It continued: 
All  WTO  Members  would  benefit  from  the  effective  application  of 
competition law to anti competitive practices which limit access to the 
markets  of  other  countries  for  goods,  services  and  investment.    The 
substantial  reduction  of  government  obstacles  to  trade,  as  a  result  of 
successive  Rounds  of  trade  liberalization  has  greatly  contributed  to 
enhanced conditions of competition.  At the same time, in the absence of 
an effective competition law framework firms may have an incentive to 
engage in anti competitive behaviour with a view to protect the domestic 
market against foreign competition.
26 
In the absence of an effective competition regime, therefore, the benefits of 
trade liberalization could be nullified or at least reduced. 
                                         
25 WGTCP, Submission by the European Community and Its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/45, 
(1997), p. 4. 
26 Id. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 52 
 
1.1.3 Limitations of the Interaction between International Trade 
and Competition Policy 
 
1.1.3.1  Not All Trade-Related Restraints Are Anticompetitive 
Needless to say, it should be borne in mind that not all restraints which have 
adverse  impacts  on  international  trade  are  considered  anticompetitive  under 
national competition regimes. Under certain circumstances, some restraints may 
be  considered  pro competitive  where  efficiency enhancing  properties  exist, 
despite the fact that they may have negative impacts on international trade. In 
addition, the criteria by which restraints are considered as anticompetitive vary 
during different periods.
 27 
 
In sum, on one hand, a restraint could have adverse impacts on trade flows and 
market access where foreign firms are being kept out of a market by virtue of 
the  restraint.  On  the  other  hand,  this  restraint  may  be  considered  pro 
competitive if it has efficiency enhancing properties for the participants in the 
local  market.  In  other  words,  not  all  restraints  which  could  have  negative 
impacts on international trade are anticompetitive and thus prohibited under 
competition regimes. 
 
1.1.3.2  Not All Competition Problems Are Relevant to International Trade 
Similarly, not all competition problems are relevant to international trade, either. 
For  example,  the  procedural  and  substantive  features  of  multi jurisdictional 
merger  review  warrant  additional  efforts  at  convergence,  harmonization  and 
minimization.  These  issues,  while  important,  are  not  matters  customarily 
considered of consequence for international trade policy. Similarly, expanding 
cooperation between competition authorities and developing protocols regarding 
the  treatment  of  confidential  information  are  important  global  challenges  to 
competition policy but are not matters of relevance to international trade policy.  
 
                                         
27 See, K. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, (2003). Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 53 
1.2 The Evolution of Competition-Related Provisions in 
the GATT/WTO 
Due to the adverse impacts of anticompetitive practices on international trade, 
the WTO has paid attention to competition issues. What follows is intended to 
examine the evolution of competition related provisions in the GATT/WTO.28 It 
is  divided  into  four  stages:  (i)  competition related  provisions  under  the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO); (ii) competition related provisions under 
the GATT; (iii) competition related provisions under the WTO; and (iv) after the 
establishment of the WTO. 
 
1.2.1  Competition-Related Provisions under the International 
Trade Organisation 
Anticompetitive practices at the international level, particularly the practices of 
German  cartels  and  Japanese  zaibatsu,  during  the  1930s,  illustrated  that 
anticompetitive practices could block market access. This experience provided 
the incentive to prohibit anticompetitive practices under the Havana Charter for 
an  International  Trade  Organisation  (hereinafter  the  Havana  Charter).
29 The 
anticompetitive  practices  prohibited  under  the  Havana  Charter  included:  (a) 
price fixing or agreements on terms and conditions of supply of a product; (b) 
agreements  to  exclude  suppliers  or allocating  markets  between  suppliers;  (c) 
                                         
28 The American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law made an 
excellent description on the history of the competition laws at the international level, see the 
American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law, Report of the ABA 
Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice on the Internationalization of 
Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence, (1999), pp. 1-12, 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/comments/2000/convexe.html; E. Fox, ‘Competition Law and the 
Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade’, Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal, vol. 4(2), (1995), 1, pp. 2-7; and M. Matsushita, ‘Competition Law and Policy in the 
Context of the WTO System’, Depaul Law Review, vol. 44, (1994), 1097, pp. 1101- 1103. 
29 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Final Act and Related Documents, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, from 21 November 1947 
to 24 March 1948, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948). For a general discussion of the Havana 
Charter, see R. Wilson, ‘Proposed ITO Charter’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 41, 
(1947), 879; also G. Bronz, ‘The International Trade Organisation Charter’, Harvard Law 
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discrimination  against  particular  enterprises  (d)  limiting  production  or  fixing 
production  quotas;  (e)  agreements  preventing  the  development  of  particular 
technologies; and (f) unjustified or unlawful extensions of patent or intellectual 
property rights.
30  
 
The Havana Charter was the first attempt to provide an international set of rules 
to combat anticompetitive practices. Under the Havana Charter, the ITO had the 
power to investigate any complaint brought by a Member and, if upheld, the 
Member concerned would have to do everything possible to remedy the situation. 
However, the ITO failed to materialise. Thus, one can only speculate whether 
and how these comprehensive provisions would be implemented in practice.  
 
1.2.2 Competition-Related Provisions under the GATT 
Chapter V of the Havana Charter that prohibits anticompetitive practices was 
not included in the original GATT. Thus, the GATT was born without competition 
related provisions. In 1954 and 1955 a number of Contracting Parties of the GATT 
pressed for the inclusion of competition related provisions in the GATT. In 1958, 
the  Group  of  Experts  on  Restrictive  Business  Practices  was  appointed  by  the 
Contracting Parties of the GATT to examine the competition issues relating to 
international trade. It concluded:  
It would be unrealistic to recommend at present a multilateral agreement 
for  the  control  of  international  restrictive  business  practices.  The 
necessary  consensus  amongst  countries  [do]  not  yet  have  sufficient 
experience  of  action  in  this  field  to  devise  an  effective  control 
procedure.
31  
This conclusion was due to the perception that cartels were not a major problem 
at the time and there was opposition to loss of national policy autonomy in such 
a  sensitive  policy  area.  Nevertheless,  the  Decision  on  Arrangements  for 
Consultations  on  Restrictive  Business  Practices  based  on  this  report  was 
eventually adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties in 1960.
 32 It recognised that: 
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for Consultations, BISD 3S/170, (1960), para. 7.  
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Business practices which restricted competition in international trade may 
hamper the expansion of world trade and the economic development in 
individual countries and thereby frustrate the benefits of tariff reductions 
and of the removal of quantitative restrictions or otherwise interfere with 
the objectives of the GATT.
33 
However,  this  decision  only  recommends  that  Contracting  Parties  enter  into 
consultations in the event of harmful restrictive practices in international trade 
on  either  a  bilateral  or  multilateral  basis.
34 Thus,  it  is  not  binding  on  the 
Contracting Parties. Three decades later, in 1986, developing countries proposed 
to include restrictive business practices on the agenda for the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (1986 1994).
 35  But the US and other developed countries rejected 
such a proposal.
36  
 
1.2.3 Competition-Related Provisions under the WTO 
As the result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, GATT Contracting Parties signed 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter 
the  Marrakesh  Agreement)  in  April  1994.
37 Although  the  need  for  addressing 
competition issues in the context of trade policies was recognized during the 
Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  there  is  no  overarching  set  of  principles  or 
interpretation  of  the  WTO  rules  as  they  apply  to  competition  issues. 
Competition related  provisions  are  scattered  around  in  different  WTO 
agreements.  
 
There  are  dozens  of  competition related  provisions  under  the  existing  WTO 
framework.
38  These competition related provisions have been reviewed by the 
                                         
33 Id., p. 28. 
34 Id., pp. 28-29. This arrangement for consultation has been invoked on only three occasions, all in 
1993, between the US and Japan concerning business practices affecting consumer 
photographic film and paper.   
35 See, GATT, GATT Activities 1986, Geneva: GATT, (1987), p. 27. 
36 Id. 
37  It is available on the WTO website. 
38 For a summary of competition-specific provisions in the WTO Agreements, see, E.-U. 
Petersmann, Competition Policy Aspects of the Uruguay Round: Achievements and Prospects- 
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OECD
39, the WTO
40 and some scholars.
41 There is consensus that these provisions 
include Articles II, XIX, XVII of the GATT, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, Articles 
8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the TRIPS. In addition, the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to  Trade  (TBT)  requires  standards  be  no  more  restrictive  on  trade  than  is 
necessary. Articles VII to XVI in the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) 
could be used to challenge certain anticompetitive practices, such as bid rigging. 
Compared to the GATT, thus, competition related rules under the WTO covered 
more  trade related  anticompetitive  practices,  although  a  comprehensive 
agreement on competition with the existing WTO framework is lacking. 
 
1.2.4 After the Establishment of the WTO
42 
At  the  Marrakesh  Ministerial  meeting  at  which  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  was 
signed, trade and competition policy was identified as an item for consideration 
on the WTO future work programme. During the first WTO Ministerial Meeting 
                                                                                                                             
International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round Overview of WTO Agreement, OECD: 
Paris, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1998); M. Matsushita, ‘Reflections on Competition 
Policy/Law in the Framework of the WTO’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: 
Fordham Corporate Law 1997, New York: Juris Publishing, (1998), 31; and M. Matsushita, 
‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy’, Washington University Global 
Study and Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 363. 
39 OECD, Competition Elements in International Instruments, Background Document for a Joint 
Roundtable of the Trade and Competition Law and Policy Committees held on 15 April 1994, 
Paris: OECD, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)35, (1994); OECD, The Note of Discussions held at the 
Roundtable, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)76, Paris: OECD, (1994); OECD, (1998), note 38; 
OECD, Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round 
Overview of WTO Agreements, Paris: OECD, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1999). 
40 WTO, ‘Trade and Competition Policy’, in WTO, WTO Annual Report 1997, vol. 1, Geneva: WTO, 
(1997).  
41 See, e.g., E.-U. Petersmann, ‘International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private 
Business’, Journal of World Trade, vol. 30(3), (1996), 5; M. Matsushita, (1998), note 38, 31; E.-
U. Petersmann, Competition Policy Aspects of the Uruguay Round: Achievements and 
Prospects, Paris: OECD, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1999); M. Matsushita, (2004), 
note 38, 363. 
42 For the details of the development of competition issues after the establishment of the WTO, 
see, P. Marsden, A Competition Policy for the WTO, Oxford: Cameron May, (2003); also see, A. 
Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case for A Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing 
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 9, (2006), 293, pp. 295- 299. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 57 
which  was  held  in  Singapore  in  1996,  WTO  Members  agreed  to  set  up  the 
WGTCP.
43  The  mandate  of  the  WGTCP,  however,  did  not  imply  that  any 
negotiations  would  eventually  be  launched;  this  would  only  occur  after  an 
explicit  consensus  decision  was  taken  to  that  effect  by  WTO  members.
44 For 
more than seven years, the WGTCP has provided a forum for Members to discuss 
the  ‘relevance  of  fundamental  WTO  principles  of  national  treatment, 
transparency and most favoured nation treatment to competition policy and vice 
versa’.
45 It has also provided a forum for WTO Members to discuss the possibility 
to set up a peer review in the WTO competition context.
46  
 
The Doha Ministerial Meeting in 2001 led to the inclusion of competition policy in 
the  Fourth  Ministerial  Declaration  in  Doha  (hereinafter  Doha  Ministerial 
Declaration).  During  that  meeting,  WTO  Members  also  agreed  to  start 
negotiations  on  competition  policy  ‘after  the  Fifth  Session  of  the  Ministerial 
Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that 
session on modalities of negotiations’.
47 Moreover, the Doha Declaration specifies 
the following areas for the negotiations on competition policy: core principles, 
including  transparency,  non discrimination  and  procedural  fairness,  and 
provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support 
for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries 
                                         
43 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, (1996), para. 20. 
44 Id. 
45 WGTCP, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy Annual 
Reports for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, WT/WGTCP/1, WT/WGTCP/2, 
WT/WGTCP/3, WT/WGTCP/4, WT/WGTCP/5, WT/WGTCP/6, and WT/WGTCP/7, respectively.  
46 See, WGTCP, Communication from the European Community and its Member States - Dispute 
Settlement and Peer Review: Options for a WTO Agreement on Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/229, (2003); WGTCP, Communication from the United States - The Benefits of 
Peer Review in the WTO Competition Context, WT/WGTCP/W/233, (2003); WGTCP, 
Communication from Korea - Peer Review in the Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/235, (2003); WGTCP, Communication from Japan - Introducing a Model of Peer 
Review, WT/WGTCP/W/236, (2003); WGTCP, Communication from the OECD- Practical 
Modalities of Peer Review in a Multilateral Framework on Competition, WT/WGTCP/W/243, 
(2003); and WGTCP, Communication from the OECD - Peer Review: Merits and Approaches in 
a Trade and Competition Context, WT/WGTCP/244, (2003). 
47 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on the 14
th November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 
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through capacity building.
48 China generally supports the idea of establishing a 
competition specific agreement within the WTO.
49  
 
After  the  failure  to  reach  an  agreement  on  launching  negotiations  on 
competition  policy  at  the  Cancun  Ministerial  Meeting  in  September  2003, 
consensus was reached to exclude competition policy from the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations at the WTO General Council meeting in July 2004.
50 
 
Despite  the  failure  to  start  negotiations  on  competition,  WTO  Members  have 
successfully  included  competition  principles  in  some  new  agreements.  For 
example, the Telecommunications Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles of 
the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (the Reference Paper) was 
negotiated after the establishment of the WTO.
51 Under the Reference Paper, 
Members’  national  competition  regulations  are  potential  matters  of  trade 
concern.
52 Lawrence A. Sullivan claimed that the competition rules stipulated in 
Section 1 of the Reference Paper make the Basic Telecommunications Agreement 
(BTA),  potentially,  ‘the  most  significant  multilateral  ‘antitrust’  regime  ever 
undertaken’.
53  Another  example  is  paragraph  1  of  the  Understanding  on 
Commitments in Financial Services (UCFS) which was also negotiated after the 
establishment of the WTO.
54 It deals with monopolies.  
 
                                         
48 Id., para. 25. 
49 See, WGTCP, Communication from China - Hardcore Cartels and Voluntary Co-operation, 
WT/WGTCP/W/241, (2003); and WGTCP, Communication from China - Elements contained in 
Paragraph 25 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/WGTCP/W/227, (2003). 
50 Paragraph 1 (g) of the WTO General Council’s post Cancun Decision (hereinafter the July 
Package), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm. 
51 The Reference Paper is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm. 
52 For more details of this provision, see Chapter Four. 
53 L. Sullivan, ‘The U.S., the EU, the WTO, the Americas, and Telecom Competition’, Southwestern 
Journal of Law & Trade in the Americas, vol. 6, (1999), 63, p. 78. 
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1.3 National Competition Laws Could Be Challenged 
under the Current WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Anticompetitive practices could have negative impacts on international trade. In 
theory, therefore, the adoption and the enforcement of competition laws are 
matters of international trade. As Frédéric Jenny claimed, ‘international trade 
policy makers are equally concerned with the design of domestic laws and the 
quality of domestic enforcement to the extent that they may have an effect on 
the ability of foreign firms to gain market accesses’.
55 
 
Although  there  is  no  requirement  for  a  WTO  Member  to  adopt  a  national 
competition law under the current WTO system, the WTO does include dozens of 
provisions  that  are  relevant  to  the  content  and  the  enforcement  of  a  WTO 
Member’s national competition law. As Stefan D. Amarasinha pointed out, it is a 
fact: 
[A]t  least  among  trade  people,  namely  that  competition  laws  and 
competition  regulations,  etc.,  are  in  fact  covered  by  those  GATT 
provisions to the extent that they somehow affect the conditions for trade. 
That  is  probably  a  point  which  is  not  always  well  understood—in  fact, 
there are some who are unwilling to accept it—but, as with so many other 
things in life, it is a fact that you will have to accept, and that is the 
situation that we will have to live with.
56  
 
So far, however, few of the competition related WTO provisions have led to cases 
or enforcement within the WTO dispute settlement system. One of the reasons 
for this could be that the existing WTO framework lacks an overarching set of 
competition  rules.  As  Francois  Souty  argued,  the  dispersion  of  competition 
related  provisions  under  the  current  WTO  framework  is  ‘not  easily  and 
frequently consulted by competition authorities in Member States nor by market 
operators  (which  remain  unfamiliar  with  current  WTO  proceedings  that  only 
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concern Member States of that organization and not corporations)’.
57  
 
Nevertheless, it is still possible for a WTO Member to challenge another WTO 
Member’s competition law under the existing WTO dispute settlement system.
58 
Article XXIII (Nullification and Impairment) of the GATT applies to government 
measures which nullify or impair agreed market access or the attainment of the 
objectives of the Agreement. There is no doubt that national competition laws 
belong to government measures. Under the current WTO system, therefore, WTO 
Members could bring complaints on both the content and the enforcement of a 
Member’s national competition law to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body where 
the  content  or  the  enforcement  of  such  competition  law  has  the  effect  of 
impeding market access of foreign products or entry of foreign enterprises. 
 
In Japan-  Measures Affecting  Consumer  Photographic  Film and Paper (Japan-
Film)
59,  the  Panel  stringently  interpreted  Article  XXIII(1)(b)  of  the  GATT.  It 
imposed a heavy burden of proof on the use of the non violation complaint of 
Article XXIII(1)(b) as a mechanism for solving competition cases. It required that 
Members  bringing  complaints  provide  ‘a  detailed  justification’  that  would 
address three issues: 
(1) whether the practices in question were government ‘measures’; (2) if 
so,  whether  the  measure  in  question  related  to  a  benefit  reasonably 
anticipated  to  accrue  from  prior  tariff  concessions  by  upsetting  the 
competitive relationship between imports and domestic products; and (3) 
                                         
57 F. Souty, ‘Is there a need for additional WTO competition rules promoting non-discriminatory 
competition laws and competition institutions in WTO members?’, in E.-U. Petersmann, ed., 
Reforming the World Trading System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2005), 305, p. 310. 
58 For a more thorough and authoritative discussion on the extent to which national competition 
laws could be challenged under the existing WTO dispute settlement system, see C.-D. 
Ehlermann and L. Ehring, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the 
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whether the benefit accruing to the complainant state had in fact been 
nullified or impaired by the measure in questions (causality).
60  
Despite this heavy burden of proof on the use of the non violation complaint of 
Article XXIII(1)(b) imposed by the Panel in this case, the Panel did not reject the 
idea that a complaint on competition law could be brought in through Article 
XXIII(1)(b) of the GATT. 
 
In Japan-Film, the Panel did not examine the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
(JFTC)  Rule  No. 1  under  Article 6  of  the  Japanese  Antimonopoly  Law 
(International Contract Notification Requirement) and JFTC Notification No. 34 
on open lotteries (1971) under Article 2(7) of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law 
because they were not listed separately as measures challenged by the US in its 
Panel request.
61 However, the Panel made it clear that the reason why the Panel 
dismissed these two measures was not because they were part of the Japanese 
competition law. It argued: ‘we see no reason why, as suggested by the United 
States, the nature of these measures precluded their specification by the United 
States  in  the  Panel  request’.
62 Moreover,  the  Panel  did  examine  1981  JFTC 
Guidance on Dispatched Employees under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law in this 
case  despite  the  fact  that  this  Guidance  is  part  of  Japan’s  competition 
legislation.
63 Thus, this case illustrated that some provisions of a WTO Member’s 
domestic competition law could be examined under the existing WTO framework, 
if another WTO Member brought a complaint specifically listing these provisions in 
its  Panel  request.  Put  another  way,  the  nature  of  these  provisions  of  a  WTO 
Member’s competition law would not bar WTO Panels from considering them. 
 
In  United  States-  Anti-Dumping  Act  of  1916-Complaint  by  the  European 
Communities, the Panel claimed openly that Members’ national competition law 
could be covered by WTO provisions if the content or the implementation of 
national competition law had the effect of impeding market access of foreign 
products or entry of foreign enterprises by stating:  
                                         
60 M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2
nd ed., London: Routledge, 
(1999), p. 447. 
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63 Id., para. 10.15. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 62 
[T]he mere description or categorization of a measure under the domestic 
law as well as the policy purpose behind the measure cannot be a decisive 
factor in the categorization of that measure under the WTO Agreement.
64  
It continued:  
[T]he scope of the WTO Agreement does not exclude a priori restrictive 
business practices.  Thus, the fact that the 1916 Act would be an anti 
trust law would not per se be sufficient to exclude the application of WTO 
rules to that law…panels under GATT 1947 and the WTO have addressed 
various aspects of restrictive business practices initiated by governments 
when such practices had the effect of impeding market access of foreign 
products or entry of foreign enterprises.
65  
Therefore, the Panel concluded that the dichotomy trade law/anti trust law, to 
the extent that it would be based on the assumption that WTO disciplines are 
not intended to apply to business restrictive practices, was not a limitation to 
the  application  of  WTO  rules  and  disciplines.
66 This  illustrated  that  WTO 
Members’ national competition laws could be subjected to the WTO rules, if the 
content or the implementation of national competition laws has the effect of 
impeding market access of foreign products or entry of foreign enterprises. 
 
From  these  two  cases,  it  can  be  seen  that  both  the  content  and  the 
implementation  of  a  WTO  Member’s  national  competition  law  could  become 
subject  to  the  WTO  rules  if  the  content  or  the  implementation  of  national 
competition law has the effect of impeding market access of foreign products or 
entry  of  foreign  enterprises.  As  Claus Dieter  Ehlermann  and  Lothar  Ehring 
claimed, under existing WTO rules: 
[N]ational competition law and practice are not exempt from, but rather 
subject  to,  the  application  of  the  dispute  settlement  system.  Both 
competition laws as such and their application in individual cases must 
comply  with  the current  substantive  standards  of  the  WTO  agreement, 
                                         
64 Panel Report, United States- Anti-Dumping Act of 1916-Complaint by the European 
Communities (US-1916 Act (EC)), WT/DS136/R, adopted as upheld by Appellate Body 26 
September 2000, DSR 2000:X, 4593, para. 6.101. 
65 Id., para. 6.172. 
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and complaints can be brought against both.
67  
Claus Dieter Ehlermann was formerly a Member, and in 2001 Chairman, of the 
Appellate Body of the WTO. And from 1990 to 1995, he was Director General of 
the  Directorate General  of  Competition  of  the  European  Commission.  Lothar 
Ehring was formerly an official in the Appellate Body Secretariat. Given their 
background, therefore, their opinion carries huge weight on this issue. Moreover, 
they  are  not  alone.  Many  scholars  share  their  opinion.  For  example,  Alberto 
Alvarez Jiménez also claimed that ‘A new competition jurisprudence is emerging 
within  the  World  Trade  Organisation…  and  its  Dispute  Settlement  Body’.
  68 
Therefore, it seems clear that both the content and the enforcement of a WTO 
Member’s national competition law could be challenged under the existing WTO 
dispute  settlement  system  if  the  content  or  the  implementation  of  such 
legislation has the effect of impeding market access of foreign products/services, 
or entry of foreign firms. 
 
2  The WTO and China 
This section examines some general issues surrounding the WTO and China. First, 
it examines briefly the process of China’s accession to the WTO and China’s WTO 
commitments.  Second,  it  surveys  whether  China  is  bound  by  its  WTO 
commitments.  Third,  it  explores  how  China  is  going  to  implement  its  WTO 
commitments.  
 
2.1 China’s Accession to the WTO and China’s WTO 
Commitments 
 
2.1.1 Entering the Dragon 
The process of China’s accession to the WTO has been examined extensively.
69 
                                         
67 C.-D. Ehlermann and L. Ehring, (2002), note 58, 1505, p. 1506. 
68 A. Alvarez-Jiménez, (2003), note 58, 441, p. 441. 
69 For a thorough and authorative analysis of the process of China’s accession to the WTO, see, G. 
Yang and J. Cheng, ‘The Process of China’s Accession to the WTO’, Journal of International 
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Thus, what follows does not explore comprehensively this process. Instead, it 
explains briefly this process in order to provide necessary background for this 
study. 
 
Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement deals with accession. However, it neither 
gives guidance on the terms to be agreed, nor lays down any procedures to be 
used for negotiating these terms. The terms on which an applicant is accepted as 
a new member of the WTO are left to negotiations between the WTO Members 
and  the  applicant.  The  procedure  for  accession  is  left  to  individual  Working 
Parties  to  agree.  In practice,  the  accession  follows  closely  the  corresponding 
Article XXXIII of GATT 1947. The WTO has summarised the process.
70 The WTO 
accession  process  formally  begins  when  a  country  informs  the  WTO  Director 
General of its desire to join. A working party of Members will then be formed by 
the WTO General Council to examine the application. After the working party has 
examined the basic principles and policies, individual WTO Members enter into 
bilateral negotiations with the applicant over the specific undertakings that the 
applicant  will  agree  to  as  a  condition  of  WTO  membership.  Although  the 
negotiations are bilateral, the commitments apply to all WTO Members due to 
the most favoured nation principle (MFN). The working party will finalize the 
accession  terms  in  three  documents  after  the  completion  of  bilateral 
negotiations. They are: the working party report, the protocol of accession, and 
the  attached  schedules  containing  the  new  Member’s  specific  liberalization 
commitments. The final accession terms are presented to the WTO body for a 
vote. If two thirds of WTO Members favour the accession, the applicant may sign 
                                                                                                                             
Treaty and Law in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, People’s Republic 
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http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 65 
the protocol and accede to the WTO.
71 
 
China’s accession was arguably in line with the above process for accession.
72 
China was one of the 23 original signatories of the GATT in 1947. Due to some 
political reasons, however, the Chinese government represented by the Chinese 
Nationalist Party withdrew from the GATT on the 5
th May 1950.
73 The Chinese 
Communist Party then argued that the Chinese Nationalist Party had no right to 
represent the whole of China because it had lost its control over China at that 
time  except  Taiwan.
74  Based  on  this  argument  China,  led  by  the  Chinese 
Communist Party, has never recognised the withdrawal from the GATT by the 
Nationalist Party. Nevertheless, China applied for a resumption of membership to 
the  GATT  as  a  Contracting  Party  in  1986.  Momentum  for  China’s  accession 
application began to build in 1999 when the US and China concluded a bilateral 
agreement on China’s entry into the WTO.
75 In 2000, China concluded a similar 
bilateral  agreement  with  the  EU.
76 In  the  same  year,  the  US  granted  China 
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR).
77 China’s PNTR status cleared the way 
for the US to grant China the MFN, as required by Article I of the GATT. After the 
successful conclusion of the bilateral trade agreements with the US and the EU, 
China hastened its negotiation process for the accession to the WTO.  
 
After  fifteen  years  of  negotiations,  the  decision  to  accept  China  as  a  WTO 
Member was made by a consensus at the Doha Ministerial Meeting on the 10
th 
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November  2001.
78  The  Chinese  government  accepted  the  Protocol  on  the 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Protocol on China’s 
Accession) on the 11
th November 2001.
79 Consequently, it became the 143
rd WTO 
Member on the 11
th December 2001. This historical step was the result both of 
an  arduous  process  within  China  and  intensive  negotiations  with  the  world’s 
major  trading  nations.  China’s  accession  to  the  WTO  ‘constitutes  a  landmark 
decision for the Chinese economy reform comparable, to some extent, to the 
“open  door  policy”  launched  in  December  1978’.
80 It  is  widely  considered  as 
‘part of a larger strategy of massive and fundamental economic reform’
 .
81 The 
OECD also expressed a similar view. It notes that China’s accession to the WTO 
‘marks an important milestone along the reform path China has been following 
for  more  than  twenty  years,  rather  than  a  new  direction….  WTO  entry  is  a 
complementary aspect of the next phase of China’s reforms’.
82 
 
China’s  GATT/WTO  negotiations  lasted  longer  than  any  other  Members’ 
negotiations. There are at least two reasons why it took China fifteen years to 
join  the  WTO.  First,  China  had  to  convert  its  own  economic  system  from  a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy in order to join the GATT/WTO. 
Although this transition is in line with China’s economic reform agenda, it was 
still not easy to transform China’s economic system in a short time due not only 
to  political  difficulties  but  also  economic  hardship.  Second,  China’s  unique 
economic  situation  has  also  contributed  to  the  prolonged  negotiation.  Its 
economy  and  trade  are  significant.  In  fact,  it  was  the  biggest  economy  and 
trading country that was outside of the WTO. In addition, some WTO Members, 
particularly the US, were worried about China’s potential growth. Thus, they 
required exceptionally severe terms from China. They argued that China should 
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join  the  WTO  as  a  developed  country,  although  many  economic  indicators 
suggested that it still fell within the category of a developing country, which 
would  enable  it  to  be  in  receipt  of  special  and  differential  treatment  and 
implement reforms over a longer period of time.
83   
 
2.1.2 China’s WTO Commitments 
China’s  WTO  commitments  comprise  the  consolidation  of  the  thirty seven 
bilateral agreements with thirty seven WTO Members including the US and the 
EU, and several multilateral agreements with the WTO working party concerning 
modalities by which China carries out its obligations and responsibilities. The 
negotiations  between  China  and  the  WTO  Working  Party  on  the  Accession  of 
China aimed to ensure that China would bring its trade regime into conformity 
with all the rules, practices, and obligations required by the WTO agreements. 
The results of these negotiations were finalised in the Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter Report of 
the Working Part on China’s Accession)
84 and the Protocol on China’s Accession 
that outline the terms of China’s membership. 
 
The full list of China’s WTO commitments is in the Annexes of the Protocol on 
China’s Accession and is available at the WTO website. These commitments are 
extensive. For a comprehensive understanding of them, one could pore over the 
some 1,000 pages of the Protocol, the Report of the Working Party on China’s 
Accession, and Schedules of China’s Commitments on Goods and Services.
85 The 
OECD  published  a  summary  of  China’s  WTO  commitments.
86 The  Office  of  US 
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Trade  Representative  also  summarised  China’s  WTO  commitments.
87  Some 
academics also produced some summaries of China’s WTO commitments.
88 
 
By becoming a full member of the WTO, China has in fact made three tiers of 
commitments. These three categories of commitments constitute China’s WTO 
accession package. The first category is the commitment to the principles of the 
WTO,  such  as  free  trade,  MFN,  national  treatment  and  transparency.  These 
principles are the spirit of the WTO and expounded in the various agreements 
setting up the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT. The second category is the 
multilateral  agreements  within  the  WTO.  This  is  the  basic  requirement  for 
joining  the  WTO.  The  third  category  is  the  commitment  to  the  set  of  rules 
governing trade for specific sectors, such as agricultural goods, textile goods, 
information technology and telecommunications.  
 
2.2 Is China Bound by Its WTO Commitments? 
There is no doubt that the fundamental principle of treaty law is the proposition 
that treaties are binding upon the parties to them and must be performed in 
good faith.
89 This principle is referred to as pacta sunt servanda and is arguably 
the oldest principle of international law. It was reaffirmed in Article 26 of the 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties.
90  Article  II  of  the  Marrakesh 
Agreement provides: 
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2. The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 
2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’) are 
integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members. 
… 
3. The agreements and associalted legal instruments included in Annex 4 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of 
this  Agreement  for  those  Members  that  have  accepted  them,  and  are 
binding  on  those  Members.  The  Plurilateral  Trade  Agreements  do  not 
create either obligations or rights for Members which have not accepted 
them. 
 
Now the question is whether China’s WTO commitments are binding on China. 
The Protocol on China’s Accession provides: 
The WTO Agreement to which China accedes shall be the WTO Agreement 
as ratified, amended or otherwise modified by such legal instruments as 
may have entered into force before the date of accession. This Protocol, 
which  shall  include  the  commitments  referred  to  in  para.  342  of  the 
Working Party Report, shall be an integral part of the WTO Agreement.
91 
In essence, thus, the Protocol on China’s Accession is an agreement between 
China and other WTO Members.  
 
The Chinese Constitution 1982 stipulates that the State Council is responsible for 
‘conducting  foreign  affairs  and  conclude[ing]  treaties  and  agreements  with 
foreign states’.
92  It also provides that the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s  Congress  (NPC)  has  the  power  to  ‘decide  on  the  ratification  or 
abrogation  of  treaties  and  important  agreements  concluded  with  foreign 
states’.
93 Article  7  of  the  Law  of  Procedures  for  Concluding  Treaties  of  the 
People’s Republic of China 1990, which concerns the procedures for negotiating 
and ratifying international legal instruments, including treaties (条约, Tiaoyue) 
and agreements (协定, Xieding), lists the conditions under which a treaty or 
agreement needs the approval of the Standing Committee of the NPC. In regard 
to WTO Agreements, the Report of the Working Party on China’s Accession clearly 
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provides:  ‘the  WTO  Agreement  fell  within  the  category  of  “important 
international agreements” subject to the ratification by the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress’.
94  
 
The Chinese Constitution does not require the publication of an international 
treaty as a precondition of its validity. Therefore, an international treaty that is 
signed  by  the  State  Council  becomes  effective  upon  ratification  by  the  NPC 
Standing Committee. In theory, the NPC Standing Committee can refuse to ratify 
a treaty signed by the State Council. In practice, however, there has been no 
case so far in which the NPC Standing Committee refused to ratify a treaty that 
has been signed by the State Council. There is no exception for the ratification 
of  China’s  WTO  commitments.  The  NPC  Standing  Committee  ratified  them  at 
different times since these negotiations were not concluded at the same time. 
For instance, the US and China reached a bilateral agreement on the conditions 
of China’s WTO accession in 1999. Like other treaties and agreements that China 
has ratified, thus, all China’s WTO commitments, except the Protocol on China’s 
Accession, are binding on China. There is a procedural problem in regard to the 
ratification  of  the  Protocol  on  China’s  Accession.  The  9
th  NPC  Standing 
Committee ratified the Protocol on China’s Accession on the 25
th August 2000, 
long before the Protocol on China’s Accession itself had taken its final form and 
been signed by the Chinese government’s representative in Doha. Thus, the act 
of the 9
th NPC Standing Committee is virtually a before the fact authorization 
rather  than  an  after the fact  ratification.  From  this  view,  the  ratification 
procedure for the Protocol on China’s Accession is defective. Does this imply that 
the Protocol on China’s Accession is ineffective?  
 
In regard to this issue, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties clearly 
provides:  
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty 
has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that 
violation  was  manifest  and  concerned  a  rule  of  its  internal  law  of 
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fundamental importance.
95  
Despite this procedural defect, therefore, the validity of the Protocol on China’s 
Accession is unquestionable as a matter of international law under Article 46 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
Article II:2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO clearly sets out that ‘The 
agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 … 
are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members’. As a signatory and 
party to the WTO, China clearly accepts that the obligations contained in the 
WTO Agreements are legally binding upon it. How those obligations are to be 
given effect may be a matter of dispute, but their binding nature is not, and it is 
primarily the political institutions in China which must give effect to WTO law. If 
a Chinese action or measure is found to conflict with the provisions of the WTO, 
for example, it is up to China to find a solution.  
 
2.3 How Does China Implement its WTO Commitments? 
Article  XVI:4  of  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  requires  that  “Each  Member  shall 
ensure conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its 
obligations  provided  in  the  annexed  Agreements”.
96  However,  it  does  not 
stipulate how WTO Members shall ensure the conformity. As the Panel in United 
Sates- Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 claimed, the WTO had not so 
far been interpreted by WTO institutions as a legal order producing direct effect 
in WTO Members’ domestic law.
97 Consequently, each WTO Member can decide 
its own means and ways to implement its obligations in its domestic legal system 
as long as they ‘ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures  with  its  obligations  provided  in  the  annexed  Agreements’.
98 The 
implementation of this conformity obligation and the effect on domestic law are, 
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therefore,  left  to  individual  WTO  Members  to  determine.  What  follows  is  to 
examine how China will implement its WTO commitments.  
 
2.3.1 WTO Members’ Approaches to Implement Their WTO 
Commitments 
Legal theory posits two basic solutions with respect to the relationship between 
international law and domestic law: monism and dualism. Monism means that 
both international law and domestic law form parts of the same legal order.
99 
Exponents of monism generally agree that international law is directly applicable 
in domestic law and prevails over inconsistent domestic laws.
100 Dualism means 
that international law and domestic law are separate systems of law.
101 Neither 
international law nor domestic law has the power to alter the rules of the other. 
Each is supreme within its own sphere so that a domestic court would apply 
domestic law in the case of a conflict between domestic law and international 
law. According to the dualist view, international treaties are not self executing 
with the domestic legal system. In order to take effect in the national legal 
regime, international treaties must be implemented by enactment of domestic 
legislation. In reality, however, neither monism nor dualism corresponds entirely 
with state practice. In fact, practice by most countries combines the monist and 
dualist approaches. 
 
The WTO Agreements can be applied directly within a WTO Member’s domestic 
legal system without further domestic legislation, where such Member follows 
monist approach.
102 In practice, several WTO Members follow a monist approach 
to  implement  WTO  Agreements.  These  countries  include  Chile,  Mexico,  the 
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Netherlands,  Philippines,  Poland,  and  Venezuela.  However,  the  situation  is 
different  where  a  WTO  Member  follows  the  dualist  approach.  The  WTO  rules 
cannot be applied in the domestic legal system unless there is further relevant 
legislation transforming the WTO agreements. In practice, the majority of the 
WTO Members, including the four major trading powers— the US,
103 the EU,
104 
Japan and Canada, follow a dualist approach.
105  
 
There  are  two  ways  of  implementing  WTO  Agreements  where  WTO  Members 
follow the dualist approach. First, a WTO Member enacts an overarching statute 
in which the WTO Agreements are given effect in such Member’s domestic law. In 
practice, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and the US follow this approach. In 
the US, for instance, the WTO Agreements were given effect in the American law 
by  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreements  Act  (URAA)  on  the  8
th  December  1994.  In 
Canada, the WTO Agreements were given effect in Canadian law by the WTO 
Agreement Implementation Act on the 1
st January 1995.  
 
Second, instead of enacting an overarching statute, a WTO Member may enact 
numerous  new  laws  and  amend  existing  laws  in  order  to  implement  WTO 
agreements. In practice, Argentina, Australia, the EC, Hong Kong, India, Japan, 
Singapore, Switzerland, and Thailand adopt this approach. For example, the EC 
Council Decision 94/800/EEC promulgates the WTO Agreements.
106 In addition to 
this  Decision,  the  Community  institutions  have  adopted  several  legislative 
instruments  to  ensure  that  Community  law  complies  with  the  international 
obligations  of  the  Community  under  the  WTO  law.  The  Community  Customs 
Code
107  and  its  implementing  legislation,  as  amended,
108  contain  several 
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provisions that reflect the terms of the relevant WTO Agreements. Following the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Community also enacted (or upgraded) a 
number of commercial policy instruments, such as Council Regulation 2026/97 on 
protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the EC.
109 
 
2.3.2 China’s Approach to Implementing Its WTO Commitments 
The  Chinese  Constitution  1982  remains  silent  on  whether  a  treaty  shall  be 
applied directly or through domestic law. Chinese practice in this regard is not 
consistent. Sometimes, China follows a monist approach. For example, Article 
142 of General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, provides: 
‘If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of 
China contains provisions differing from those in the civil laws of the People’s 
Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail, except 
for those provisions to which China has declared its reservations’. Sometimes, 
China follows a dualist approach. In 1986, for instance, the 6
th NPC Standing 
Committee  adopted  a  special  law  ‘Regulations  on  Diplomatic  Privileges  and 
Immunity’ for the purpose of implementing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.
110  
 
In regard to implementing the WTO rules, China follows a dualist approach. Thus, 
China’s WTO commitments need to be given further legislative effect in order to 
be applicable within China’s domestic legal system. There are several reasons for 
this. First, the WTO Agreements are very complicated. Thus, it is far from easy 
for China, like other WTO Members that follow a dualist approach, to implement 
the WTO rules automatically without further domestic legislation. Second, some 
WTO obligations are not clearly defined. It would be difficult to expect domestic 
courts to apply these obligations without further definition. Third, implementing 
WTO rules through further legislation gives China extra time to fulfil its WTO 
obligations. 
 
The Report of Working Party on China’s Accession lays down China’s approach to 
the implementation of its WTO commitments. It stated: 
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China would ensure that its laws and regulations pertaining to or affecting 
trade  were  in  conformity  with  the  WTO  Agreement  and  with  its 
commitments so as to fully perform its international obligations.  For this 
purpose,  China  had  commenced  a  plan  to  systematically  revise  its 
relevant  domestic  laws.    Therefore,  the  WTO  Agreement  would  be 
implemented  by  China  in  an  effective  and  uniform  manner  through 
revising  its  existing  domestic  laws  and  enacting  new  ones  fully  in 
compliance with the WTO Agreement.
111  
Thus,  China  has  clarified  that  it  will  implement  the  WTO  obligations  through 
enacting  new  laws  and  amending  existing  legislation  rather  than  enacting  an 
overarching law. This involves the examination and review of all existing laws, 
regulations and rules. In principle, those which are found inconsistent with WTO 
Agreements have to be amended or repealed; where no provisions can be found 
corresponding  to  relevant  WTO  Agreements,  new  laws  or  regulations  will  be 
enacted pursuant to the WTO Agreements.  
 
This approach has been confirmed in the Secretariat Report of China’s first trade 
policy review under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) by claiming that 
China implements the WTO Agreement and the Protocol on China’s Accession 
through  enabling  legislation.
112 During  the  Meeting  for  China’s  trade  policy 
review, the Chinese delegate also claimed:  
To  implement  its  accession  commitment,  the  Chinese  government 
reviewed its legal framework, including laws enacted by the NPC and its 
Standing  Committee,  administrative  regulations  by  the  central 
government, i.e. the State Council, and rules and measures promulgated 
by ministries and agencies of the central government. As depicted in the 
Secretariat  Report, amendment  and enactment  of  laws  and  regulations 
reflected  the  effort  by  the  Chinese  government  to  bring  its  legal 
framework in line with the WTO rules.
113  
China’s approach to implementing the WTO rules has a disadvantage. According 
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to this approach, China has to review hundreds of if not thousands of pieces of 
legislation in order to bring such legislation into conformity to the WTO rules. 
Thus, Donald C. Clarke claimed: ‘It is well understood both inside and outside of 
China that the task of making China’s laws and regulations conform to World 
Trade Organization (WTO) requirements is a huge one’.
114 
 
3  Conclusion 
In  general,  the  adverse  impact  of  anticompetitive  practices  on  international 
trade has been widely recognised, although there is no unanimous agreement on 
what practices should be condemned in different competition regimes. In the 
absence of an effective competition policy, the benefits of trade liberalization 
could be nullified or at least reduced. In acknowledging this, the GATT/WTO has 
included a  number of  competition related rules  during  the  last  five  decades. 
However,  there  still  lacks  a  general  agreement  on  competition  within  the 
existing WTO framework. On the one hand, this leads to the situation that the 
WTO can have impact on the adoption and implementation of WTO Members’ 
national competition laws due to the existence of the competition related WTO 
rules. On the other hand, the WTO impact has been limited due to the lack of a 
competition specific agreement under the WTO. The WTO does not impose an 
obligation on its Members to enact a comprehensive domestic competition law. 
Because of this, some WTO Members, the EU in particular, tried to initiate a 
negotiation of a new agreement on competition within the WTO system. It is 
necessary  to  recognize  the  relevance  and  the  limitations  of  the  WTO  to  the 
development of WTO Members’ national competition policy and law in order to 
understand  the  following  chapters  (chapter  three,  four,  five  and  six)  that 
examine the impact of the WTO on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. 
 
After fifteen years of negotiations, China joined the WTO in December 2001. As 
Karen  Halverson  summarized  on  China’s  accession  to  the  World  Trade 
Organisation (WTO), ‘No country has endured as lengthy an accession process to 
the GATT…/WTO as China, nor has any country acceding to the WTO been asked 
                                         
114 D. Clark, (2003), note 81, 97. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 77 
to take on as many concessions as the price for admission.’
115 Like other WTO 
Members,  China  is  bound  by  its  WTO  commitments.  Since  the  WTO  does  not 
specify  how  its  Members  should  implement  their  WTO  commitments,  WTO 
Members  adopt  different  approaches  to  implement  their  WTO  commitments. 
China adopts the dualist approach and gives effects of its WTO commitments 
through amending existing legislation and enacting new one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
115 K. Halverson, (2004), note 69, 319, p. 323. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 1, 78 
Table I-1: Events Leading Up to China’s WTO Accession 
 
Year  Event 
1948  GATT went into effect and China was a Contracting Party 
1950  China (represented by Chinese National Party) withdrew from GATT 
1982  China was granted observer status in GATT 
1986  China notified GATT of intent to renegotiate terms of membership, Hong 
Kong became a GATT Contracting Party 
1987  Working party on China’s membership to GATT was established 
1989  Discussions of China’s membership was suspended until 1992 
1992  Working party on Taiwan’s accession established 
1994  Uruguay round of trade negotiations was completed 
1995  WTO entered into force, China applied for accession to WTO 
1999  United States and China signed bilateral agreement on China’s accession 
2000  U.S.  Congress  passed  PNTR  legislation,  EU  and  China  signed  bilateral 
agreement on China’s accession 
2001  China’s accession to WTO becomes effective 
Sources: WTO website and the website of PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Chapter Two:                                      
China’s Competition Legislation 
This chapter examines the issues surrounding China’s competition legislation in 
order to provide a background for understanding the arguments in the following 
chapters. To this end, it is structured into two sections. The first section focuses 
on the history and the status of China’s competition related legislation before 
the  adoption  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China 
(hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007) on the 30
th August 2007.
1 The second 
section explores the reasons why China needs a comprehensive competition law 
and sets out the history of the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
1  The History and the Status of China’s 
Competition-Related Legislation before the 
Adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
1.1 The History of China’s Competition-Related 
Legislation before the Adoption of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007
2 
The development of China’s competition related legislation is closely related to 
the process of China’s Economic Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978.
3 Before 
that, China applied a centrally planned economy where market mechanism was 
                                         
1 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
2 For the examination of the development of competition-related legislation in China, also see, J. 
Berry, ‘Antimonopoly Law in China: A Socialist Market Economy Wrestles with Its Antitrust 
Regime’, International Law & Management Review, vol. 2, (2005), 129, pp. 129-140. 
3 China’s Economic Reform and Open Door Policy [改革开放, Gaige Kaifang] refers to the program 
of economic changes in China. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 80 
denied  as  an  efficient  means  to  allocate  resources.  The  development  of 
competition related legislation in China can be divided into three stages. 
 
1.1.1 Stage One: Planned Commodity Economy (From 1978 to 
1992) 
From 1978 to 1992, China applied a planned commodity economy.
4 This means 
that the Chinese economy was operated in a market setting but did not amount 
to  an  overall  market  economy  during  that  period.
5  Accordingly,  market 
competition  was  allowed  under  the  planned  commodity  economy.  The 
underlying theory is that on the one hand, competition was no longer considered 
to  be  unique  to  capitalism,  but  could  ‘stimulate  the  economy  and  benefit 
socialism’.
6 On  the  other  hand,  Chinese  officials  stressed  that  competition 
between the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) was ‘fundamentally different from 
that under capitalism’.
7 Competition was discouraged when it posed a threat to 
other more favourable strategies to strengthen the SOEs, such as merger and 
horizontal co operation.
8 
 
Under these circumstances, China started its competition related legislation. In 
1980, the Interim Regulation for the Promotion and Protection of Competition in 
the Socialist Economy (hereinafter the Interim Regulation for Competition 1980) 
was promulgated by the State Council.
9 It is a set of general and abstract rules. 
                                         
4 See the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the 
Economic Structure, Part IV, adopted by the 12
th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party at its Third Plenary Session on the 20
th October 1984. For an English translation, see B. 
Liu and Q. Wu, eds., China’s Socialist Economy: An Outline History (1949-1984), Beijing: 
Beijing Review, (1986), 672, pp. 680-683. 
5 S. Shou, The Prerequisites to Successfully Reform State Enterprises, 6
th July 2001, 
http://www.chinareform.org.cn/cgi-bin/BBS_Read.asp?Topic_ID=604. 
6 S. Liu and Q. Wu, (1986), note 4, 672, p. 688. 
7 Id. 
8 Centre of Economics Studies of Fu Dan University, New Approach to Enterprises reform and 
development, Shanghai: Fu Dan University, (1988), pp. 199-203. 
9 The Interim Regulation for the Promotion and Protection of Competition in the Socialist Economy, 
[关于开展和保护社会主义的竞争的暂行规定, Guanyu Kaizhan He Baohu Shehui Zhuyi De 
Jingzheng De Zanxing Guiding], was promulgated on 17
th October 1980 and reprinted in Wang Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 81 
It  aims  to  introduce  a  maximum  degree  of  competition  into  the  planned 
commodity  economy.  It  represents  the  first  legislative  attempt  to  combat 
anticompetitive practices in China. It stipulates: ‘In economic life, apart from 
the products which are to be exclusively traded in by the departments or units 
designated by the state, no other products may be monopolized or exclusively 
traded in’.
10 There are contradictions in this regulation. For example, on the one 
hand, it stipulates that necessary adjustments should be made to the pricing 
system  in  order  to  stimulate  effective  competition.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
provides that enterprises need to apply for government approval to raise prices. 
Furthermore,  it  provides  that  prices  of  designated  key  products  must  remain 
‘stable’.
11 In  addition,  its  contents  are  ‘proclamations  rather  than  concrete 
provisions that could be applied by judges’ in courts.
12 
 
Based on  the  Interim  Regulation  for  Competition  1980,
13 various  competition 
related  rules  at  the  local  level  were  promulgated  in  many  provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities during the 1980s, such as the Provisional 
Rule of Wuhan City against Unfair Competition 1985
14 and the Provisional Rule of 
Shanghai Municipality against Unfair Competition 1987.
15  
                                                                                                                             
Huaian et al. eds., Collection of Laws of the People’s Republic of China 1949-1989 [中华人民共
和国法律全书 1949-1989, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Falu Quanshu 1949-1989], (1989), 
pp. 1137-1138. It ceased into force in 2000. 
10 The Interim Regulation for Competition 1980, Art. 3. 
11 Id., Art. 5. 
12 C. Jin and W. Luo, Competition Law in China, New York: William S. Hein & Co., (2002), p. 6. 
13 Article 10 of the Interim Regulation for Competition 1980 encourages local governments to adopt 
their own measures in order to implement this regulation. 
14 The Provisional Rule of Wuhan City against Unfair Competition, [武汉市制止不正当竞争暂行办法
，Wuhan Shi Zhizhi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Zanxing Banfa] . It came into force on the 29
th 
November 1985, http://www.law-
star.com/showtxt?dbsType=lar&dbsText=????????&multiSearch=false&multiSearch=false&dbs
Type=lar&dbsText=????????&isopen=1&keywords=&dbn=lar&fn=lar_17.086.txt&upd=1. 
15 The Provisional Rule of Shanghai Municipality against Unfair Competition, [上海市制止不正当竞
争暂行规定, Shanghai Shi Zhizhi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Zanxing Guiding], it came into force 
on the 15
th October 1987, http://www.law-
star.com/showtxt?dbsType=lar&dbsText=????????&multiSearch=false&multiSearch=false&dbs
Type=lar&dbsText=????????&isopen=1&keywords=&dbn=lar&fn=lar_6.150.txt&upd=1. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 82 
 
On the 12
th April 1986, the 6
th National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted the 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
the  General  Principles  of  Civil  Law  1986).
16 Article  58  (4)  invalidates  acts 
performed through malicious collusion and are detrimental to the interests of 
the State, a collective or a third party. On the 11
th September 1987, the State 
Council  promulgated  the  Regulation  on  the  Administration  of  Prices  of  the 
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Regulation of Prices 1987),
17 which 
prohibits  enterprises  and  industrial  institutions  from  negotiating  on  and 
monopolizing prices. 
 
Except  Article  58  (4)  of  the  General  Principles  of  Civil  Law  1986,  all  the 
competition related  rules  during  this  period  were  promulgated  by  the  State 
Council and some ministries. During this period, therefore, competition related 
legislation remained at relatively low level. In addition, it was sporadic. This 
illustrated that competition related legislation was not considered as the top 
legislative  priority  by  Chinese  policy makers  during  this  period,  because 
competition was only allowed in a limited sphere during this period. In sum, 
China’s competition related legislation was at the beginning stage during this 
period. 
 
1.1.2 Stage Two: Socialist Market Economy (From 1992 to 2001) 
During the 14
th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in 1992, China 
further readjusted the goal of its economic reform to establish a socialist market 
economy, under which the market mechanism replaces the planning system as 
the  means  to  allocate  resources.
18 In  response  to  this  new  development  of 
                                         
16 The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, [中华人民共和国民法
通则, Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Minfa Tongzhe] came into force on the 1
st January 1987, 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=3633. 
17 The Regulation on the Administration of Prices of People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国价
格管理条例, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiage Guanli Tiaoli] came into force on the 11
th 
September 1987, http://www.sz.sx.cei.gov.cn/DNKJ/flfg/fl50.htm. 
18 See, ‘Report of the 14
th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party’, 12
th October 1992, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shixheng/252/5089/index.html. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 83 
economic  reform,  the  Chinese  Constitution  1982  was  amended  in  1993.  It 
stipulates: ‘The state has put into practice a socialist market economy’.
19 
In 1993, the 8
th NPC Standing Committee enacted the Anti Unfair Competition 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the LAUC 1993).
20 As its name 
illustrates, the LAUC 1993 mainly focuses on unfair competition practices, such 
as  false  advertising,  forgery,  and  defamation.  In  theory,  anticompetitive 
practices should not be the subject of the LAUC. However, at the time when the 
LAUC was enacted, the draft Antimonopoly Law failed to be enacted. Due to this 
reason, a few provisions regarding anticompetitive practices were incorporated 
into the LAUC. From this view, thus, the LAUC 1993  is a significant piece of 
legislation in the history of the Chinese competition related legislation. It signals 
a  desire  by  Chinese  officials  to  incorporate  some  competition  rules  into  the 
Chinese  legal  system.  However,  it  is  inadequate  to  deal  with  all  types  of 
anticompetitive  practices  due  to  its  limited  competition related  provisions. 
Thus, Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao argued: ‘As the LAUC is limited in scope and 
its implementing regulations have little authority, anti monopoly provisions have 
appeared in legislation beyond the reach of the LAUC’.
21 
On the 24
th December 1993, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC),
22 which  is  the  enforcement  authority  of  the  LAUC  1993,  promulgated 
Certain  Rules  on  Prohibiting  Public  Utility  Enterprises  from  Committing 
Restrictive Acts against Competition.
23 These rules are based on Article 6 of the 
LAUC 1993. They provide more details on prohibiting statutory monopolies, since 
the purpose of these rules is to facilitate the application of Article 6 of the LAUC 
1993. 
                                         
19 The Chinese Constitution 1982 (as amended in 1993), Amend. Two, Sec. 7. 
20 An English version is available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306. 
21 Y. Jung and Q. Hao, ‘The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition 
Regime?’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol. 24, (2003), 107, p. 129. 
22 The SAIC is an organization directly under the State Council. For the function of the SAIC, see, 
www.saic.gov.cn. 
23 The Certain Provisions on the Prohibiting Public Utility Enterprises from Committing Restrictive 
Acts against Competition was promulgated by Order No. 20 of the SAIC on the 24
th December 
1993. An English version is available at 
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/Decision/cndec05.html. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 84 
 
In 1997, the 8
th NPC Standing Committee adopted the Price Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter the Price Law 1997).
24 The purpose of the Price 
Law 1997 is to combat price wars and predatory pricing in China, particularly in 
consumer goods markets. The Price Law 1997 replaced the Regulation of Prices 
1987.  The  State  Planning  Commission  was  the  enforcement  authority  before 
March  2003.  After  that,  the  National  Development  and  Reform  Commission 
(NDRC)  replaced  the  State  Planning  Commission  and  thus  became  the 
enforcement authority of the Price Law 1997.
25 
 
On  the  30
th  August  1999,  the  9
th  NPC  Standing  Committee  adopted  the  Bid 
Inviting and Submitting Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the 
Bidding  Law  1999).
26 It  provides  regulations  in  regard  to  bidding  and  inviting 
bids. It prohibits collusive tendering practices.
27 On the 20
th September 2000, 
the State Council issued the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on 
Telecommunications  (hereinafter  the  Telecommunications  Regulation  2000).
28 
Article 17 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides: ‘the dominant 
operator  in  telecommunication  service  shall  not  refuse  requests  of  the 
interconnection by other operators and the special purpose net operators’. It 
also defines the term ‘dominant operator in telecommunication service’.
29 
This  period  is,  therefore,  significant  in  regard  to  China’s  competition related 
legislation.  It  witnessed  the  enactment  of  several  key  competition related 
                                         
24 The Price Law of the People’s Republic of China came into force on the 1
st May 1998. An 
English version is available at http://www.chinagate.com.cn/english/430.htm. 
25 In March 2003, the NDRC took over the responsibilities of the State Planning Commission. It is a 
macro-economic regulatory department under the State Council, with a mandate to develop 
national economic strategies, long-term economic plans and annual plans, and to report on the 
national economy and social development to the NPC. See, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn. 
26 The Bid-Inviting and Submitting Law of the People’s Republic of China came into force on the 1
st 
January 2000. An English version is available at http://www.sh360.net/law/law12/3398.html. 
27 The Bidding Law 1999, Art. 32. 
28 The Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Telecommunications came into force on the 
25
th September 2000. An English edition is available at 
http://www.chinaitlaw.org/?p1=print&p2=040929235127. 
29 The Telecommunication Regulation 2000, Art. 17. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 85 
national laws, such as the LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997 and the Bidding Law 
1999. These national laws and the administrative rules issued by the relevant 
ministries  in  order  to  implement  such  laws  replaced  most  of  the  previous 
competition related  regulations,  administrative  rules  and  local  rules  issued 
during 1978 1992, such as the Regulation of Prices 1987 and the Provisional Rule 
of Wuhan City against Unfair Competition 1985. Compared to the previous stage, 
both  the  quality  and  quantity  of  the  Chinese  competition related  legislation 
were improved during this period. 
 
1.1.3 Stage Three: After China’s Accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (From 2001 to Present) 
Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy was deepened and broadened.
30 Under 
its  WTO  commitments,  China  is  opening  its  previously  protected  sectors  and 
liberalizing  its  trade and investment  policies.  In  order to implement its  WTO 
commitments,  China  is  amending  its  existing  laws  and  enacting  new  laws. 
China’s competition related legislation is no exception. 
 
On  the  18
th  June  2003,  the  Interim  Rule  on  Prohibiting  Monopolistic  Pricing 
Behaviour was issued by the newly established NDRC.
31 It came into force on the 
1
st November 2003 and is based on the Price Law 1997.
32 It aims to ‘promote fair 
competition  and  to  protect  the  legal  rights  and  interests  of  operators  and 
consumers’.
33 Despite its name, it focuses on both abuses of dominant positions
34 
and horizontal restraints,
35 which are collectively referred to as ‘monopolistic 
pricing activities’. It not only reiterates the existing prohibitions in other laws 
and regulations but also further explains such laws and regulations. According to 
                                         
30 For the impacts of the WTO on China’s economic reform, see, e.g., H.-G. Fung, C. Pei and K. 
Zhang, China and the Challenge of Economic Globalisation: The Impact of WTO Membership, 
London: M. Sharpe, (2006). 
31 An unofficial English version is available at http://51trans.net/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=618. 
32 The Interim Rule on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 2003, Art. 1. 
33 Id. 
34 Id., Arts. 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
35 Id., Art. 4. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 86 
the  press  release  dated  30
th  June  2003  on  the  website  of  the  NDRC,  it  was 
declared to be a ‘preliminary exploration of antitrust legislation’.
36 
1.2 The Status of China’s Competition-Related Legislation 
before the Adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, China’s competition related 
legislation  was  scattered  in  different  laws,  administrative  regulations  and 
departmental or local government rules. The major national laws that contain 
competition rules were the LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997, and the Bidding Law 
1999. There were some administrative rules based on these three national laws, 
such  as  the  Interim  Rule  on  Prohibiting  Monopolistic  Pricing  Behaviour  2003. 
There were also numerous competition related rules at the local level, which 
are based on these three national laws. For example, more than 25 provinces in 
China  had  promulgated  detailed  rules  based  on  the  LAUC  1993  before  the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In addition, there were some sector 
regulations on competition, such as the Telecommunication Regulation 2000. 
 
What follows focuses on the LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997, the Bidding Law 
1999 and administrative rules based on these three national laws because they 
were  the  most  important  competition related  legislation  in  China  before  the 
adoption  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  The  comments  regarding  China’s 
competition related legislation are provided in the next sub section. 
1.2.1 Prohibiting Anticompetitive Agreements 
Article 14 (1) of the Price Law 1997 prohibits horizontal price fixing. It stipulates 
that  operators  must  not  ‘collude  with  others  in  controlling  market  prices, 
thereby  harming  the  lawful  rights  and  interests  of  other  operators  or 
consumers’. Article 4 of the Interim Rules on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing 
Behaviour 2003 further expands Article 14 (1) of the Price Law 1997. It prohibits 
price cartels by stipulating: 
Operators  shall  not  conduct  any  of  the  following  acts  of  price  monopoly 
through agreements, decisions or coordination: (1) Uniformly determining, 
                                         
36 See the NDRC website, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 87 
maintaining  or  changing  prices;  (2)  Controlling  prices  by  limiting  the 
production or supply quantities; (3) Controlling prices in bid invitation and 
bid tendering, or auction; (4) Other acts of controlling prices. 
 
The Bidding Law 1999 prohibits collusive tendering practices by stipulating: 
Bidders shall not collude on the bid price, preclude fair competition from 
other bidders or prejudice the lawful rights and interests of the bid inviting 
party or other bidders. Bidders and the bid inviting party shall not collude in 
the submission of bids in order to harm the interests of the State, the public 
interest or the lawful rights and interests of a third party.
37 
In fact, it reiterates Article 15 of the LAUC 1993 which provides: 
Tenderers shall not submit tenders in collusion with one another to force the 
tender price up or down. A tenderer shall not collaborate with the party 
inviting tenders to exclude competitors from fair competition.
38 
 
1.2.2 Abuses of Dominance 
1.2.2.1  Abuses of Dominance through Pricing Practices 
Articles  5,  6,  7  and 8  of  the  Interim  Rule  on  Prohibiting  Monopolistic  Pricing 
Behaviour 2003 prohibit abuses of dominance through pricing practices. Article 5 
prohibits resale price setting. Article 6 prohibits exploititive pricing. Article 7 
prohibits  predatory  pricing  and  making  price  below  costs  through  rebates, 
subsidies  and  rewards.  Article  8  prohibits  price  discrimination  under  similar 
transaction situations. 
 
The Price Law 1997 stipulates that business operators must not act: 
To engage in dumping sales (except the cases of sales of fresh and live 
merchandise,  seasonal  merchandise  and  stockpiled  merchandise  at 
discount)  at  below  cost  prices  in  order  to  force  out  competitors  or 
monopolise the market and disrupt the normal production and operation 
order to great detriment to the interests of the State or the lawful rights 
                                         
37 The Bidding Law 1999, Art. 32. 
38 The LAUC 1993, Art. 15. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 88 
and interests of other business operators.
39 
But  this  provision  does  not  specially  stipulate  that  it  is  only  applicable  to 
dominant firms. Thus, the enforcement agencies do not need to consider first 
whether a company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to 
apply this provision. 
 
Article 11 of the LAUC 1993 can be used to combat the abuses of dominance 
through predatory pricing. It provides that a business operator may not, for the 
purpose of forcing out his competitors, sell his commodities at prices lower than 
cost.
40 However, it is not designed specially for combating abuses of dominance. 
Thus,  the  enforcement  agencies  do  not  need  to  consider  first  whether  a 
company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to apply to 
Article 11. Moreover, Article 11 does not define costs. But the Price Law 1997 
suggests that costs include production and operation costs. 
 
1.2.2.2  Abuses of Dominance through Non-Pricing Practices 
The LAUC 1993 stipulates: 
Public  utility  enterprises  or  other  operators  having  monopolistic  status 
according to law shall not force others to buy the goods of the operators 
designated by [the public utility enterprises or other operators] so as to 
exclude other operators from competing fairly.
41 
Thus, it only prohibits a particular type of abuse by statutory monopolies. There 
is no mention of other types of abuses by statutory monopolies, such as refusal 
to supply and price fixing. Moreover, there is no mention of monopolistic firms 
other than statutory monopolies. In order to facilitate the application of Article 
6 of the LAUC 1993, the SAIC issued the Provisions on the Prohibition of Public 
Utility Enterprises from Committing Restrictive Acts against Competition in 1993. 
As a guidance of Article 6 of the LAUC 1993, these Provisions prohibit various 
abuses of dominance by statutory monopolies.
42 
                                         
39 The Price Law 1997, Art. 14 (2). 
40 The LAUC 1993, Art. 11. 
41 Id., Art. 6. 
42 The Provisions on the Prohibition of Public Utility Enterprises from Committing Restrictive Acts 
against Competition 1993, Art. 4. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 89 
 
Article 12 of the LAUC 1993 can be used to combat certain types of abuses of 
dominance. It stipulates that a business operator may not, against the will of the 
purchasers,  conduct  a  tie in  sale  of  commodities  or  attach  any  other 
unreasonable  conditions  to  such  a  sale.  Like  Article  11  of  the  LAUC  1993, 
however, Article 12 of the LAUC 1993 is not specially designed for combating 
abuses of dominance. Thus, the enforcement agencies do not need to consider 
whether a company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to 
apply to Article 12. 
 
2  The Antimonopoly Law 2007 
What  follows  focuses  on  three  issues:  (1)  Why  China  needs  a  comprehensive 
competition law; (2) how the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was drafted; (3) why it 
took so long for China to enact the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
2.1 Why Does China Need A Comprehensive Competition 
Law? 
There are a number of reasons why China needs a comprehensive competition 
law.
43 What follows focuses on two most significant reasons. 
 
2.1.1  Increasing Anticompetitive Practices in China 
The  central  theme  of  China’s  Economic  Reform  and  Open  Door  Policy  is  the 
switch from the centrally planned economy to the market economy. The advent 
of  this  policy  witnessed  far reaching  market oriented  reform  leading  to 
considerable diminution in the direct role of the State in economic activity. This 
policy has been associated with the deregulation of prices, the privatization of 
the SOEs, and the liberalization of trade and investment.
44 With the introduction 
                                         
43 For the discussions of these reasons, see, e.g., Y. Jung and Q. Hao, (2003), note 21, 107, pp. 
110-123; also, X. Wang, ‘The Prospect of Antimonopoly Legislation in China’, Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 1, (2002), 201, pp. 201-216. 
44 For a general discussion on China’s transformation to market economy, see, O. Suliman, ed., 
China’s Transition to a Socialist Market Economy, London: Quorum Brooks, (1998). For a Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 90 
of market economy, have anticompetitive practices emerged in China? 
 
One  of  the  arguments  that  support  China  not  adopting  a  comprehensive 
competition  law  is  that  Chinese  companies  are  relatively  small  and  do  not 
possess dominant positions in the relevant markets.
45 This claim underestimates 
the  extent  of  dominance  possessed  by  some  Chinese  companies.  At  the 
international level, there were no less than 20 Chinese firms among the Fortune 
global 500 list in 2006.
46 Aluminum Corp of China (Chalco) is the second largest 
maker  of  alumina  in  the  world.
47 Lenovo,  a  Chinese  personal  computer  (PC) 
manufacturer,  is  the  third  largest  PC  maker  in  the  world.  Four  Chinese 
companies now supply the majority of the global demand for vitamin C. At the 
domestic level, Chinese companies are dominant players in some sectors, such as 
telecommunications, alumina, oil mining, lottery machines, insurance, banking, 
computer,  and  TV  manufacture.
48 In  the  telecommunications  sector  (mobile 
service), for instance, China Mobile and China Unicom together had 100% market 
share in 2005.
49 Chalco had 100% market share in the Chinese alumina market in 
2005.
50 Currently, the Chinese oil mining industry is monopolized by Petrochina, 
Sinopec and CNOOC. Therefore, these examples demonstrate that some Chinese 
companies do possess dominant positions in the relevant markets. 
 
With the existence of dominant Chinese companies, anticompetitive practices 
have also emerged in China. In June 2000, for example, top managers of nine 
Chinese TV manufacturers, which accounted for more than 80% of the market at 
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that time, held a summit and agreed to form an alliance. The top TV producer, 
Changhong,  did  not  join  the  alliance.  The  alliance  agreement  covers,  among 
other deals, setting minimum prices for TVs sold domestically.
51 
 
Five big shopping malls in Jinan city boycotted Changhong colour TVs in 1997, 
forcing the producer to lower its price.
52 In June 2002, seven gas companies in 
Xinyang city jointly raised gas prices by 60% (from 29 RMB per unit to 48 RMB). 
One term of the agreement even required each company to deposit 5,000 RMB as 
a  good  faith  pledge,  which  would  be  forfeited  upon  violation  of  the  price 
cartel.
53  
 
In February 2005, Animal Science Products and Ranis Company filed petitions 
against six Chinese vitamin C producers, including Bulk vitamin C manufacturer 
China Pharmaceutical Group, at the Supreme Court of California.
54 They claimed 
that vitamin C customers in the United States (US) paid more for vitamin C as a 
result of the alleged cartel. When these cases were filed, Chinese vitamin C 
producers made 60% of the world’s vitamin C supply, and about 80% of this was 
exported.
55 Although these cases were filed in the US and focused on the damage 
in foreign countries, 20% products by these Chinese producers were still sold in 
the  Chinese  domestic  market.  Thus,  their  practice  could  have  an  impact  on 
                                         
51 P. Lin, ‘People’s Republic of China’, in D. Brooks and S. Evenett, eds., Competition Policy and 
Development in Asia, London: Palgrave Macmillan, (2005); Asian Development Bank, ‘Part III. 
Promoting competition for long-term development’, in Asian Development Bank, Asian 
Development Outlook 2005, (2005), p. 252, 
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2005/ado2005-part3.pdf; C. Wang and Y. Shen, ‘Four 
Questions to Chinese Antimonopoly’, Worker’s Daily [工人日报, Gongren Ribao], 20
th April 
2001. 
52 See, X. Long and D. Du, ‘How to Effectively Protect Competition’ [我们怎样保护有效竞争, 
Women Zenyang Baohu Youxiao Jingzheng], 9
th January 2001, 
www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/20010109/374202.html. 
53 See J. Yang, ‘Ugly “co-Operation”’ [丑陋的联合, Choulou De Lianhe], 14
th September 2002, 
www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/30/20020914/822295.html. 
54 ‘China’s Vitamin C Makers Ready for Anti-trust Battle’, 7
th June 2005, 
http://www.nutraingredients.com/news/ng.asp?id=60491-vitamin-china-anti-trust; also see, 
‘Chinese Vitamin C Maker in Antitrust Complaints’, 23
rd February 2005, http://www.ap-
foodtechnology.com/news/ng.asp?id=58285-chinese-vitamin-c. 
55 ‘China’s Vitamin C Makers Ready for Anti-trust Battle’, note 54. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 92 
Chinese consumers. 
 
The latest example is in the telecommunications sector in China. As of 2007, 
there are only four landline providers in China: China Telecom, China Netcom, 
China Unicom and China TieTong.
56 China Telecom is the largest landline provider 
in  China,  while  China  Netcom  is  the  second  largest  landline  provider.  China 
Unicom  and  China  TieTong  are  much  smaller  than  China  Netcom  and  China 
Telecom. Geographically, China Telecom covers 21 provinces in Southern China, 
while China Netcom covers 10 provinces in Northern China.
57 In February 2007, 
China  Netcom  and  China  Telecom  signed  an  agreement  not  to  compete  for 
landline customers in the other’s territory.
58 This agreement is the result of two 
year preparation by these two companies. It is even described as a gentleman’s 
agreement.
59 
 
With  China’s  continuing  trade  liberalization,  more  and  more  international 
companies  have  invested  in  China.  On  the  one  hand,  the  entry  of  foreign 
companies has many positive effects on the Chinese economy, such as bringing in 
much needed investment, increasing employment and improving technology. On 
the other hand, China has also become the target of anticompetitive practices 
that are carried out by foreign companies. According to a report by the SAIC, 
there  were  a  number  of  industries  where  free  competition  could  have  been 
limited by multinationals.
60 The affected industries included sectors of software, 
photosensitive  materials,  mobile  phones,  cameras,  vehicle  tires,  and  soft 
packaging. 
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These are just a few examples of the existence of anticompetitive practices in 
China. According to the statistics provided by the SAIC, 1459 cases regarding 
restrictions  by  public  utilities,  predatory pricing,  tie in  sales,  and  bid  rigging 
were  investigated  by  the  SAIC  in  2002,  while  there  were  172  such  cases  in 
1995.
61 In particular, the number of the cases in regard to restrictions by public 
utilities  was  increased  from  55  in  1995  to  1089  in  2002.
62 However,  it  is  not 
possible to know the exact number of anticompetitive practices in China because 
many types of anticompetitive practices are not prohibited under the existing 
Chinese competition related legislation. The lack of legislation on competition 
leads  to  a  lack  of  awareness  of  the  existence  of  anticompetitive  practices. 
Nevertheless,  these  data  still  demonstrate  that  anticompetitive  practices  are 
rising in China as a result of introducing a market economy. 
 
2.1.2 China’s Competition-Related Legislation Cannot Effectively 
Combat Anticompetitive Practices 
In order to combat anticompetitive practices, China has adopted a number of 
pieces of competition related legislation. Why does China need a comprehensive 
competition law? 
 
2.1.2.1  Inadequacies 
First, the existing competition related legislation in China does not provide a 
general  ban  on  anticompetitive  practices.
63  Many  types  of  anticompetitive 
practices,  such  as  agreements  on  market  share,  boycott,  quotas  and  other 
restrictions on production, are not prohibited. Neither the LAUC 1993 nor the 
Price Law 1997 provides a general ban on anticompetitive practices. 
 
Second, the existing competition related legislation in China is not specifically 
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designed for the purpose of preventing anticompetitive practices. Most of the 
existing  competition  regulations  are  simply  principles  rather  than  applicable 
legal  provisions.
64  It  also  lacks  procedural  provisions.  There  are  no  clear 
provisions dealing with complaints of anticompetitive practices. 
 
Third,  some  key  terms  under  a  competition  regime  are  not  defined  in  the 
existing  Chinese  competition related  legislation.  For  instance,  the  term 
‘monopoly’ is not defined in China’s competition related legislation, although it 
is  used  in  several  pieces  of  legislation,  such  as  the  LAUC  1993.  The  term 
‘dominant  position’  is  only  defined  in  the  Interim  Rule  on  Prohibiting 
Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 2003, which only applies to pricing related abuses 
of  dominant  positions.
65  Thus,  there  is  no  general  definition  of  ‘dominant 
position’. 
 
Fourth, some terms which are used in the existing Chinese competition related 
legislation are not always consistent. For example, Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the 
Interim  Rule  on  Prohibiting  Monopolistic  Pricing  Behaviour  2003  use  the  term 
‘dominance’, while Article 6 of the LAUC 1993 use the term ‘monopoly’. It is 
unclear whether there are any differences between dominance and monopoly 
under the existing Chinese competition related legislation. 
 
2.1.2.2  Ineffective Sanctions 
First,  the  sanction  provisions  under  the  existing  Chinese  competition related 
legislation are too light to prevent anticompetitive practices. Under the LAUC 
1993, for instance, violators can be fined between RMB 50,000 (less than £3,400) 
and RMB 200,000 (less than £14,000) and can also attract the confiscation of 
between 100 per cent and 300 per cent of the illegally acquired revenues.
66 This 
fine  cannot  deter  business  operators  and  is  not  suitable  to  the  situation  of 
economic development. 
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Second, the sanction provisions under the existing Chinese competition related 
legislation are too complicated to be applicable in practice. Under the Price Law 
1997,  for  instance,  the  maximum  fine  is  up  to  five  times  of  illegal  gains.
67 
However, it is extremely difficult for the enforcement agency to find out the 
exact gains from anticompetitive practices because lots of relevant information 
cannot be easily accessed. In practice, thus, such a provision does not work very 
well.  
 
Third,  criminal  punishment  is  only  available  to  one  type  of  anticompetitive 
practice  under  the  existing  Chinese  competition related  legislation.  Under 
Article 50 of the Bidding Law 1999, bidder collusion can lead to imprisonment. 
Article 223 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that 
bidders  and  tenderers  who  collude  can be  fined  and  put into prison up  to  3 
years.
68 Therefore,  hard core  cartels  do  not  lead  to  imprisonment  under  the 
existing Chinese competition related legislation. 
 
2.1.2.3  Ineffective Enforcement Agencies 
The impact of the existing Chinese competition related legislation on combating 
anticompetitive  practices  has  been  further  reduced  due  to  the  overlapping 
jurisdiction of enforcement agencies. At present, more than ten governmental 
agencies are responsible for interpreting and enforcing the competition related 
legislation in China. These agencies include the NDRC for the area of pricing 
practices,  the  SAIC  for  overall  regulation  of  business  activities  including  the 
enforcement of the LAUC 1993, and the Ministry of Commerce as the regulator of 
domestic  and  foreign  trade  and  inward  investment.  Such  overlapping 
jurisdictions, compounded with the lack of coordination among the government 
agencies, have made it difficult to efficiently enforce the existing competition 
related legislation. 
 
Current enforcement agencies lack authority. They are normally departments of 
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the State Council. Combating anticompetitive practices needs an agency that has 
the power to oversee and monitor different sectors. Abuses of dominance are 
committed  by  giant  companies.  Without  enough  power,  the  agencies  cannot 
effectively  combat abuses  of  dominant  positions.  Current competition related 
enforcement agencies are incapable to investigate abuses of dominant positions, 
not to mention enforcing their decisions. 
 
The current enforcement agencies are decentralized. The NDRC and the pricing 
administration  department  at  local  government  level  are  responsible  for  the 
Price  Law  1997.
69  The  SAIC  and  its  local  branches  are  the  enforcement 
authorities for the LAUC 1993. In the case of the SAIC, there are no more than 
four  levels  from  the  national  level  to  the  county  level.  Because  there  is  no 
central  enforcement  agency,  the  implementation  of  the  existing  Chinese 
competition related legislation is fragmented. 
 
Finally, the judicial system does not play a significant role in the enforcement of 
the existing Chinese competition related legislation. Very few anticompetitive 
cases have been brought to courts. This is partly due to the lack of procedural 
rules in the existing Chinese competition related legislation. This leads to the 
failure of the Chinese courts to gain experiences of handling competition cases. 
 
2.1.3 Sub-Section Conclusion 
From the above discussion, we can see that after nearly thirty years of economic 
reform,  China  has  shifted  its  economy  from  a  centrally  planned  system  to  a 
market mechanism. Competition is the main means to allocate resources in the 
current Chinese economy. Domestic firms have started to restrain competition 
through carrying out anticompetitive practices. These practices are increasing 
due  to  the  improvement  of  the  level  of  industry  concentration.  With  the 
liberalization of Chinese investment policies, more and more foreign companies 
have invested in China. The increased presence of foreign companies in China 
has also brought anticompetitive concerns into the Chinese economy. 
 
In the last two decades, China has combated anticompetitive practices through 
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enacting  some  specified  laws  and  regulations,  such  as  the  enactment  of  the 
LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997 and the adoption of the Interim Regulations on 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Pricing Acts 2003. This approach worked well during 
the time when there were very few anticompetitive practices in China. With the 
increasing  anticompetitive  practices  in  China,  however,  this  approach  cannot 
accommodate  the  need  of  combating  anticompetitive  practices  since  the 
existing Chinese competition related legislation is not systematic and specific 
enough and does not ban all types of anticompetitive practices. The absence of a 
comprehensive competition law is proving to be a source of major concern. Both 
domestic  and  foreign  companies  are  exploiting  the  situation  and  curbing 
competition  through  engaging  anticompetitive  practices.  Therefore,  it  is 
necessary and essential for China to adopt a comprehensive competition law in 
order to effectively combat the increasing anticompetitive practices. 
 
2.2 The Process of Formulating the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
In order to understand the Antimonopoly Law 2007, it is instructive to consider 
how this law was formulated. Thus, what follows explores the process of the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
2.2.1 Stage One: Before China Joined the WTO in 2001 
As early as 1987, the SAIC and five other authorities set up a drafting group to 
draft  a  competition  law  (including  both  an  antimonopoly  law  and  unfair 
competition law).
70 In the following year, a draft entitled ‘Interim Regulation 
against Monopoly and Unfair Competition’ was provided.
71 As its name illustrates, 
this draft includes both antimonopoly and unfair competition. On the 4
th March 
1989, the State Council issued the Circular on Key Points of Economic System 
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Reform.
72  Article  20  of  the  Circular  calls  for  the  ‘establish[ment]  and 
improve[ment  of]  the  market  supervisory  system  made  up  of  relevant 
government agencies, propaganda units and non governmental institutions…rapid 
enact[ment]  of  Antimonopoly  Law,  Law  against  Unfair  Competition  Law’.  In 
September 1993, the 8
th NPC Standing Committee adopted part of the draft of 
Interim Regulation against Monopoly and Unfair Competition as the LAUC 1993. 
In  general,  the  rest  of  the  draft  of  Interim  Regulation  against  Monopoly  and 
Unfair  Competition,  which  prohibits  anticompetitive  practices,  failed  to 
materialize, although some provisions were incorporated into the LAUC 1993. 
 
In 1994, the 8
th NPC Standing Committee listed the Antimonopoly Law in its five 
year legislative plan for the first time. It authorized the State Economic & Trade 
Commission (SETC) and the SAIC to set a Drafting Group in order to work on 
drafting an antimonopoly law.
73 This Drafting Group also included members of 
the NPC legislative affairs committee and other ministries, such as the Ministry 
of Railway. 
 
In  the  process  of  drafting  the  Antimonopoly  Law,  domestic  opinions  were 
consulted by the Drafting Group. The Ministries that are responsible for tobacco, 
construction,  pharmaceuticals,  metallurgy,  telecommunications,  posts, 
electricity generation and distribution, chemicals and civil aviation gave their 
views and inputs to the Drafting Group in 1994. Many of them tried to make a 
case for special treatment or exemption from the forthcoming Antimonopoly Law 
based on the national interest, the need to take advantage of economies of scale, 
or the disastrous consequences of cut throat price competition. Industries were 
also  worried  about  local  protectionism,  the  demarcation  line  between 
permissible  and  impermissible  competition,  and  the  need  to  have  a  clear 
distinction  between  acceptable  economies  of  scale  and  monopolisation. 
Academics worried that making a distinction between economic monopoly and 
administrative  monopoly  would  not  be  suitable  considering  the  difficulties  of 
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implementation. 
 
Not only were domestic opinions considered during the process of formulating 
the  Antimonopoly  Law,  but  also  recommendations  from  governmental 
organizations  (including  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co operation  and 
Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the United  Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)), non governmental organizations and several 
countries (including the U.S., Germany, Japan, Australia, and South Korea) were 
consulted.  In  1994,  the  U.S.  antitrust  enforcement  agencies,  the  Directorate 
General (DG) of the European Commission, and the Japan Fair Trade Commission 
submitted  comments  and  proposed  revisions  to  the  Drafting  Group.  Chinese 
officials convened two conferences on competition policy. The first conference, 
which was sponsored by the UNCTAD, convened in Shenzhen on the 21
st March 
1994. The second conference, which was organized under the joint auspices of 
the  Center  for  International  Studies  of  the  University  of  Toronto  and  China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, was held in Beijing on the 25
th 
April 1994. 
 
In  1998,  the  Antimonopoly  Law  was  again  listed  in  the  five year  legislative 
agenda of the 9
th NPC Standing Committee. During 8
th –10
th November 1998, the 
OECD held a conference in Beijing named ‘Forum on China’s Draft Antimonopoly 
Law’ attended by Chinese government officials and academics.
74 In October 1999, 
a Chinese delegation including high level officials and members of the Drafting 
Group  visited  the  headquarters  of  the  OECD  in  Paris.  This  visit  provided  the 
opportunity for further discussion of the draft law. During the visit, the Chinese 
delegation and the OECD also planned a conference in Shanghai on ‘Legislating 
China’s Antimonopoly Law’ in December 1999. The Shanghai Conference marked 
a significant step forward in the process of adopting the Antimonopoly Law in 
China. It brought together top officials from Chinese government and expertise 
from  major  OECD  countries  for  what  all  participants  found  to  be  a  very 
productive  discussion  of  the  most  substantive  provisions  of  the  draft 
Antimonopoly Law, as well as an important contribution to the understanding of 
the  relevance  of  competition  policy  to  China’s  ongoing  economic  reform 
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process.
75 
 
Originally the Drafting Group planned to complete a draft at the end of 1995. 
But this was too optimistic to be true. The original timetable slipped significantly. 
The first outline of the Antimonopoly Law ‘the 1999 Draft’ was not finalized until 
the 30
th November 1999 just before the Shanghai Conference.
76 The 1999 Draft 
consists of eight chapters and fifty six articles. It is a milestone in the process of 
formulating China’s Antimonopoly Law because it lays down the basic structure 
of the forthcoming Antimonopoly Law.  
 
Both  the  US  and  the  European  Union  (EU)  and  its  Member  States  tried  to 
influence the design of the 1999 Draft. In general, the 1999 Draft is based on the 
model of EU competition law.
77 There are several reasons why China prefers the 
model  of  EU  competition  law.
78 First,  since China is  a  civil  law  country,  it  is 
difficult for China to adopt the American court based antitrust system. China’s 
legal tradition determines that China has to follow the model of EC competition 
law.  Second,  China’s  court  system  would  not  be  able  to  accommodate  the 
demands of applying the Antimonopoly Law, if China followed the US model.
79 In 
1999, judges were not required to have a law degree. Only after 2003, have 
judges been required to pass a specially designed exam. Since then, the quality 
of judges in China has been improving. However, the complexity of competition 
issues can still be overwhelming to most of them. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect 
Chinese courts to be the core organs to enforce the forthcoming Antimonopoly 
Law  at  least  at  the  early  stage.  Third,  considering  the  level  of  economic 
development  and  other  social  conditions,  China  cannot  adopt  ‘economic 
efficiency’ as the sole objective of its forthcoming Antimonopoly Law at this 
moment, like the US. In fact, the US changed the objectives of its antitrust laws 
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over the past century.
80 In other words, it does not always only apply ‘economic 
efficiency’. Thus, the multi objective model of the EU competition law is more 
suitable for China’s Antimonopoly Law. 
 
Compared  to  the  US  antitrust  laws,  the  most  distinctive  feature  of  the  1999 
Draft  is  that  it  differentiates  economic  anticompetitive  practices  and 
administrative  anticompetitive  acts.  The  US  antitrust  laws  do  not  regulate 
administrative  or  regulatory  anticompetitive  acts.
81  Under  the  1999  Draft, 
Chapters  two,  three  and  four  deal  with  economic  anticompetitive  practices, 
while Chapter five prohibits administrative anticompetitive acts.  
 
In sum, the economic conditions for enacting a comprehensive competition law 
were  emerging  during  this  period.  However,  these  conditions  were  far  from 
mature for enacting a competition law. Generally, anticompetitive behaviour was 
not a major concern in China during this period. Consequently, it was not widely 
supported to adopt an antimonopoly law. Due to these factors, the enactment of 
a competition law failed to materialise. 
 
2.2.2 Stage Two: After China’s Accession to the WTO  
China  joined  the  WTO  in  December  2001.  This  historical  event  hastened  the 
process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law in China. Xiaoye Wang claimed that 
‘the call for the speedy adoption and promulgation of an antimonopoly law’ was 
‘now much louder’ with China’s accession to the WTO.
82 In general, the interests 
of enacting a competition law have grown and activities of drafting such a law 
                                         
80 See, D. Valentine, ‘US Competition Policy and Law: Learning from a Century of Antitrust 
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were intensified after China’s WTO accession. 
 
China continued studying other competition regimes. In May 2002, for instance, 
officials  from  the  SETC  visited  Australia  and  New  Zealand  to  study  their 
competition  regimes.
83 In  September  2002,  they  visited  Russia,  Finland  and 
Sweden to study their competition regimes.
84 
 
During the 5
th Plenary Session of the 9
th NPC held in March 2002, 31 deputies of 
the NPC submitted a bill to urge the government to adopt an antimonopoly law 
as soon as possible.
85 This action demonstrated the recognition of the urgency of 
enacting  an  antimonopoly  law  after  China’s  accession  to  the  WTO.  It  also 
illustrated that some deputies were not impressed by the progress of formulating 
a competition law.  
 
After the 5
th Plenary Session of the 9
th NPC, the process of formulating China’s 
Antimonopoly Law was accelerated. In April and October 2002, the April 2002 
Draft  and  the  October  2002  Drafts  were  circulated  respectively.
86 These  two 
drafts addressed some concerns raised in regard to the 1999 Draft. Compared to 
the 1999 draft, for example, the 2002 drafts do not contain blanket exemption 
provisions. Such improvements were confirmed by the note submitted by China’s 
officials to the OECD Global Forum on Competition that was held during 10
th 11
th 
February 2003.
87 Some commentators even argued that these two drafts could be 
adopted as an antimonopoly law subject to only minor changes.
88 However, the 
later  development  proved  that  this  opinion  was  too  optimistic  to  be  true. 
Dramatic changes emerged in the later drafts. 
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87 See, China, Objectives of the Competition Law of People’s Republic of China and the Optimal 
Design of Competition Authority, 9
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In December 2003, the Antimonopoly Law was not only listed on the 10
th NPC 
legislative agenda, but also treated as key economic legislation by the 10
th NPC 
Standing Committee.
89 It was listed as a first class legislation by the 10
th NPC 
Standing Committee in 2003. In general, first class legislation means that this 
legislation is the most urgently needed law for China. 
 
In  March  2003,  the  SETC  and  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Economic 
Cooperation merged into a new ministry called the Ministry of Commerce.
90 The 
introduction  of  a  comprehensive  competition  law  became  a  priority  for  the 
Ministry of Commerce.
91 In July 2004, the Ministry of Commerce submitted the 
2004 Submitted Draft to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council for 
further consideration.
92 The big difference between the 2004 Submitted Draft 
and  previous  drafts,  particularly  the  1999  draft,  is  that  the  former  does  not 
provide  an  independent  agency  to  oversee  implementation  or  to  report 
violations of the Antimonopoly Law. It took a step back on this critical issue by 
proposing that the competition enforcement authority is a sub organ under the 
Ministry  of  Commerce.
93 This  could  be  because  the  2004  Submitted  Draft  is 
submitted by the Ministry of Commerce. 
 
In early 2005, it was widely reported that the Ministry of Commerce, the SAIC 
and the NDRC each released independent and conflicting suggestions relating to 
the structural framework of the Antimonopoly Law.
94 The Ministry of Commerce 
even  had  to  publicly  deny  these  reports  that  differences  regarding  the  draft 
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%20final.pdf. For an overview of this draft, see, e.g., H. Harris, ‘An Overview of the Draft China 
Antimonopoly Law’, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 34, (2005), 131. 
93 The 2004 Submitted Draft, Art. 6. 
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antimonopoly  law  existed  among  these  three  ministries.
95 This  illustrates  the 
fierce competition among these three ministries in order to be the designated 
competition enforcement authority once a competition law was adopted. 
 
The April 2005 Draft that was based on the 2004 Submitted Draft was released on 
the 8
th April 2005.
96 Compared to the 2004 Submitted Draft, one of the major 
changes of the April 2005 draft is that the competition authority is revised to be 
an organ under the State Council rather than a sub organ under the Ministry of 
Commerce.  This  means  that  the  forthcoming  anticompetitive  agency  will  be 
equal  to  a  ministry,  while  the  competition  enforcement  agency  is  under  a 
ministry under the 2004 Submitted Draft. It is a significant change because this 
change will lead to the increase of the authority of the forthcoming competition 
enforcement agency.  
 
On the 23
rd and 24
th May 2005, the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council, the 
Ministry of Commerce and the SAIC hosted a conference on the enactment of 
China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  in  Beijing.
97 Some  officials  from  other  competition 
regimes, such as the deputy minister of the American Department of Justice and 
the head of the DG Competition of the EC attended this conference. Shortly 
before the seminar, the American Bar Association’s Sections on Antitrust Law, 
Intellectual Property Law and International Law jointly submitted comments on 
the April 2005 Draft.
98 In June 2005, Chinese officials held another conference on 
its  Antimonopoly  Law  in  Beijing.  Representatives  from  some  multinational 
companies,  such  as  Microsoft  Corp.,  Intel  Corp.,  General  Electric  Co.,  Cisco 
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Systems Inc., Eastman Kodak Co. and Dow Chemical Co. attended this meeting 
and discussed the April 2005 Draft with Chinese officials and academics.
99 
 
Based  on  the  recommendations  from  other  governments,  companies, 
organisations and academics regarding the April 2005 Draft, the July 2005 Draft 
was  circulated  on  the  27
th  July  2005.
100 About  five  months  later,  on  the  11
th 
November 2005, the November 2005 Draft was issued by the State Council, which 
further revised previous drafts.
101 Under the November 2005 Draft, the chapter 
for the prohibition of administrative monopoly and the provisions on penalties 
for administrative monopoly were entirely deleted. After this revision, only one 
provision  was  kept  in  regard  to  administrative  monopoly.  It  provides  that 
administrative  authorities  and  other  organizations  with  public  affairs 
management functions are prohibited from abusing their administrative powers 
and eliminating or restraining competition.
102 Some scholars believed that this 
was  because  China  wanted  its  Antimonopoly  Law  to  be  consistent  with  the 
practices  of  major  competition  regimes  and  focused  on  economic 
anticompetitive  behaviour,
103 while  others  argued  that  this  was  because  the 
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http://www.people.com.cn/GB/54816/54822/4016799.html. 
103 ‘Draft Antimonopoly Law Deletes Administrative Monopoly’, note 102. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 106 
government aimed to reduce the resistance of adopting the Antimonopoly Law 
since the incorporation of administrative monopoly was considered as one of the 
reasons why China delayed adopting a competition law.
104 
 
On the 7
th June 2006, the State Council discussed and approved in principle the 
June  2006  Draft.
105 This  was  the  final  stage  before  the  10
th  NPC  Standing 
Committee  considered  the  draft.  Consequently,  the  10
th  NPC  Standing 
Committee deliberated the June 2006 Draft for the first time at the 22nd session 
of the 10
th NPC Standing Committee, which was held from the 24
th to the 29
th 
June 2006.
106 This illustrated that the process of adopting an antimonopoly law 
entered the final stage of being enacted.
107 The 10
th NPC Standing Committee 
did not adopt the Antimonopoly Law in June 2006.  
 
On the 4
th November 2006, Shengming Wang, vice head of legislative affairs work 
for the 10
th NPC Standing Committee, said that the Antimonopoly Law would be 
deliberated for the second time in the first half of 2007 and the State Council 
would  establish  an  antimonopoly  law  committee.
108  In  March  2007,  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  was  listed  in  the  legislation  plan  2007  of  the  10
th  NPC 
Standing Committee.
109 
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On 24
th June 2007, the 10
th NPC Standing Committee deliberated the June 2007 
Draft for the second time. Compared to the June Draft 2006, the June 2007 
Draft  includes  six  new  provisions.
110 One  of  them  is  Article  7  that  clearly 
prohibits big SOEs from abusing their dominant positions and harming consumers’ 
interests.
111 The  June  2007  Draft  was  improved  so  much  that  many  scholars 
believed that it only needed minor changes before it was adopted. The further 
development proves that they are right. 
 
After more than a decade of drafting, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was finally 
adopted by the 10
th NPC Standing Committee on the 30
th August 2007 by 150 out 
of the 153 votes.
112 The adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is a landmark in 
the  history  of  the  Chinese  economic  legislation.  James  Zimmerman,  the 
chairman  of  the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Beijing,  stated  that  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 is a ‘defining moment in the development of China’s 
legal system, which establishes a basic framework to build a fair, uniform and 
national  competition  law  system  that  benefits  consumers  by  recognizing  and 
preserving the incentives to compete’.
113  
 
The Antimonopoly Law 2007 contains eight chapters and 57 provisions. Article 13 
and Article 14 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 ban monopolistic arrangements, 
such as cartels and other forms of collusion. Article 15 grants exemptions to 
monopolistic  arrangements  that  promote  innovation  and  technological 
advancement. Article 17 prohibits monopolies from using their dominant status 
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in the market to curb competition, fix prices, enforce package sales, and refuse 
or enforce trade. Chapter Four of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 deals with mergers 
and acquisitions. In addition, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 also bans the so called 
administrative monopoly.
114 
 
It will improve the existing competition regime in China in four aspects once it 
comes into force on the 1
st August 2008. First, it will bring some coherence to 
China’s competition regime through uniting all the existing Chinese competition 
related legislation into one piece. Second, it will provide a systematic legal basis 
for combating anticompetitive practices. Third, it will provide a general ban on 
all  types  of  anticompetitive  practices  which  are  normally  prohibited  by  a 
competition law in most competition regimes, such as hard core cartels. Four, it 
will  improve  the  enforcement  of  competition  legislation  through  centralizing 
enforcement by setting up an Antimonopoly Commission under the State Council 
which will be responsible for organization, coordination and supervision of the 
enforcement of this Law. 
 
2.3 Why Has It Taken China Nearly 20 Years to Adopt the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
There are several reasons why it has taken China nearly 20 years to enact the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007.
115 What follows summarises some of these reasons. 
 
First, political elements delayed the adoption of an antimonopoly law. Despite 
its aim to establish a market economy, China has not abandoned its socialist 
political system. Before China adopted the Antimonopoly Law 2007, Vietnam was 
the only communist country which had adopted a competition law. Considering 
its relatively small size, Vietnam does not provide a useful solution for China. 
Moreover, Vietnam’s competition law itself suffers from criticism as well. From 
this view, no comparable example can be considered for the Chinese officials in 
order to formulate the Antimonopoly Law. Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, therefore, 
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claimed that: 
In  tune  with  its  ambition  to  achieve  a  market  economy  without 
completely  abandoning  the  socialist  political  system,  China  is 
experimenting with what may be referred to as a ‘third way’ in framing 
competition law, which rejects both pure capitalism and socialism.
116  
 
Second,  Chinese  culture  is  not  very  helpful  to  formulate  a  comprehensive 
competiton law. The word ‘competition’ originates from the Latin word ‘con 
curro’ (‘concurr’ ere’), which refers to running together, emulation and rivalry. 
However,  the  translation  of  ‘competition’  into  Chinese  varies  from  the  Latin 
meaning. It is translated as 竞争 [Jingzheng] in Chinese, a creation with two 
Chinese characters. The first character 竞 [Jing] refers to emulation and race. 
The second character 争 [Zheng] stands for the negative meaning of dispute, 
quarrel, conflict and fight. From this translation, we can see that competition or 
‘Jingzheng’ does not reflect the traditional understanding of the harmonization 
[和谐,  Hexie]  culture.  For  more  than  2,000  years,  Chinese  society  has  been 
influenced by Confucianism.
117 According to Confucianism, harmonization is the 
basis of a society. This concept has also influenced the way in which businessmen 
operate their business. Businessmen believe in harmonious cooperation among 
themselves over competition. A harmonization culture exists not only in China, 
but  also  in  other  East  Asian  countries,  such  as  Japan  whose  culture  is  also 
dominated by Confucianism.
118 Although China has been governed by the Chinese 
Communist  Party  for  nearly  sixty  years,  the  influence  of  the  concept  of 
‘harmonization’ still exists in Chinese Society. For example, building a socialist 
harmonious  society  is  one  of  the  aims  of  China’s  Eleventh  Five year  Plan.
119 
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Traditionally,  therefore,  China  does  not  have  a  favourable  culture  for 
competition as understood in the west. 
 
Third,  there  was  a  struggle  for  power  among  different  ministries  during  the 
process  of  adopting  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  Some  ministries  have  huge 
power in regard to some industries, although such power is diminishing in recent 
years. For example, the Ministry of Railway is still in charge of the daily business 
of trains. Adopting a competition law could reduce the power possessed by these 
ministries. During the process of adopting the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, 
they were anxious to either seek exemption from this Law or try to block the 
adoption of this Law in order to protect their own existing interests and power. 
For example, the 1999 Draft provides that this Law shall not apply, within five 
years after its promulgation, to behaviour ratified by the competition authorities 
under  the  State  Council  in  natural  monopolies  or  public  utilities  such  as  the 
postal  service,  railroads,  electricity,  gas,  and  water.  This  hostile  attitude 
towards a competition law delayed the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Fourth, there were disagreements regarding the establishment of a competition 
authority  or  competition  authorities  during  the  process  of  adopting  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. The administrative enforcement authority will play a 
key role in implementing China’s Antimonopoly Law. It will play the part of law 
maker, policeman, investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. Thus, the Ministry of 
Commerce,  the  SAIC,  and  the  NDRC,  which  are  in  charge  of  drafting  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, compete with each other in order to be chosen as the 
designated competition enforcement authority. For example, the 2004 Submitted 
Draft  submitted  by  the  Ministry  of  Commerce  provides  that  the  competition 
authority is a sub organ under the Ministry of Commerce. The power struggle 
among these three ministries seriously delayed the adoption of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007, particularly during the final stage. 
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3  Conclusion 
China started to combat anticompetitive practices nearly 30 years ago when the 
State Council promulgated the Interim Regulation for Competition 1980. Since 
then,  it  has  adopted  a  number  of  pieces  of  competition related  legislation. 
However, these pieces of competition related legislation became insufficient to 
combat the increasing anticompetitive practices during China’s market oriented 
economic reform and its rapid integration into the global economy particularly 
after  China’s  accession  to  the  WTO.  Hence,  China  needed  a  comprehensive 
competition law. It started to draft an antimonopoly law in the late 1980s. The 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 was adopted on the 30
th August 2007. As China’s first 
comprehensive  competition  law,  it  unites  the  existing  competition related 
legislation in China and provides a general ban on all anticompetitive practices. 
It will change the landmark of China’s competition regime once it takes effect 
on the 1
st August 2008. Moreover, it will inevitably have international reach due 
to China’s increasingly significant role in the global economy. 
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Table II-1: Market Share of Top Three Companies in Sector in China 
Market Share of top three companies in sector (%) 
Telecoms (mobile)  100.0  China Mobile, China Unicom 
Telecoms (fixed 
line) 
100.0  China Telecom, China Netcom, China Unicom 
Alumina  100.0  Calco 
Oil mining  100.0  Petrochina, Sino pec, CNOOC 
Lottery machines  100.0  China Lotsynergy 
Insurance (property)  89.7  PICC, China Pacific, Ping An 
Insurance (life)  86.7  China Life, Ping An, China Pacific 
Instant noodles  60.0  Master Kong, Uni president, Hualong 
Dairy products  60.0  Yili, Mengniu, Bright 
Banking  58.5  ICBC, CCB, Aboc 
Notebook PCs  54.0  Lenovo+IBM, Dell, Hewlett Packard 
Desktop PCs  52.5  Lenovo+IBM, Founder, Tongfang 
Colour TVs  50.0  Konka, Changhong, TCL 
Cars   27.5  Shanghai GM, Shanghai Volkswagen, Beijing 
Hyundai 
Aluminium  23.1  Chalco, Qingtongxia, Jiaozhowanfang 
Sportswear  15.0  Nike, Adidas, Li Ning 
Steel  12.2  Bao Steel, Wugang Steel, Shougang Steel 
Coal mining  12.0  Shenhua, Shanxi Coking, Datang 
Source: Deutsche Bank (quoted from Financial Times, ‘Challenging Change: Why 
an ever fiercer battle hinders China’s march to the market’, p.15, 28 February, 
2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 2, 113 
Table II-2: Competition Cases Concluded by the SAIC 
Type of Case  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Restrictions by 
public utilities 
55  102  94  131  432  758  1,614  1,089 
Predatory 
pricing 
10  59  32  19  26  39  31  43 
Tie in sales  91  42  85  44  84  64  110  139 
Bid rigging  16  23  37  77  51  210  316  188 
Total number 
of 
anticompetitive 
cases 
172  226  248  271  593  1071  2071  1459 
Total number 
of cases 
5,288  11,388  14,891  14,646  18,199  26,053  35,371  40,851 
The percentage 
of 
anticompetitive 
cases in the 
whole cases 
concluded by 
the SAIC 
About 
3.25% 
About 
1.98% 
About 
1.665% 
About 
1.85% 
About 
3.258% 
About 
4.11% 
About 
5.855% 
About 
3.572% 
 
Source: SAIC, there is English version at 
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China.html#Statistics 114 
Chapter Three:                                        
The Impact of the National Treatment 
Principle under the WTO on the Formulation 
of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This chapter examines the impact of the national treatment principle under the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007).
1 To this 
end, it is structured into two sections. The first section explores whether a WTO 
Member’s  competition  law  needs  to  be  consistent  with  the  WTO  national 
treatment  principle. The  second  section  examines,  if  so,  to  what  extent  the 
formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  has  been  influenced  by  such  an 
obligation. 
 
Before that, it has to be acknowledged that it is always far from easy to apply 
general principles even at domestic level. Peter M. Gerhart and Michael S. Baron 
argued: ‘Rules against discrimination are easy to state at a general level but are 
devilishly  difficult  to  apply  in  particular  cases;  the  gulf  between  articulating 
principles of non discrimination and applying them is wide’.
 2 This becomes even 
more  difficult  to  apply  the  national  treatment  principle  at  the  international 
level considering the weaknesses of international law.  
 
                                         
1 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
2 P. Gerhart and M. Baron, ‘Understanding National Treatment: The Participatory Vision of the 
WTO’, Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 14(3), (2003), 505, p. 505. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 115 
1  The WTO National Treatment Principle and WTO 
Members’ National Competition Laws
3 
This section examines whether, and if so, to what extent, and how the WTO 
national  treatment  principle  matters  to  WTO  Members’  national  competition 
laws. 
 
1.1 The WTO National Treatment Principle
4 
What follows focuses on the meaning, the purpose and the exceptions of the 
WTO national treatment principle. 
 
1.1.1 The Meaning of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
The principle of national treatment has long been ‘a cornerstone of the world 
                                         
3 For more discussions on the matter of the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle to 
competition law and policy, see, e.g., the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP), Communication from the European Community and Its member 
states -The Relevance of Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Transparency 
and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment to Competition Policy and Vice Versa, 
WT/WGTCP/W/115, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from Switzerland, WT/WGTCP/W/117, 
(1999); WGTCP, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/119, (1999); WGTCP, 
Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/120, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from the 
United States, WT/WGTCP/W/131, (1999); and E.-U. Petersmann, ‘WTO Core Principles and 
Trade/Competition’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate 
Law 2003, New York: Juris Publishing Inc., (2004), 669. 
4 For more discussions of the WTO national treatment principle, see, WGTCP, The Fundamental 
WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment- Background Note by 
the Secretariat, WT/WGTCP/W/114, (1999); J. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2
nd ed., 
Cambridge: MIT Press, (1997), pp. 213-245; J. Jackson, W. Davey and A. Sykes, eds., Legal 
Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, 4
th ed., St. Paul: 
West Group, (2002), pp. 479-531; P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), pp. 
326-369; M. Matsushita, T. Schoenbaum and P. Mavroidis, eds., The World Trade 
Organisation: Law, Practice, and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2006), pp. 233-256. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 116 
trading  system  that  is  served  by  the  WTO’.
5 It  is  set  out  in  the  following 
provisions  of  the  three  main  WTO  Agreements:  Article  III  of  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
6, Article XVII of the General Agreement 
on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS)
7 and  Article  3  of  the  Trade Related  Aspects  of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
8. In addition, it is incorporated in various 
other WTO Agreements, such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT)
9 ,  the  Application  of  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Measures
10  and  the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP).
11 
 
The WTO national treatment principle requires a WTO Member to treat foreign 
products, services or persons not less favourably than it treats ‘like’ domestic 
products, services and service suppliers. Put another way, a WTO Member is not 
allowed to discriminate against foreign products, services and service suppliers. 
The  WTO  Working  Group  on  the  Interaction  between  Trade  and  Competition 
Policy (WGTCP) claimed: ‘The essence of the principle of national treatment is 
to require that a WTO Member does not put the goods or services or persons of 
other WTO Members at a competitive disadvantage  vis-à-vis its own goods or 
services  or  nationals’.
12 The  national  treatment  principle  is  a  significant  rule 
under the WTO framework that has given rise to many trade disputes.
13 
                                         
5Appellate Body Report, United States- Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (US-
Section 211 Appropriations Act), WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II, 589, 
para. 241. 
6 The GATT is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm. 
7 The GATS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm. 
8 The TRIPS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. 
9 The TBT is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm. 
10 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm. 
11 The AGP is a plurilateral agreement and available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm. 
12 WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/114, note 3, para.13, p. 4. 
13 See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery 
(Italy-Agricultural Machinery), L/833, adopted 23 October 1958, BISD 7S/60; GATT Panel 
Report, Canada-Foreign Investment Review Act (Canada - FIRA), L/5504, adopted on 7 
February 1984, BISD 30S/140; GATT Panel Report, United States- Section 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 (US-Section 337 Tariff Act), L/6439, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345; GATT Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 117 
 
1.1.2 The Purpose of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
The purpose of the national treatment principle under the GATT/WTO has been 
interpreted  by  Panels  and  the  Appellate  Body.  In  Japan-Taxes  on  Alcoholic 
Beverages  (Japan-Alcoholic  Beverages  II),  for  example,  the  Appellate  Body 
claimed:  
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism 
in  the  application  of  internal  tax  and  regulatory  measures.  More 
specifically, the purpose of Article III ‘is to ensure that internal measures 
not  be  applied  to  imported  or  domestic  products  so  as  to  afford 
protection  to domestic  production.’ Toward  this  end, Article  III  obliges 
Members  of the  WTO  to  provide  equality of  competitive conditions  for 
imported products in relation to domestic products… Article III protects 
expectations not of any particular trade volume but rather of the equal 
competitive relationship between imported and domestic products.
14 
This  anti protectionist  thrust  is  supported  by  Article  III:1  of  the  GATT  which 
reads: 
Members  recognize  that  internal  taxes  and  other  internal  charges  and 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering 
for  sale,  purchase,  transportation,  distribution  or  use  of  products,  and 
internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use 
                                                                                                                             
Panel Report, European Economic Community- Regulation on Imports of Parts and 
Components (EEC-Parts and Components), L/5155, adopted 16 May 1990, BISD 37S/132; 
Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II), 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:1, 97; 
Panel Report, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas 
III), WT/DS27/R, circulated 22 May 1997, DSR 1997:II, 943; Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas 
III), adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591; Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC-
Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243; Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’—Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities (US-FSC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 
January 2002, DSR 2002:I, 55; and Appellate Body Report, US-Section 211 Appropriations Act, 
note 5. 
14 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, note 13, p. 15. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 118 
of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to 
imported  or  domestic  products  so  as  to  afford  protection  to  domestic 
production.
15 
In European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products  (EC-Asbestos),  the  Appellate  Body  re emphasized:  ‘there  must  be 
consonance between the objective pursued by Article III, as enunciated in the 
“general  principle”  articulated  in  Article  III:1,  and  the  interpretation  of  the 
specific expression of this principle in the text of Article III:4’.
16 
 
Hence, Peter M. Gerhart and Michael S. Baron argued:  
[T]he Appellate  Body  has  developed  an  interpretive  framework  for  the 
national  treatment  provision  of  Article  III  that  is  consistent  with  the 
process oriented role of the WTO, and re emphasizes it as an institution 
whose  central  mission  is  to  insure  that  when  a  member  country  takes 
regulatory action affecting foreigners, the interests of the foreigners are 
not ignored in the decision making process.
17  
In general, therefore, the purpose of the WTO national treatment principle is as 
a legal yardstick to scrutinize the appropriateness of a WTO Member’s domestic 
legislation to see whether or not such legislation is consistent with the values 
that  make  up  the  WTO’s  free  trade  regime.
18 The  inclusion  of  the  national 
treatment  principle  in  the  WTO  Agreements  helps  to  define  the  appropriate 
balance between the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members that is part of state 
sovereignty and the suppression of hidden protectionism.
19 From this point of 
                                         
15 The GATT, Art. III :1. 
16 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, note 13, para. 98. 
17 P. Gerhart and M. Baron, (2003), note 2, p. 549. 
18 Generally, the WTO rules limit the WTO Members’ domestic regulatory power in trade-related 
areas. 
19 See generally, J. Jackson, (1997), note 4, p. 212, (referring to the ‘clash of policies’ inherent in 
the national treatment provision); F. Roessler, ‘Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral 
Trade Integration’, in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization, vol. 2, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, (1996), 1, p. 1 (stating: ‘the rules of [GATT] primarily aim at the 
reduction of barriers between markets, not at the harmonization of competitive conditions in 
markets. They therefore impose in principle only constraints on trade policies, but leave the 
contracting parties free to conduct their domestic policies’.); G. Verhoosel, National Treatment 
and WTO Dispute Settlement: Adjudicating the Boundaries of Regulatory Autonomy, Oxford: Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 119 
view, thus, its function is similar to the so called Commerce Clause of the United 
States (US) Constitution that has helped define the balance of power between 
the federal government and individual states.
20 This could be the reason why 
Gaetan Verhoosel claimed that: ‘Defining National Treatment means determining 
the constitutional function of the WTO’.
21 
 
1.1.3 Exceptions to the Application of the WTO National 
Treatment Principle 
Under  the  WTO  Agreements,  there  are  some  exceptions  where  the  national 
treatment principle is not applicable. Moreover, the scope of the application of 
the  national  treatment  principle  varies  in  different  WTO  Agreements.  What 
follows focuses on the GATT and the GATS since they are the most important 
agreements under the WTO framework. 
 
The GATT only covers goods and does not apply to producers, while the GATS 
applies  to  both  services  and  service  providers.  From  this  sense,  the  national 
treatment principle under the GATS has a broader scope than under the GATT. 
The GATT requirement is also limited to ‘internal’ measures. The corresponding 
requirement  in  the  GATS  is  dependent  on  specific  commitments  having  been 
scheduled  by  the  WTO  Member  concerned.  In  other  words,  the  national 
treatment principle is not applicable automatically under the GATS.  
 
In  addition,  there  are  also  a  number  of  other  permissible  exceptions  to  the 
national  treatment  principle  under  the  GATT  and  the  GATS.  First,  it  is  not 
applicable to government procurement of goods and services under Article III:8(a) 
of the GATT and Article XIII of the GATS. Under the AGP which is a plurilateral 
                                                                                                                             
Hart Publishing, (2002), p. 2 (portraying the national treatment analysis as turning on the desire 
to liberalize trade without requiring deeper market integration or harmonization).  
20 The United States (US) Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3 (stipulating: ‘The Congress shall 
have Power… To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes’). Peter Gerhart and Michael Baron argued: ‘The national treatment 
provision, like its counterpart in the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine of the US Constitution, 
is designed to oversee the political process in member countries to ensure that the interests of 
foreigners are not denigrated or ignored’. See, P. Gerhart and M. Baron, (2003), note 2, p. 517. 
21 G. Verhoosel, (2002), note 19, p. 7. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 120 
agreement,  however,  it  applies  to  some  WTO  Members  in  regard  to  a  large 
proportion of their government procurement of goods and services.
22 Second, it 
is not applicable to such matters as measures necessary to protect public morals 
or maintain public order, to protect human, animal, or plant life or health and to 
secure compliance with laws and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions 
of the agreement in question under Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV of the 
GATS. Such general exceptions are subject to the requirement that measures 
taken pursuant to them are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same  (GATT)  or  like  (GATS)  conditions  prevail,  or  a  disguised  restriction  on 
international trade. Third, the national treatment principle is not applicable to 
the measures regarding security issues under Article XXI of the GATT and Article 
XIVbis of the GATS. 
 
1.2 Whether, and If So, To What Extent Is the WTO 
National Treatment Principle Applicable to WTO 
Members’ Competition Laws? 
Despite the existence of exceptional provisions, the national treatment principle 
under the WTO framework could still have significant effects on WTO Members’ 
domestic  legislation.  This  is  why  some  commentators  think  the  national 
treatment principle is the gatekeeper for the WTO’s constitutional function.
23 
What  follows  explores  whether,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent  the  WTO  national 
treatment principle is applicable to WTO Members’ competition laws.  
 
1.2.1  Is the WTO National Treatment Principle Applicable to WTO 
Members’ Competition Laws? 
In  order  to  apply  the  national  treatment  under  the  GATT  or  the  GATS,  two 
conditions  must  be  fulfilled.  First,  a  piece  of  domestic  legislation  must  fall 
within either the term ‘all laws, regulations and requirements’ under the GATT 
or  the  term  ‘measures’  under  the  GATS.  Second,  such  legislation  must  have 
                                         
22 Currently 25 WTO Members are parties to the Agreement on Government Procurement.  
23 See, G. Verhoosel, (2002), note 19, pp. 1 ff, particularly, p. 4. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 121 
effects on ‘internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use’ of goods under the GATT or services or service providers under the GATS.  
 
1.2.1.1  Terms ‘Laws, Regulations and Requirements’ and ‘Measures’  
Under the GATT, Article III: 4 applies to ‘all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting  [the]  internal  sale,  offering  for  sale,  purchase,  transportation, 
distribution or use’ of products of national origin. In general, the GATT/WTO 
case law consistently interprets the term ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ 
broadly. In Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery (Italy-
Agricultural  Machinery),  the  GATT  Panel  emphasized  that  the  application  of 
Article III was not intended to be limited to measures that were overtly focused 
on regulating the conditions of trade. Instead, it claimed that ‘laws, regulations 
and requirements’ could cover ‘any laws or regulations which might adversely 
modify the conditions of competition between domestic and imported products 
on the internal market’.
24 This case signals the start of a broad approach to the 
meaning of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’. Subsequent GATT/WTO cases 
have followed this trend. In the Canada-Foreign Investment Review Act (Canada 
- FIRA), for instance, the GATT Panel considered that written and legally binding 
purchase  and  export  undertakings  submitted  by  investors  were  covered  by 
Article III, although the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act did not make 
the  submission  obligatory.
25 In  European  Economic  Community-  Regulation  on 
Imports of Parts and Components (EEC-Parts and Components), the GATT Panel 
considered that requirements which an enterprise voluntarily accepted in order 
to obtain an advantage from the government came within the scope of Article 
III: 4.
26 In addition, in United States- Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (US-
Section 337 Tariff Act), the GATT Panel made it clear that Article III: 4 applies 
to both procedural and substantive laws, regulations and requirements.
27  
 
Under the GATS, the national treatment principle applies to ‘measures affecting 
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
                                         
24 GATT Panel Report, Italy-Agricultural Machinery, note 13, para. 12. 
25 GATT Panel Report, Canada - FIRA, note 13, para. 5.4. 
26 GATT Panel Report, EEC-Parts and Components, note 13, para. 5.21. 
27 GATT Panel Report, US-Section 337 Tariff Act, note 13, para. 5.10. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 122 
like services and service suppliers’. Article XXVIII of the GATS defines the term 
‘measure’  as  ‘any  measure  by  a  Member,  whether  in  the  form  of  a  law, 
regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form’. 
Article XXVIII(c) of the GATS defines ‘measures by Members affecting trade in 
services’ to include measures in respect of:  
(i) the purchase, payment or use of a service; (ii) the access to and use 
of, in connection with the supply of a service, services which are required 
by  those  Members  to  be  offered  to  the  public  generally;  and  (iii)  the 
presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Member for the 
supply of a service in the territory of another Member.  
Thus,  the  scope  of  application  of  the  national  treatment  principle  under  the 
GATS is relatively clearer than it is under the GATT, because it is defined in the 
GATS. Like the approach to the meaning of ‘laws, regulations and measures’ in 
Article III: 4 of the GATT, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have taken the 
view that the term ‘measures’ as defined in the GATS must be given a broad 
scope  of  application
28 ,  although  there  is  less  experience  in  applying  this 
provision in particular cases than there is in respect of Article III of the GATT. In 
fact,  the  scope  of  the  application  of  national  treatment  in  GATS  could  be 
broader  than  in  the  GATT,  because  the  GATS  provisions  make  no  distinction 
between measures which directly govern or regulate services and measures that 
otherwise affect trade in services. In EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution  of  Bananas  (EC-Bananas  III),  the  WTO  Panel  argued  that  if  the 
drafters of the GATS had intended to impose a similar limitation on the scope of 
the application of national treatment in the GATS to the GATT, they would have 
provided for the limitation explicitly in the text  of the GATS itself or in the 
provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
29 These Panel findings were 
upheld by the Appellate Body.
30  
 
1.2.1.2  Term ‘Affecting’ 
As discussed above, both GATT/WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have taken a 
                                         
28 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, para. 220; also, Appellate Body 
Report, US-FSC, note 13, paras. 209 and 210. 
29 Panel Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, paras. 283-284. 
30 Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, paras. 217-222. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 123 
broad approach to interpret the meaning of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ 
under the GATT and the meaning of ‘measures’ under the GATS. However, this is 
not enough to claim that all domestic regulatory measures are covered by the 
national  treatment  principle  within  the  WTO.  In  order  to  apply  the  national 
treatment  principle,  the  term  ‘affecting’  has  to  be  examined.  A  domestic 
regulatory measure would not be covered by the national treatment principle 
under the WTO, if the term ‘affecting’ were interpreted narrowly. Fortunately, it 
is not the case here. In Italy-Agricultural Machinery, the GATT Panel found that, 
due to the verb ‘affecting’, Article III: 4 covered ‘any laws or regulations which 
might adversely modify the conditions of competition’ of imports.
31 In US-FSC, 
the Appellate Body confirmed that the word ‘affecting’ in Article III: 4 had ‘a 
broad scope of application’.
32 
 
The interpretation of the term ‘affecting’ in the GATS has followed the approach 
adopted by the case law in GATT. In EC-Bananas III, for instance, the Appellate 
Body claimed:  
The ordinary meaning of the word ‘affecting’ implies a measure that has 
‘an  effect  on’,  which  indicates  a broad  scope  of  application.  This 
interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of previous panels 
that the term ‘affecting’ in the context of Article III of the GATT is wider 
in  scope  than  such  terms  as  ‘regulating’  or  ‘governing’.  (emphasis 
added).
33  
In US-FSC, the Appellate Body confirmed that like the word ‘affecting’ in Article 
III of the GATT, the word ‘affecting’ in Article XVII of the GATS had also had a 
similar ‘broad scope of application’.
34 
 
                                         
31 GATT Panel Report, Italy-Agricultural Machinery, note 13, para. 12. 
32 Appellate Body Report, US-FSC, note 13, paras. 209-210 (referring to Appellate Body Report, 
EC-Bananas III, note 13, para. 220 and Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada-Autos), WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 
19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VII, 3043, para. 150). 
33 See, Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, para. 220. 
34 See, Appellate Body Report, US-FSC, note 13, para. 210. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 124 
1.2.1.3  National Competition Laws Could Be Covered by the WTO National 
Treatment Principle 
Because  the  terms  ‘laws,  regulations  and  requirements’,  ‘measures’,  and 
‘affecting’  have  been  interpreted  broadly,  a  WTO  Member’s  competition  law 
could easily fall into the scope of the national treatment principle under the 
WTO. The WTO Secretariat has itself confirmed this conclusion. It claimed that 
competition ‘laws would fall within the scope of the national treatment rule of 
Article III:4 to the extent that they affect the internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation,  distribution or  use  of  goods’.
35 Furthermore, it  also 
claimed  that  among  WTO  Members  there  is  a  ‘general  recognition  that  the 
fundamental principles of the WTO [including the national treatment principle] 
are already applicable… to the field of competition law and policy’.
36 In addition, 
Claus Dieter Ehlerman,  a  former  Chairman of  the Appellate  Body,  and  Lothar 
Ehring, a former member of the Appellate Body Secretariat, also argued: 
There can be no doubt that a piece of national competition legislation 
belongs to those provisions that have to comply with Article III:4 of the 
GATT.  A  national  competition  act  falls  within  the  category  of  ‘laws, 
regulations  and  requirements  affecting  (the)  internal  sale,  offering  for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use’ of goods.
37 
This  opinion  is  also  shared  by  other  leading  scholars.  Bernard  Hoekman  and 
Petros Mavroidis, for instance, argued that WTO Members’ national competition 
laws were covered by the WTO national treatment principle as the enforcement 
of national competition laws was a ‘requirement affecting’ trade.
38 
 
                                         
35 WTO, ‘Special Topic: Trade and Competition’, in WTO, Annual Report 1997, Geneva: WTO, 
(1997), p. 69. 
36 WGTCP, Core Principles, including Transparency, Non-Discrimination and Procedural Fairness-
Background Note by the Secretariat, WT/WGTCP/W/209, (2002), p. 7. 
37 C.-D. Ehlermann and L. Ehring, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the 
Perspective of the Appellate Body’s Experience’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 26, 
(2003), 1505, p. 1520. 
38 B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, ‘Economic Development, Competition Policy and the WTO’, 
Paper presented at the Roundtable ‘Informing the Doha Process: New Trade Research for 
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1.2.2 To What Extent Is A WTO Member’s National Competition 
Law Covered by the WTO National Treatment Principle?  
Although  a  WTO  Member’s  domestic  competition  law  is  covered  by  the  WTO 
national  treatment  principle,  it  has  to  be  recognised  that  this  coverage  has 
limitations.  The  obvious  one  is  that  the  national  treatment  principle  has 
inherent  limitations  in  regard  to  its  application  to  WTO  Members’  domestic 
competition  laws  because  of  the  scope  of  the  application  of  the  national 
treatment  principle  under  the  WTO  generally.
39 What  follows  explores  two 
limitations in regard to the application of the national treatment principle to 
WTO Members’ domestic competition laws.  
 
1.2.2.1  Existing Competition Laws 
Article  III:  4  of  the  GATT  expressly  applies  only  to  existing  governmental 
treatment accorded in respect of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’. Article 
XVII  of  the  GATS  only  applies  to  existing  governmental  measures.  Under  the 
current  WTO  law,  therefore,  it  does  not  seem  that  the  national  treatment 
principle  can  be  a  possible  yardstick  of  legal  scrutiny  where  WTO  Members’ 
competition  laws  are  totally  non existent.  In  other  words,  the  WTO  national 
treatment principle cannot be used as a tool to force WTO members to adopt 
competition laws, if they have not done so. It can only be applicable to the WTO 
Members’ domestic competition laws that already exist. 
 
1.2.2.2  Affecting Trade 
As discussed above, in order to apply the WTO national treatment principle to 
national  competition  law,  provisions  or  the  enforcement  of  WTO  Members’ 
competition  laws  must  affect  ‘internal  sale,  offering  for  sale,  purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use’ under the GATT or ‘the supply of services’ or 
service providers under the GATS. This has been made clear by the Appellate 
Body in the US-FSC.
40 In this case, the Appellate Body stated that Article III:4 of 
                                         
39 See the previous discussion on the scope of the WTO national treatment principle. 
40 WTO Appellate Body Report, US-FSC, note 13, para. 208. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 126 
the GATT did not cover all laws, regulations and requirements.
41 Instead, it ruled 
that  only  the  laws,  regulations  and  requirements  which  affected  the  specific 
transactions, activities and uses mentioned in Article III of the GATT.
 42 Thus, the 
GATT/WTO  case  law  has  made  it clear  that  the  national  treatment  principle 
cannot be applicable to a WTO Member’s competition law if the enforcement of 
such  law  has  no  effects  on  trade,  although  the  term  ‘affecting’  has  been 
interpreted broadly by GATT/WTO Panels and the Appellate Body. 
 
1.3 The Potential Areas under A WTO Member’s National 
Competition Law Where Violations of the National 
Treatment Principle Could Arise 
Thus far the discussion has advanced to the point of recognizing that the WTO 
national  treatment  principle  can  reach  WTO  Members’  domestic  competition 
laws. That means, the national treatment principle, such as Article III:4 of the 
GATT, prohibits WTO Members from applying their competition laws in a manner 
that discriminates against foreign goods, services or service providers. The above 
discussion  also  illustrates  that  the  scope  of  the  application  of  the  national 
treatment principle to WTO Members’ domestic competition laws is limited. Not 
all aspects of a WTO Member’s domestic competition law are covered by the 
national treatment principle. Now, the question is what the potential areas are 
under a WTO Member’s national competition law where violations of the WTO 
national treatment principle could arise.  
 
GATT/WTO  case  law  has  made  it clear  that  the  national  treatment  principle 
applies to both procedural and substantive laws, regulations and requirements 
under the GATT and measures under the GATS.
43 Thus, a violation of the national 
treatment  principle  could  arise  through  both  procedural  and  substantive 
provisions of a national competition law. In addition, the GATT/WTO case law 
has already clarified that the national treatment principle covers cases of both 
de facto and de jure discrimination, although Article III of the GATT itself is not 
                                         
41 Id. 
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clear  on  this  issue.  In  Canada-Certain  Measures  Affecting  the  Automotive 
Industry (Canada-Autos), for instance, the Appellate Body claimed:  
In approaching this question, we observe first that the words of Article I:1 
do not restrict its scope only to cases in which the failure to accord an 
‘advantage’ to like products of all other Members appears on the face of 
the measure, or can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of the 
measure. Neither the words ‘de jure’ nor ‘de facto’ appear in Article I:1. 
Nevertheless, we observe that Article I:1 does not cover only ‘in law’, or 
de jure, discrimination. As several GATT panel reports confirmed, Article 
I:1 covers also ‘in fact’, or de facto, discrimination.
 44 
Unlike  Article  III  of  the  GATT,  Article  XVII  of  GATS  clearly  provides  that  the 
national treatment principle does not require formally identical treatment of 
domestic  and  foreign  suppliers:  formally  different  measures  can  result  in 
effective equality of treatment; just as formally identical measures can in some 
cases  result  in  less  favourable  treatment  of  foreign  suppliers  (de  facto 
discrimination). Thus, a violation of the national treatment can exist through 
both de jure and de facto discrimination in a national competition law.  
 
What  follows  explores  the  potential  areas  under  a  national  competition  law 
where a violation of the national treatment principle might exist from the angle 
of  substantive  issues:  objectives  and  exemptions.  It  then  focuses  on  each  of 
these  two  substantive  issues  from  the  angle  of  both  de  jure  and  de  facto 
discrimination.  
  
1.3.1 Objectives 
The objectives of a national competition law are significant for the enforcement 
and application of the law because:  
1. They inform the enforcement and application of the law. 2. They help 
identify  and  explain  differences  in  legal  standards  and  outcomes  in 
individual  cases.  3.  They  increase  transparency  and  facilitate  reasoned 
debate to the extent that they make explicit the rationales for decisions 
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in individual cases.
45  
Nowadays, many competition laws adopt multiple objectives. Barry Rodger and 
Angus MacCulloch argued that multi objectives were likely to bring uncertainty 
and  unpredictability  in  the  enforcement  of  competition  law.
46  Deunden 
Nkikomborirak also claimed: ‘the broader the objective of the competition law, 
the greater the discretionary power the administration has in granting exception 
to  competition  cases’.
47 What  follows  is  to  examine  the  objects  which  could 
present a risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
1.3.1.1  Public Interest 
The  concept  of  public  interest  has  always  arisen  whenever  competition  law 
reforms take place. Michal Gal argued that virtually all competition regimes in 
developing countries included public interest as one of the objectives of their 
competition legislation.
48 The term ‘public interest’ generally refers to domestic 
public interest. So far, no competition law in the world defines ‘public interest’ 
as a global public interest or an international public interest. Thus, when they 
consider  public  interest  as  the  reason  for  granting  exemptions,  competition 
authorities  are  likely  to  discriminate  against  companies  according  to  their 
nationality.  Thus,  it  is  questionable  how  the  term  ‘public  interest’  can  be 
consistent  with  the  national  treatment  principle  since  such  a  term  could  be 
applied discriminately against foreign firms. In practice, however, it is far from 
easy to prove such violations. There is no such case in the GATT/WTO case law 
to date. 
                                         
45 The American Bar Association, Re: Report on Antitrust Policy Objectives, (2003), p.2, 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf. 
46 B. Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and 
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nd ed., London, Sydney, Portland and Oregon: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
(2001), p. 15. 
47 See, D. Nkikomborirak, ‘Exemptions and Exceptions: Implications for Economic Performance: 
the Case of Thailand’, in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries, Geneva 
and New York: United Nations, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/1, (2004), 91, p. 92. 
48 These countries include, inter alia, Cameroon, Gabon, Jamaica, Kenya, Macedonia, Morocco, 
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1.3.1.2  Development of the National Economy 
It is not unusual to include the development of the national economy as one of 
the  objectives  of  a  competition  law.
  49 In  Japan,  for  example,  one  of  the 
objectives of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance 
of  Fair  Trade  1947  is  ‘to  promote…  wholesome  development  of  the  national 
economy’.
50 In India, one of the objectives of the Competition Act 2002 is to 
keep ‘in view the economic development of the country’.
51 
 
However, the practice of incorporating the development of the national economy 
into competition laws is not popular among some developed countries. Ratnakar 
Adhikari  claimed:  ‘The  question  of  the  development  dimension  is  largely  a 
Southern phenomenon’.
 52 However, Terry Winslow argued:  
[O]ne reason why the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co operation and 
Development] countries are increasing their emphasis on efficiency and 
decreasing  their  use  of  competition  law  and  policy  to  promote  non 
competition  goals  is  that  they  have  other  policy  mechanisms  that  are 
more effective to promote such goals. Developing countries may not yet 
have  alternative  effective  policy  mechanisms  for  dealing  with  non 
competition goals.
53  
 
It is not clear where the inclusion of the development of the national economy 
as a primary objective of competition law is a  de  jure  violation of the WTO 
                                                                                                                             
Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries’, in 
UNCTAD, (2004), note 47, 21, p. 52. 
49 About the issue of development dimension of competition law and policy, see, e.g., R. Adhikari, 
‘Prerequisite for Development-Oriented Competition Policy Implementation: A Case Study of 
Nepal’, in UNCTAD, (2004), note 47, 53; also, W. Lachmann, The Development Dimension of 
Competition Law and Policy, Geneva and New York: United Nations, (1999). 
50 The Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade 1947, 
Sec. 1. The official English version is available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf. 
51 It is available at http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/Act/competition_act2002.pdf. 
52 See, R. Adhikari, (2004), note 49, 53, p. 68. 
53 T. Winslow, ‘Preventing Market Abuses and Promoting Economic Efficiency, Growth and 
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national  treatment  principle.  However,  inclusion  of  the  development  of  the 
national economy as an objective of a national competition law could leave the 
doors open for de facto  discriminations when the term ‘national economy’ is 
applied. Competition authorities could protect domestic firms in the name of 
promoting national economic development. However, it has to be acknowledged 
that such violation of the national treatment principle is far from easy to prove. 
There is no such case in the GATT/WTO case law to date. 
 
1.3.2 Exceptions and Exemptions 
As  Pamela  Sittenfeld  claimed,  ‘one  of  the  most  controversial  issues  in 
competition  and  international  trade  is  that  of  exceptions  and  exemptions’.
54 
Very few competition laws cover all aspects of a national economy.
55 Instead, 
exemptions  are  common  practices  in  major  competition  regimes.  In  general, 
exemptions  can  be  divided  into  sector  and  non sector  exemptions.  Generally 
speaking, it is very rare that an exemption provided by a competition regime 
explicitly refers to different treatment to be accorded on the basis of nationality. 
In other words, a violation normally arises from de facto discrimination rather 
than de jure discrimination. A violation of the national treatment principle in the 
WTO could arise either from the case where less favourable treatment exists 
because  the  application  of  the  exemption  has  been  more  burdensome  for 
imported goods or services, or from the case where the design of the overall 
competition  law  is  intended  to  exempt  sectors  where  only  domestic  firms 
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55 See, e.g., OECD, Antitrust and Market Access: the Scope and Coverage of Competition Laws 
and Implications for Trade, Paris: OECD, (1996) (providing a comprehensive study of the scope 
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benefit or few foreign firms benefit.
56  
 
1.3.2.1  Non-Sector Exemptions 
Many competition regimes grant exemptions from the prohibition against cartels. 
These  exempted  cartels  normally  include  export  cartels,  crisis  cartels,  and 
cartels involving small and medium sized businesses. These exemptions could be, 
on their face, discriminatory where they are available only to domestic firms. 
Export  cartels  provide  an  example  to  illustrate  how  granting  non sector 
exemptions could violate the national treatment principle under the WTO.
57 
 
An export cartel here refers to a group or association of firms ‘that cooperate in 
the  marketing  and  distribution  of  their  product  to  foreign  markets’.
58 The 
anticompetitive  conduct  by  associations  or  combinations  of  exporters  affects 
exports and hurts foreign customers. According to the study by Simon Evenett, 
Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow, virtually all competition regimes grant 
exemptions  to  export  cartels  from  prosecution  by  domestic  authorities.
59 The 
argument  here  is  not  about  whether  export  cartels  can  be  justified  from  a 
competition point of view
60 but whether the exemptions of export cartels violate 
the WTO national treatment principle. These are two different issues. Whether 
export cartels violate the WTO national treatment principle does not depend on 
whether such cartels are harmful to domestic consumers. Export cartels could 
violate the WTO national treatment principle even if they can benefit domestic 
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National Competition Laws and Implications for a Competition Policy Framework, Geneva and 
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consumers.  Thus,  whether  or  not  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  is 
violated  by  granting  exemptions  to  export  cartels  depends  on  how  the  firms 
which benefit from such exemptions are selected. Put another way, the violation 
of the WTO national treatment principle by exemption provisions under national 
competition  regimes  could  happen  where  foreign invested  export  firms  are 
treated less favourably than domestic export firms either de jure or de facto 
under an export cartel exemption. 
 
In  practice,  domestic  firms  can  generally  have  more  chances  to  be  granted 
exemptions than foreign invested companies. Through export cartels, a domestic 
competition  regime  provides  ‘legal  privileges  and  immunities  to  their  own 
nation’s firms that are members of export cartels’.
61 It is very rare that foreign 
invested firms are the majority of the firms which benefit from an export cartel 
exemption. Instead, the majority, if not all, of the firms which benefit from an 
export cartel exemption are domestic firms. In addition, it is debatable whether 
or not the WTO national treatment obligation is violated when imports, which do 
not  enjoy  the  exemption,  are  obviously  treated  less  favourably  than  the 
exempted exports.  
 
From the examination of export cartels, therefore, it can be seen that whether a 
non sector exemption is consistent with the WTO national treatment principle 
depends  on  how  such  a  non sector  exemption  is  selected  and  what  kind  of 
companies  benefit  from  such  an  exemption.  If  such  an  exemption  is  granted 
based  on  some  criteria  which  discriminate  against  foreign  companies  or  only 
domestic  companies  can  benefit  from  such  an  exemption,  the  concern  of 
violation of the WTO national treatment principle might be raised. In practice, 
however,  it  is  far  from  easy  to  examine  such  a  violation  because  it  is  very 
difficult  to  argue  why  only  domestic  companies  benefit  from  a  non sector 
exemption. 
 
1.3.2.2  Sector Exemptions 
Some  economic  sectors  are  exempted  from  the  application  of  a  national 
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competition law through either this law itself or other sector legislation. Labour 
organisations, agriculture and transportation are the most common sectors that 
are  exempted  by  a  national  competition  law.
62 Other  sectors  that  could  be 
exempted  from  a  national  competition  law  are  energy,  telecommunications, 
postal services, media and publishing industries. 
  
As  the  European  Union  (EU)  argued,  ‘Broad  sectoral  exclusions  from  the 
application of competition law are a matter of concern’ from the point of view 
of discrimination.
63 Sector exemptions could violate the WTO national treatment 
principle  under  the  following  circumstances.  First,  the  absence  of  effective 
competition  law  disciplines  in  a  sector  of  economic  activity  can  result  in 
anticompetitive practices by domestic firms, which can lead to deny access to 
the domestic market to foreign competitors.  Second, when a sector exemption 
is granted, the scope and criteria could discriminate against foreign firms. For 
example,  competition  law  or  other  legislation  can  grant  exemptions  to  the 
sector where domestic firms dominate the market, while at the same time it 
refuses  to  grant  exemptions  to  the  sector  where  foreign  firms  dominate  the 
market. Thus, the application of sector exemption could de facto discriminate 
against foreign firms. In practice, however, it is far from easy in reality to argue 
that  a  WTO  Member  should  not  grant  an  exemption  to  a  sector  because  the 
result of implementing such an exemption could benefit domestic firms only. 
 
2  To What Extent Has the Formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 Been Influenced by the 
WTO National Treatment Principle? 
The  national  treatment  principle  in  international  law  is  not  an  unfamiliar 
obligation and dates back to earlier centuries.
64 But certainly it is not a happy 
application of this principle for China during the late nineteenth and the early 
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twentieth centuries.
65 China was first forced to accept the national treatment 
principle in 1842 because it was defeated by the UK in Opium War. Nevertheless, 
China is bound by the WTO national treatment principle since its accession to 
the  WTO.  China  has  confirmed  its  commitment  regarding  the  WTO  national 
treatment principle.
66 This section examines to what extent the formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by such an obligation. To this 
end, it is structured into three sub sections. First, it surveys the general impact 
of the WTO national treatment principle on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law  2007.  Second,  it  explores  the  impact  of  the  WTO  national  treatment 
principle on the formulation of the objectives of the Law. Third, it examines the 
impact  of  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  on  the  formulation  of  the 
exemption provisions of it.  
 
2.1 The General Impact: Recognising the Relevance of 
the WTO National Treatment Principle in the 
Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
As discussed before, the WTO national treatment principle matters when WTO 
Members formulate their competition laws because such competition laws have 
to  be  consistent  with  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  once  they  are 
adopted.  Initially,  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  was  not  an  issue  of 
concern  for  the  Chinese  government  in  regard  to  the  formulation  of  China’s 
competition law before it joined the WTO in 2001. However, it became relevant 
after China joined the WTO. It is far from easy for China to recognise the role 
played  by  the  national  treatment  principle  in  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 partly due to the painful experience of the application 
of  the  national  treatment  in  China  during  the  late  nineteenth  and  the  early 
twentieth centuries. What follows is to analyze the general impact of the WTO 
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national treatment principle on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
by exploring how China has gone through from denying or ignoring to recognising 
the  relevance  of  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  to  its  competition 
legislation. This journey can be divided into three stages. However, there is no 
black  and  white  line  between  each  stage.  In  fact,  these  three  stages  are 
sometimes mixed with each other. The reason why this journey is divided into 
three stages is purely for convenience. 
 
2.1.1 Stage One: Denying or Ignoring the WTO National Treatment 
Principle 
After  a  year  of  investigation,  the  Chinese  corporation  watchdog,  the  SAIC, 
published a report in 2004.
67 This report listed a number of industries where free 
competition may be threatened by multinationals. The list included industries 
that  produced  software,  photosensitive  materials,  mobile  phones,  cameras, 
vehicle  tires,  and  soft  packaging.  In  addition,  it  also  named  some  foreign 
companies which had a ‘market edge or even a monopoly’ in the Chinese market. 
According  to  this  report,  Microsoft  enjoyed  a  95%  market  share  of  computer 
operating system in China. Tetra Pac held 95% market share in the sterilized 
packaging  market.  Nokia  and  Motorola  together  took  up  for  70%  of  Chinese 
mobile phone market. Eastman Kodak, which had already held more than 50% of 
China’s roll film market, strengthened its dominant position after taking 20% of 
its sole major Chinese rival, Lucky Film.
68  
 
This report not only listed some foreign monopoly companies but also accused 
them of abusing their dominant positions. On the eve of the release of WPS97, 
the report cited, a set of computer programs developed by a Chinese company, a 
multinational company hurriedly brought forward its versions of similar products 
at much lower prices. Some companies set different prices for the same kinds of 
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在华跨国公司限制竞争行为表现及对策, Zaihua Kuaguo Gongsi Xianzhi Jingzheng Xingwei 
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products, with the Chinese goods costing twice as much as the equivalents in 
their countries of origin. The report also indicated that foreign companies that 
owned rights to advanced technology or other intellectual properties squeezed 
the market by refusing to sell their services or products to Chinese companies. 
Based on these reasons, the report concluded that China needed to adopt an 
antimonopoly law in order to combat anticompetitive practices by foreign firms. 
 
One of the major concerns of foreign officials and companies in regard to China’s 
competition law is whether foreign companies will be treated no less favourably 
than domestic firms under the new law. Some multinational companies, such as 
Microsoft,  have  frequently  given  comments  on  the  drafts  of  China’s 
Antimonopoly Law.
69 Thus, it is not surprising that this report sparked outcries 
from foreign firms, particularly the ones whose names were mentioned. These 
firms  requested  explanations  from  Chinese  officials  through  their  own 
governments.
70   
 
This report did not represent an exceptional example during that period. Some 
Chinese  officials  and  Chinese  scholars  also  argued  that  China  should  adopt  a 
competition  law  as  a  means  of  fending  off  competition  from  multinational 
companies in order to protect domestic companies. For example, the head of 
China’s  statistics  bureau  called  for  action  to  limit  ‘malicious’  attempts  by 
multinational companies that wanted to buy local companies to establish market 
monopolies.
71 Some  Chinese  companies  were  also  keen  to  lobby  the  Chinese 
government  to  adopt  a  competition  law  as  a  tool  to  protect  them  from  the 
competition  of  foreign  companies.
72  To  some  extent,  these  comments  and 
lobbies denied or ignored the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle 
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to China’s forthcoming competition law, despite the fact that the Protocol on 
China’s  Accession  clearly  provides:  ‘foreign  individuals  and  enterprises  and 
foreign funded enterprises shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to other individuals and enterprises’.
73 
 
2.1.2 Stage Two: Struggling Period 
Gradually,  the  argument  shifted.  Some  scholars  started  to  argue  that  a 
competition law should not be used as a means against foreign companies.
74 It 
also  seemed  that  the  Chinese  government  started  to  be  aware  of  its  WTO 
commitment  regarding  the  national  treatment  principle.
75 During  this  period, 
however, the Chinese government still did not fully recognise the relevance of 
the WTO national treatment principle to the formulation of China’s Antimonopoly 
Law. This was reflected in the words of the Chinese delegate at the WGTCP. On 
one hand, he stated:  
China’s current Anti Unfair Competition Law places domestic and foreign 
firms  on  an  equal  footing,  thereby  observing  the  principle  of  non 
discrimination.  We  believe  in  the  philosophy  that  the  enforcement  of 
competition law should reflect the competitive nature of the market as a 
whole.
76  
On the other hand, he argued:  
[M]ore  flexibility  is  needed  for  developing  countries  in  applying  the 
principle  of  non discrimination,  the  aspect  of  national  treatment  in 
particular,  in  their  legislation  on  competition  and  the  implementation 
thereof.  This flexibility should also be reflected in any future multilateral 
framework on trade and competition policy.
77  
He continued:  
The flexibility for developing members as provided in the existing WTO 
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Agreements related to competition policy is inadequate.  Due to the big 
gap  and  contrast  between  the  developing  countries  and  the  developed 
ones in terms of economic systems, economic sizes, economic structures, 
levels of economic development as well as the sizes and competitiveness 
of various industries and enterprises, many specific de jure and de facto 
distinctions  by  the  developing  countries  in  the  treatment  offered  to 
domestic  enterprises  as  compared  to  that  to  foreign  enterprises  as 
referred to in the paper of the OECD will not be completely avoidable.
78  
This comment clearly illustrates that on the one hand, China generally accepted 
the  applicability  of  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  to  its  competition 
legislation; on the other hand, China argued that discrimination both de jure and 
de  facto  should  be  allowed  to  protect  some  domestic  firms  due  to  China’s 
economic  conditions.  Thus,  it  clearly  demonstrates  that,  during  this  period, 
China  was  still  struggling  to  fully  recognise  the  relevance  of  the  national 
treatment principle in the formulation of its competition law.  
 
2.1.3 Stage Three: Recognising the Relevance of the National 
Treatment Principle in the Formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 
After more than five years as a WTO Member, China is gaining the confidence of 
implementing  WTO  rules  in  general.  This  has  had  an  impact  on  the 
implementation  of the  national  treatment  principle  as  well.  China  started  to 
accept  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  despite  its  previous  unhappy 
experience. Moreover, China started to realise that it was not possible to ignore 
the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle in the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. As a WTO Member, China has a duty to make sure that 
its  competition  law  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  WTO  national  treatment 
principle. Otherwise, it could face complaints from other WTO Members and thus 
possibly  unfavourable  rulings  by  a  WTO  Panel  or  the  Appellate  Body.  This 
potential risk of facing complaints was recognised by the Chinese government. It 
changed  its  tune  to  accept  the  relevance  of  the  WTO  national  treatment 
principle to the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This is illustrated by 
a recent comment from the Chinese delegate to the WTO. During China’s trade 
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policy review, some WTO Members were concerned whether foreign companies 
would be treated equally in China’s forthcoming competition law. In response to 
such  concerns,  the  Chinese  delegate  reassured  WTO  Members  that  the 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law ‘would strictly follow the principle of national 
treatment and would not be discriminatory against foreign enterprises’.
79 Unlike 
the previous comment given in the WGTCP , this comment makes it very clear 
that China’s Antimonopoly Law will strictly follow the WTO national treatment 
principle without any reservation. Thus, this illustrates that China has finally 
recognised  the  relevance  of  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  in  the 
formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  This  general  impact  of  the  WTO 
national treatment on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has also 
been reflected in the formulation of some of its provisions, which are examined 
in the following two subsections. 
 
2.2 The Impact of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
on the Formulation of the Objectives of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 
All drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law adopt multi objectives. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 adopts multi objectives.
80 During the 
process  of  formulating  the  Law,  some  foreign  government  officials  and 
companies were not convinced that some of the objectives would not be used as 
a means to protect inefficient domestic companies. What follows explores the 
impact  of  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. To this end, it focuses on two objectives: development 
of  the  national  economy  and  public  interest  because  these  two  areas  could 
present a risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
2.2.1 Development of the National Economy 
All  the  drafts  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  emphasize  that  one  of  the 
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objectives  of  China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  is  to  ensure  the  development  of  the 
Chinese  economy.  This  might  be  because  ‘Maintaining  adequate  growth  is 
arguably the central challenge for China’s macroeconomic policy in the coming 
decade’.
81 China’s competition law inherently aims to promote China’s economy. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the objectives of the Antimonopoly 
Law  2007  is  to  ensure  ‘the  healthy  development  of  the  socialist  market 
economy’.
82  
 
During  the  drafting  process,  however,  the  continued  inclusion  of  the 
development of the national economy as an objective raised concerns from other 
WTO Members because the meaning of the development of national economy 
could be very flexible to competition enforcement agencies and courts. As some 
commentators pointed out, this language could provide a basis for unsuccessful 
competitors  to  attempt  to  seek  shelter  from  competition  and  they  therefore 
stressed the need to avoid the use of competition law to protect competitors, as 
opposed  to  the  competitive  process.
83 If  that  happened,  domestic  companies 
could be more likely to benefit from this flexible application of competition law 
than  foreign  companies  due  to  the  influence  of  protectionism  and  national 
interests. Thus, the inclusion of such an abstract concept as an aspirational goal 
in  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  presents  a  risk  that  competition  enforcement 
agencies  and  courts  may  resort  to  this  objective  as  a  ground  for  protecting 
inefficient domestic companies against efficient foreign ones.
84 In other words, 
the concept of the development of the national economy could be used as a tool 
for implementing the Antimonopoly Law 2007 against foreign companies. This 
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could lead to complaints of a violation of the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
Whether the concept of the term ‘development of the national economy’ is used 
as  a  means  to  protect  domestic  firms  depends  on  how  such  concept  is 
interpreted  and  applied  by  competition  enforcement  agencies  and  courts.  It 
cannot  be  pre judged  that  the  inclusion  of  the  development  of  the  national 
economy as an objective is inconsistent with the national treatment principle 
under the WTO automatically. The term ‘development of the national economy’ 
is not inconsistent with the WTO national treatment principle as long as it is 
interpreted and applied in a way in which foreign firms are not treated less 
favourably than domestic firms. In practice, the interpretation and enforcement 
of Chinese laws is rarely grounded in the term ‘development of the national 
economy’, despite the fact that virtually every Chinese law includes such a term. 
Thus, it could be the case that the term ‘development of the national economy’ 
will not be applied in practice. However, the Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities should be aware of the potential risk of violating the WTO national 
treatment  principle  through  applying  the  term  ‘development  of  the  national 
economy’. Further guidance or administrative rules are needed in order to make 
sure  that  this  term  is  not  interpreted  and  applied  as  a  means  to  protect 
inefficient domestic companies. 
 
2.2.2 Public Interest 
The term ‘public interest’ is clearly mentioned in Article 1 of the 1999 Draft,
85 
Article 1 of the February 2002 Draft,
86 Article 1 of the 2004 Submitted Draft,
87 
Article 1 of the April 2005 Draft,
88 Article 1 of the July 2005 Draft,
89 Article 1 of 
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the November 2005 Draft,
90 Article 1 of the June 2006 Draft,
91 and Article 1 of 
the June 2007 Draft.
92 This illustrates that the term ‘public interest’ routinely 
appears in the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Article 1 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 stipulates: ‘This Law is enacted for 
the purposes of… safeguarding … public interest’. 
 
Unlike the term ‘development of national economy’, the term ‘public interest’ 
has been interpreted and applied widely in practice in China. As Youngjin Jung 
and Qian Hao pointed out, ‘“Public interest”, used as a Chinese legal term, is a 
catch all  routinely  subject  to  wide  interpretations  to  the  fullest  possible 
degree’.
93  Public  interests  could  ‘be  exploited  to  prevent  inefficient  local 
companies from deservedly winding up as “roadkill”’.
94  In a submission to the 
2003 OECD Global Forum on Competition, the Chinese government indicated that 
‘public  interest’  could  include  the  protection  of  employment  and  the 
preservation of the general ‘economic situation’.
95 As with the development of 
national economy, there is a lack of guidance in the drafts of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 on how public interest will be interpreted and implemented. However, 
it cannot be ruled out that public interest will not be used to protect inefficient 
domestic  companies  against  foreign  ones.  Thus,  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007 
could be interpreted and implemented by competition enforcement authorities 
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and  courts  against  foreign  companies  under  the  provision  of  protecting  the 
‘public interest’. This could lead to the violation of the WTO national treatment 
principle.  Thus,  the  Chinese  competition  enforcement  authorities  should  be 
aware of such potential inconsistence to the national treatment principle when 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is interpreted and implemented. Further guidance or 
administrative rules are needed to make sure that this term is not interpreted 
and applied as a means to protect domestic firms. 
 
2.3 The Impact of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
on the Formulation of the Exemption Provisions of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
As  discussed  above,  exemption  provisions  in  a  competition  law  can  be  areas 
where  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  could  be  violated.  Thus,  it  is 
necessary to draft such exemption provisions carefully in order to avoid potential 
violations of the WTO national treatment principle. What follows examines to 
what extent the formulation of the exemption provisions of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 has been influenced by the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
2.3.1 Sector Exemptions 
Article  2  (Scope  of  Application)  of  the  February  2002  Draft  provides:  ‘Unless 
otherwise  specifically  provided  by  law,  activities  restricting  competition  in 
market transactions in the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall be 
governed  by  this  Law’.  This  article  sends  a  worrying  signal  because  many 
anticompetitive  practices  can  be  exempted  through  this  article.  It  has  the 
potential  to  violate  national  treatment  where these  exemptions  are  provided 
according  to  the  nationality  of  the  companies  concerned.  This  provision  was 
changed  in  the  2004  Submitted  Draft.  Article  2  of  this  draft  provides: 
‘Monopolistic behaviours in market transactions in the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China shall be governed by this Law’. Thus, this provision does not 
provide blank sector exemptions. It is an incredible change given the fact that 
many competition regimes do provide sector exemptions.
96 
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However, this encouraging change did not last very long. In the April 2005 Draft, 
an article which is similar to Article 2 of the 1999 Draft was included. Article 55 
(Inapplicability to Legitimate Conducts) of the April 2005 Draft provides: ‘This 
law is not applicable to any conduct which is taken according to other laws and 
regulations’.  Thus,  Articles  2  and  55  together  are  similar  to  Article  2  of  the 
February 2002 Draft.  
 
Article 2 of the July 2005 Draft provides: ‘This Law does not apply where other 
laws or administrative regulations provide for special regulation of an industry or 
a sector, but applies to the market competition conducted by undertakings’. It is 
very similar to Article 55 of the April 2005 Draft and Article 2 of the February 
2002 Draft.  Article 2 of the November 2005 Draft and Article 2 of the June 2006 
follow this trend. Article 2 of the June 2006 Draft provides: ‘As for monopolistic 
conduct prohibited by this Law, this Law does not apply where other laws or 
administrative regulations provide provisions’. This trend was confirmed by the 
Chinese government during China’s first policy review in 2006 by stating: ‘The 
current draft of the Antimonopoly Law does not explicitly provide the industries 
or  areas  that  are  exempt  from  its  application.  Therefore  the  law  will  be 
applicable to all industries and areas’.
 97 However, such an exemption provision is 
like  a  blank  cheque.  It  leaves  the  door  open  for  future  sector  exemptions 
through  sector  legislation.  Thus,  this  presents  a  risk  that  such  an  exemption 
provision  may  be  resorted  to  as  a  means  to  protect  domestic  firms  and 
discriminate against foreign firms through sector legislation. This could lead to 
the violation of the WTO national treatment principle.  
 
It seems that the Chinese government was aware of such a potential violation 
because  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  does  not  include  such  an  exemption 
provision. Article 2 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 stipulates:  
This  Law  is  applicable  to  monopolistic  conduct  in  economic  activities 
within  the  territory  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China;  This  Law  is 
applicable to monopolistic conduct outside the territory of the People’s 
Republic  of  China  that  have  eliminative  or  restrictive  effects  on 
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competition in the domestic market of the People’s Republic of China.  
This is remarkable because this provision does not provide sector exemptions 
through a blank provision and thus reduces the risk of violating the WTO national 
treatment. Therefore, this is a good example of recognising the relevance of the 
WTO  national  treatment  principle  and  responding  to  it  accordingly  in  the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
2.3.2 Non-Sector Exemptions 
In  general,  all  drafts  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  include  non sector 
exemptions.  However,  the  exemptions  granted  by  the  non sector  exemption 
provision under different drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 are not exactly 
the same. What follows is to examine the impact of the WTO national treatment 
principle on the formulation of the exemption provisions of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 by analysing the changes of these provisions. 
 
Article 11 of the 2004 Submission Draft grant exemptions from the application of 
Article 8 to:  
(1)  Joint  activities  by  operators  to  improve  product  quality,  enhance 
efficiency,  reduce  cost,  unify  commodity  specifications  or  models;  (2) 
Joint  activities  by  operators  to  prevent  significant  decline  of  sales  or 
obvious overproduction in order to adapt themselves to economic distress; 
or (3) Joint activities by small and medium sized enterprises to enhance 
operational  efficiency  and  competitiveness;  (4)  Joint  activities  by 
operators to upgrade technology, improve product quality, develop new 
commodities  and  market;  (5)  Other  activities  that  may  eliminate  or 
restrict  competition,  but  are  beneficial  to  the  development  of  the 
national economy and the social and public interests. 
This provision was criticised due to the broadness of these exemptions. Under 
Article 9 of the 2004 Submitted Draft, for instance, members of horizontal price 
fixing conspiracy are exempted from the prohibitions of the law if such price 
fixing is ‘beneficial to the development of the national economy and the social 
and public interests’. Such criteria for non sector exemptions could be used to 
protect  domestic  firms  against  foreign  firms.    In  addition,  crisis  cartels  are 
exempted in this draft. It could be used by the competition authority and the 
courts  to  apply  the  exemption  to  favour  domestic  firms  while  denying  the Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 146 
benefit  of  the  exemption  to  foreign  companies  if  the  law  was  implemented 
selectively.
98 
 
Recognising the potential risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle 
by Article 11 of the 2004 Submitted Draft, some changes were made in Article 9 
of the April 2005 Draft, which provides:  
Agreements among undertakings with one of the following objectives shall 
be exempted from application of Article 8 if the agreements can enable 
consumers to share impartially the interests derived from the agreements, 
are  necessary  for  achieving  the  objectives  and  will  not  substantially 
eliminate  competition  in  the  relevant  market:  (i)  Agreements  for  the 
purpose  of  product  quality  upgrading,  cost  reduction  and  efficiency 
improvement;  (ii)  Agreements  to  cope  with  economic  depression,  to 
moderate serious decrease in sales volumes or distinct production surplus; 
(iii)  Agreements  by  small  and  medium sized  enterprises  to  improve 
operational  efficiency  and  to  enhance  their  competitiveness;  (iv) 
Agreements  to  enhance  the  competitiveness  of  exports  in  the  global 
market; (v) Agreements to improve technology, develop new products or 
explore new markets.  
From  this  provision,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  April  2005  Draft  has  made 
improvements  regarding  the  criteria  for  granting  non sector  exemptions.  This 
provision deletes broader national interest loopholes from the 2004 Submitted 
Draft.  This  change  can  be  explained  as  a  response  to  the  WTO  national 
treatment principle because this criterion is very broad and could be used easily 
as a means to discriminate against foreign firms in order to protect domestic 
firms.  In addition, Article  9  of  the April  2005  Draft  limits  the exemptions  to 
anticompetitive actions that are intended and necessary for the achievement of 
the exempt objectives— ‘enable consumers to share fairly’ in the benefits of the 
agreement,  and  do  not  ‘substantially  eliminate  competition  in  the  relevant 
market’. This will reduce the potential chance that this provision will be used as 
a means to protect inefficient domestic firms against efficient foreign ones. To 
some extent, thus, it illustrates the recognition of relevance of the WTO national 
treatment principle to the Antimonopoly Law.  
 
                                         
98 H. Harris, (2005), note 84, 131, p. 139. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 147 
Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 stipulates: 
If the undertakings can prove that the concluded agreements belong to 
one of the following situations, Article 13 and Article 14 shall not apply: (1) 
to improve technology, research and develop new product; (2) to upgrade 
the  product  quality,  reduce  cost,  enhance  efficiency,  and  unify  the 
specifications  and  standards  of  product;  (3)  to  improve  operational 
efficiency and enhance competition capacity of small and medium sized 
undertakings;  (4)  to  realize  the  social  public  interests  such  as  to  save 
energy, protect environment, and contribute for disaster; (5) during the 
period  of  economic  depression,  to  moderate  serious  decreases  in  sales 
volumes  or  distinct  production  surpluses;  (6)  to  ensure  the  legitimate 
interests  in  foreign  trade  and  economic  cooperation;  (7)  the  other 
situations provided by law or the State Council. 
In addition, it requires that such agreements should enable consumers to share 
impartially  the  interests  derived  from  the  agreements  and  not  substantially 
eliminate competition in order to qualify for exemption under Article 15(1) (5). 
 
The difference between Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and Article 9 of 
the April 2005 Draft is that the former includes a blanket provision for granting 
exemptions. Thus, Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is much broader than 
Article 9 of the April 2005 Draft. Although it does not violate the WTO national 
treatment principle automatically, Article 15(7) does present a risk of violating 
the  WTO  national  treatment  principle.  In  the  future,  thus,  the  Chinese 
government needs to be aware of the risk that Article 15 (7) of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 could violate the WTO national treatment principle if such a provision 
is applied in a way which foreign undertakings are treated less favourably than 
domestic  ones.  Any  further  administrative  rules  or  guidelines  regarding  the 
interpretation and enforcement of this provision must be consistent with the 
WTO national treatment principle. 
 
The  rest  of  the  exemptions  granted  under  Article  15  are  common  practices 
among other competition regimes. Thus, it is highly unlikely that WTO Members 
will  challenge  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  because  this  Law  adopts  such 
exemptions. However, violations of the national treatment principle could arise 
if China applies these exemptions in a way which foreign companies are treated 
less favourably than domestic firms. But it will be far from easy to justify such Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 148 
complaints.  To  date,  there  have  been  no  such  complaints  under  the  WTO 
national  treatment  principle.
99  Nevertheless,  the  Chinese  competition 
enforcement authorities need to be aware of such potential violations of the 
national treatment principle under the WTO and provide clear criteria in further 
administrative rules or guidelines for enforcing non sector exemption provisions 
under the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
3  Conclusion  
As  a  cornerstone  of  the  WTO  system,  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle 
functions  as  a  legal  yardstick  to  scrutinize  the  appropriateness  of  a  WTO 
Member’s  domestic  legislation.  It  is  applicable  to  WTO  Members’  competition 
laws insofar as such laws exist and the enforcement of such laws affects trade. 
Due to this significant role played by the WTO national treatment principle on 
WTO  Members’  competition  laws,  even  the  US,  which  arguably  has  the  most 
advanced  competition  regime,  has  to  defend  how  its  antitrust  laws  are 
consistent with the WTO national treatment principle.
100  Particularly, violations 
of  the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  could  be  raised  in  regard  to  the 
interpretation and implementation of the objectives and the exemptions under a 
WTO Member’s national competition law. 
 
This  chapter  has  showed  that  it  was  not  easy  for  China  to  recognise  the 
relevance  of the  WTO  national  treatment  principle  in  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 partly due to its previous unhappy experience regarding 
the national treatment principle. As a WTO Member, however, China has to make 
sure that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is not inconsistent with the WTO national 
treatment principle. In particular, it would be hard for China to justify any de 
jure  discrimination  under  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  without  the  risk  of 
violating the WTO national treatment principle. During the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, certain provisions have been changed in order to be 
                                         
99 Although Japan- Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan-Film) is 
highly relevant to competition regulation and national treatment, the US did not complain that 
the provisions of Japanese Antimonopoly Law themselves were inconsistent with national 
treatment obligation. See, Panel Report, Japan- Film, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 
1998:IV, 1179. More about this case, see Chapter One. 
100 See, WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/131, note 3, paras. 13-18, pp. 5-7. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 3, 149 
consistent  with  the  WTO  national  treatment  provisions.  In  general,  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide de jure discrimination against foreign 
firms. In particular, Article 2 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide a 
blank  exemption  to  protect  domestic  firms  in  particular  sectors,  as  most 
previous drafts do. These changes reduce the risks that the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 could violate the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
However, it has to be borne in mind that the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 is only the start of this issue. Whether the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will be 
used as means to protect domestic firms against foreign firms depends on how 
such  law  is  interpreted  and  applied.  In  particular,  the  interpretation  and 
implementation  of  the  concept  of  public  interest  under  Article  1  of  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007  could  present  a  risk  of  violating  the  WTO  national 
treatment  principle.  Traditionally,  both  Chinese  authorities  and  courts  enjoy 
broad discretion to interpret and apply laws. Moreover, it is not the case that 
Chinese  courts  interfere  with  Chinese  agencies’  interpretations  of  laws. 
Therefore, the uncertainty of whether the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will be used 
as a tool to against foreign companies will be continued. In the future, thus, the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities need to be aware of the risk of 
potential violations of the WTO national treatment principle and make sure that 
the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  is  interpreted  and  applied  in  a  way  in  which  is 
consistent with the WTO national treatment principle. 150 
Chapter Four:                                      
The Impact of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, 
and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper on the 
Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This  chapter  examines  the  impact  of  Articles  VIII  and  IX  of  the  General 
Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS),
1  and  Section  1.1  of  the 
Telecommunications Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles of the Negotiating 
Group on Basic Telecommunications (thereinafter the Reference Paper)
2 on the 
formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China 
(hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007).
3 To this end, it is structured into two 
sections. The first section examines the impact of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, 
while the second section focuses on the impact of Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper. 
 
1  The Impact of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS on 
the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This section explores whether the enactment of a competition law could help 
China to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS and, if 
so,  to  what  extent  the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  has  been 
influenced by the possibility of helping China to implement such obligations. 
 
                                         
1 The GATS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm. 
2 The Reference Paper is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm. 
3 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
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1.1 Articles VIII and IX of the GATS 
1.1.1 Article VIII of the GATS 
As its title ‘Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers’ illustrates, Article VIII of 
the GATS deals with monopolies. In particular, Article VIII:2 of the GATS clearly 
stipulates: 
Where a Member’s monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through 
an affiliated company, in the supply of a service outside the scope of its 
monopoly rights and which is subject to that Member’s specific commitments, 
the Member shall ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly 
position  to  act  in  its  territory  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  such 
commitments. 
The key term ‘abuse’ is not defined under the GATS. The Chief American GATS 
negotiator during the Uruguay Round noted: ‘After considerable debate, “abuse” 
was left undefined’.
4 It is not surprising that the term ‘abuse’ is left without 
definition since it is far from easy for negotiators to agree any such definition. 
However, further explanation of the term ‘abuse’ is still possible through Panels 
and the Appellate Body in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
It is quite common, although less so now with privatisation, that one national 
company is invested with monopoly rights for services supply in one or several 
segments of the market. For example, the electricity sector is often divided into 
generation,  transmission  and  distribution  segments.  The  government  often 
grants the monopoly of services supply in the transmission sector to one state 
owned company or one private company. Normally, this company is also directly 
or indirectly the distributor or producer of electricity. When it competes outside 
the transmission sector, it can easily abuse its monopoly position. It can stop 
supplies for its competitors or supply insufficient quantities with poor quality 
and discriminatory prices. Another example is postal services. Many countries 
grant the monopoly of certain postal services, such as carrying addressed letter 
mail,  to  one  state owned  supplier.  This  supplier  also  competes  in  non 
                                         
4 R. Self, ‘General Agreement on Trade in Services’, in T. Stewart, ed., The World Trade 
Organization: the Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21
st Century and US Implementing 
Legislation, Washington: the American Bar Association, (1996), 523, pp. 532-533. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 152 
monopolized markets, such as express parcel delivery. When it competes outside 
its  monopoly  areas,  it  can  easily  abuse  its  monopoly,  for  example  by  cross 
subsidy. Article VIII is designed to deal with these situations. According to it, if a 
WTO  Member’s  monopoly  supplier  acts  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  its 
obligations in or outside the scope of its monopoly rights, other WTO Members 
can request information on these practices. It is also applicable when a WTO 
Member  authorises  or  establishes  a  small  number  of  services  suppliers  and 
prevents  competition  among  them.  Therefore,  it  imposes  obligations  on  WTO 
Members regarding preventing certain monopolies in services.  
 
So far, no complaint has been filed to a WTO Panel in regard to the issue of 
breaching Article VIII of the GATS. On the 2
nd May 1997, however, the United 
States (US) did request consultations with Belgium in respect of certain measures 
governing  the  provision  of  commercial  telephone  directory  services.
5 These 
measures include the imposition of conditions for obtaining a license to publish 
commercial directories, and the regulation of the acts, policies, and practices of 
Belgacom  N.V.  with  respect  to  telephone  directory  services.  One  of  the 
allegations  by  the  US  in  this  case is  that Belgium  violated Article  VIII  of  the 
GATS.
6 In June 1997, the US held consultations with Belgium in order to address 
its concerns.
7 However, the US decided not to proceed further because, after a 
change  in  ownership  interests  in  the  Belgian  directory  services  industry,  the 
American interests were no longer substantially affected.
8 Consequently, there is 
no Panel report on it. 
 
1.1.2 Article IX of the GATS 
Not only does the GATS prohibit certain restrictive practices of monopoly service 
providers, but it also addresses restrictive business practices of non monopoly 
                                         
5 Request for Consultations by the United States on Belgium-Measures Affecting Commercial 
Telephone Directory Services, 13
th May 1997, WT/DS80/1. 
6 Id. The US claimed that Belgium violated Articles II, VI, VIII and XVII of the GATS. 
7 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Fact Sheet: Monitoring and Enforcing 
Trade Laws and Agreements, Washington, D.C.: USTR, (2000), p. 18, 
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uploads/images/_TGf6Rmt1IhGcTyxq_-HAg/usinfo_301_00-
fact.pdf. 
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service suppliers. Article IX :1 of the GATS provides: ‘Members recognize that 
certain business practices of service suppliers, other than those falling under 
Article  VIII,  may  restrain  competition  and  thereby  restrict  trade  in  services’. 
Article IX:2 deals with the procedure where restrictive business practices of non 
monopoly  service  suppliers  exist.  It  requires  WTO  Members  to  enter  into 
consultations  at  the  request  of  any  other  WTO  Member  with  a  view  to 
eliminating  such  practices  referred  to  in  Article  IX:1.  It  is  strict  because  it 
foresees the elimination of the trade constraints. However, it requires only ‘full 
and  sympathetic  consideration’  of  requests  for  consultations,  and  supply  of 
‘publicly  available  non confidential  information’.
9  It  is  not  clear  what  will 
happen  after  the  consultation  if  Members  fail  to  reach  an  agreement.  Is  it 
possible for a WTO Member to file a complaint to a WTO Panel? This has to wait 
for clarification by WTO Panels or the Appellate Body in future WTO cases. To 
date,  no  such  case  has  been  filed.  However,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  no 
complaint  is allowed to a  WTO  Panel if  Members  fail  to  reach an agreement 
during  the  consultation  period  because  this  is  against  the  purpose  of  the 
establishment of the WTO dispute settlement system. Therefore, the potential 
risk of facing a complaint and possibly leading to a ruling by a WTO Panel or the 
Appellate  Body  exists.  This  implies  that  Article  IX,  like  Article  VIII,  imposes 
obligations on WTO Members to address restrictive business practices by non 
monopoly service suppliers. 
 
1.1.3 Summary 
In sum, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS recognize that certain business practices 
may  restrain  competition  and  thus  trade  in  services.  Therefore,  Article  VIII 
obliges  WTO  Members  to  ‘ensure  that  such  a  supplier  does  not  abuse  its 
monopoly position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent’ with Article II 
(the  most favoured nation  principle)  and  specific  commitments.  Article  IX 
addresses a broad range of anticompetitive practices across all service sectors by 
non monopoly  service  providers  and  obliges  WTO  Members  to  enter  into 
consultations  at  the  request  of  other  WTO  Members  where  such  a  potential 
violation of Article IX exists with a view to eliminating such practices. To some 
extent,  thus,  Articles  VIII  and  IX  of  the  GATS  establish  obligations  for  WTO 
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Members to  pro actively  create internally  competitive  markets in  services.  In 
addition, they also require WTO Members to take action or provide remedies 
against private operators engaging in the anticompetitive practices that affect 
the trade in services of other Members. This implies that, unlike the majority of 
the WTO rules which concern government measures, Articles VIII and IX of the 
GATS relate to private anticompetitive practices. 
 
Conduct that is specially prohibited under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS is also 
normally subject to control under WTO Members’ national competition laws, if 
they  have  already  adopted  competition  laws.  To  some  extent,  for  example, 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS have similar functions to Articles 81 and 82 EC 
and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, if we ignore the fact that Articles VIII 
and IX are only applicable to trade in services. 
 
1.2 Impact on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
1.2.1 The Insufficiency of China’s Competition-Related 
Legislation before the Adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 Regarding the Implementation of Articles VIII and IX of 
the GATS
10 
What  follows  examines  whether  the  Chinese  competition related  legislation 
before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was sufficient for China to 
implement Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. 
 
1.2.1.1  Abuse of A Dominant Position 
Before  the  adoption  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  the  Interim  Rule  on 
Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 2003 was the major legislation which 
prohibits  monopolistic  behaviour  through  pricing.
11 Article  5  prohibits  resale 
price setting. Article 6 prohibits exploitive pricing. Article 7 prohibits predatory 
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Antimonopoly Law 2007, see Chapter Two. 
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pricing and making price below costs through rebates, subsidies and rewards. 
Article 8 prohibits price discrimination under similar transaction situations. In 
addition,  Article  14  (2)  of  the  Price  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China 
(hereinafter the Price Law 1997) prohibits firms from selling products at below 
cost  price  in  order  to  force  out  competitors  or  monopolise  the  market  and 
disrupt the normal production and operation order to the great detriment of the 
interests of other companies.
12 Article 11 of the Anti Unfair Competition Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the LAUC 1993) prohibits predatory 
pricing  by  stipulating  that  a  business  operator  may  not,  for  the  purpose  of 
forcing out his competitors, sell his commodities at prices lower than cost.
13 
However, neither Article 14(2) of the Price Law 1997 nor Article 11 of the LAUC 
1993 is designed specially for the purpose of combating abuses of dominance. In 
other words, the enforcement authorities do not need to consider first whether 
a company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to apply 
these two provisions. 
 
Before  the  adoption  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  the  LAUC  1993  was  the 
major  legislation  which  prohibits  monopolistic  behaviour  through  non pricing 
practices. Article 6 of the LAUC 1993 prohibits a particular type of abuses by 
statutory monopolies. It stipulates: 
Public  utility  enterprises  or  other  operators  having  monopolistic  status 
according to law shall not force others to buy the goods of the operators 
designated by [the public utility enterprises or other operators] so as to 
exclude other operators from competing fairly. 
However, it is only applicable to statutory monopolies. There is no mention of 
abuses by monopolistic firms other than statutory monopolies. 
 
Although Article VIII of the GATS does not define the term ‘abuse’, it seems that 
this  term  could  refer  to  all  abusive  behaviours  that  are  condemned  in  most 
competition regimes. It has to be acknowledged that it is not possible to give an 
exclusive  list  which  includes  all  abusive  practices.  Nevertheless,  it  is  still 
possible to agree that some abusive behaviour, such as price discrimination, is 
commonly recognised to be illegal under many competition regimes. Before the 
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adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, there was no general ban on abuses of 
dominance in China’s competition related legislation. For example, there was no 
ban on cross product subsidies in the non telecommunications sector in China
14, 
while such subsidies might be prohibited by Article VIII of the GATS. Put another 
way,  some  abusive  behaviour  could  be  legal  under  the  Chinese  competition 
related legislation, but such a practice could breach Article VIII of the GATS. 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, China’s legislation 
regarding  abuses  of  dominance  was  insufficient  for  China  to  implement  the 
obligation under  Article  VIII,  which  requires  China  to  take  action  against  the 
anticompetitive  practices  prohibited  by  Article  VIII  of  the  GATS.  As  a  WTO 
Member, China should ensure that its monopoly service suppliers do not abuse 
their monopoly position to act in a manner inconsistent with Article VIII of the 
GATS. Otherwise it could face complaints from other WTO Members. 
 
1.2.1.2  Anticompetitive Agreements 
Article 14 (1) of the Price Law 1997 prohibits horizontal price fixing. It is further 
expanded by Article 4 of the Interim Rules on Prohibiting Monopolistic Price 2003. 
Article 32 of the Bid Inviting and Submitting Law of the People’s Republic of 
China  (hereinafter  the  Bidding  Law  1999)  prohibits  collusive  tendering 
practices.
15 Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, however, there 
was  no  general  ban  on  anticompetitive  agreements  in  China.  Many  types  of 
restrictive agreements were not prohibited. For instance, there was no ban on 
anticompetitive agreements regarding market share, boycott, quotas and other 
restrictions  on  production.  The  lack  of  legislation  prohibiting  such 
anticompetitive  agreements  did  not  imply  that  there  were  no  such 
anticompetitive practices in China. On the contrary, there were such restrictive 
practices in China. For instance, at the beginning of 1993, ten brickyards in a 
city reached an agreement after consultation to reduce 30% of their production 
and  mutually  determine  a  minimum  selling  price.
16 In  April  1999,  under  the 
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(hereinafter the Telecommunications Regulation 2000) prohibits irrational cross-product 
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pressure  of  more  than  ten  trade  competitors  of  Shandong  Jinan  Guangming 
Machinery Co., Ltd., the organizing committee of 99’s China Exhibition of Tube 
and  Panel  Products  and  Machinery  for  Construction  Doors  and  Windows  was 
forced to refuse to provide Shandong Jinan Guangming Co., Ltd. the exhibition 
stand originally arranged for it.
17 On the 23
rd May 1999, eight colour picture tube 
manufacturers whose output exceeded 90% of the total amount of colour picture 
tubes in China jointly made a decision that from the 28
th June 1999 they would 
stop production for a month and reduce the output by three million tubes.
18 In 
regard  to  the  problem  of  the  lack  of  regulation  of  certain  anticompetitive 
agreements  in  China,  some  scholars  argued  that  China’s  existing  competition 
regime  was  unable  to  prevent  anticompetitive  agreements.  For  instance, 
Chaowu Jin and Wei Luo claimed:  
Legal regulation of conspired restrictive competition practices in China is far 
from orderly and comprehensive. The relevant legal provisions are scattered 
among laws, regulations and departmental rules. Most of them are simply 
principles  rather  than  applicable  legal  provisions…  the  absence  of 
appropriate regulation of conspired restrictive competition practices remains 
a critical problem in the competition law of China.
19 
 
In the same way that Article VIII of the GATS does not list monopolistic practices, 
Article IX of the GATS does not list anticompetitive agreements. However, it does 
not expressly exclude any special type of anticompetitive agreements. Thus, it 
seems that Article IX of the GATS could prohibit all types of anticompetitive 
agreements  that  are  prohibited  in  major  competition  regimes.  Before  the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, China’s competition related legislation 
did  not  prohibit  all  types  of  anticompetitive  agreements.  For  example, 
boycotting  certain  services  was  not  clearly  banned  under  the  Chinese 
competition related legislation, while it breaches Article IX of the GATS. Like the 
situation  of  abuses  of  dominant  positions,  therefore,  some  anticompetitive 
agreements could be legal under current Chinese competition related legislation, 
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19 C. Jin and W. Luo, Competition Law in China, New York: William S. Hein & Co., (2002), pp. 90-
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while they could breach Article IX of the GATS. If that happened, China could 
enter into consultations at the request of any other WTO Member with a view to 
eliminating the practices referred to in Article IX:1 of the GATS. It would be very 
difficult for China to do so due to its lack of legislation providing a general ban 
on such practices. This illustrates that Article IX imposes obligations on China 
regarding combating certain anticompetitive agreements. 
 
1.2.1.3  The Insufficiency of China’s Competition-Related Legislation 
Thus far, not all anticompetitive practices prohibited under Articles VIII and IX of 
the GATS were illegal under the Chinese competition related legislation before 
the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. For example, restrictive distribution 
systems and exclusionary boycotts were not illegal in China because there was 
no ban on such anticompetitive practices under the Chinese competition related 
legislation.  However,  these  anticompetitive  practices  could  be  banned  under 
Articles  VIII  and  IX  of  the  GATS  if  they  have  impacts  on  trade  in  services. 
Therefore, China could face complaints from other WTO Members due to its lack 
of legislation prohibiting the anticompetitive practices which are banned under 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. It had two options to implement the obligations 
under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS.
20 The first option was that China could 
amend its existing competition related legislation. However, it was not easy to 
insert a general ban on anticompetitive practices into the existing competition 
related  legislation  because  none  of  the  existing  legislation  was  specially 
designed to combat anticompetitive practices. Even if it had been provided in 
China’s existing competition related legislation, such a provision would not have 
been  implemented  efficiently  due  to  the  lack  of  systematic  design  of  the 
competition related legislation. Therefore, this option was not an ideal solution 
for China to implement Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, although there is no 
doubt that it would have been helpful. The second option was to adopt a new 
piece of legislation providing a general ban on anticompetitive practices. The 
new legislation could provide a systematic solution regarding Articles VIII and IX 
of the GATS.  
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1.2.2 Impact on Formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Enacting  a  comprehensive  competition  law  belongs  to  the  second  option  for 
China to implement its obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. If it 
provides a general ban on anticompetitive practices which include the practices 
prohibited by Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, a comprehensive competition law 
could help China to implement its obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the 
GATS.  
 
As China’s first comprehensive competition law, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 does 
provide  a  general  ban  on  anticompetitive  practices.  Article  3  of  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007  refers  to  monopolistic  conduct  as:  (i)  ‘undertakings 
concluding  monopoly  agreements’  (monopoly  agreements  here  means 
‘agreements, decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate or restrict 
competition’); (ii) ‘abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings’; (iii) 
‘concentration of undertakings that have or are likely to have the effects of 
eliminating or restricting competition’. In fact, all the drafts included a similar 
provision  on  prohibiting  anticompetitive  practices  during  the  process  of 
formulating  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  In  particular,  Article  3  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 is exactly the same as Article 3 of the June 2006 Draft
21 
and Article 3 of the June 2007 Draft.
22 From this, we can see that providing a 
general  ban  on  anticompetitive  practices  was  always  included  in  the  drafts 
through  the  process  of  drafting  China’s  Antimonopoly  Law.  There  was  no 
controversy in regard to providing a general ban on anticompetitive practices. 
During  the  drafting  process,  therefore,  there  was  no  doubt  that  China’s 
forthcoming competition law would provide a general ban on anticompetitive 
practices even without considering the impacts of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. 
 
However, China’s WTO membership strengthened the expectation that China’s 
forthcoming  competition  law  needed  to  provide  a  general  ban  on 
anticompetitive practices because by doing so, such legislation could help China 
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to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. After China’s 
accession to the WTO, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS are binding on China. 
Because  the  Chinese  competition related  legislation  did  not  ban  all 
anticompetitive practices which are prohibited by Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, 
it became urgent for China to enact a national competition law that provided a 
general ban on anticompetitive practices in order to implement Articles VIII and 
IX of the GATS. During the process of formulating China’s Antimonopoly Law, 
therefore,  Articles  VIII  and  IX  of  the  GATS  did  positively  have  an  impact  on 
broadening  the  scope  of  China’s  forthcoming  competition  law,  although  they 
might not play a decisive role in this issue. In the future, it is important for the 
Chinese  competition  enforcement  authorities  to  be  aware  of  the  need  to 
implement  the  obligations  under  Articles  VIII  and  IX  of  the  GATS  through 
enforcing  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  in  a  way  that  such  benefits  are 
materialised. 
 
2  The Impact of Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper 
on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This section examines whether the enactment of an antimonopoly law could help 
China to implement the obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, and 
if so, to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been 
influenced by the possibility of helping China to implement such an obligation. 
 
2.1 Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper  
2.1.1 Background 
2.1.1.1  The Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA) 
When  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  Establishing  the  World  Trade  Organisation 
(hereinafter the Marrakesh Agreement) was signed in April 1994, no agreement 
was reached in regard to basic telecommunications.
23 In the telecommunications 
                                         
23 Basic telecommunications refer to voice telephone, telex, and telegraph, in contrast to enhanced 
or value-added telecommunications such as electronic mail, voice mail, on-line and data based 
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sector, however, a major issue is the abuse of a dominant position by existing 
suppliers, often in the public sector or legally sanctioned private monopolies, to 
block the entry of new competitors. Because it is costly and wasteful for each 
supplier to install its own wire network, one way in which an incumbent can 
block competition is to deny new entrants access (interconnection) to its pre 
existing network. In respect of this issue, Article VIII of the GATS is limited in 
scope. Thus, negotiations on basic telecommunications were continued after the 
establishment of the WTO in order to ensure that monopolistic suppliers would 
not  undermine  market  access  commitments.
24 Andreas  F.  Lowenfeld  claimed: 
‘The [telecoms] negotiations in the WTO were consistent with the general wave 
of privatisation and deregulation, which in turn was consistent with opening up 
of at least some competition within states and across national frontiers’.
25  
 
On the 15
th February 1997, sixty nine WTO Members comprising more than 91 
percent of global telecommunications revenues at that time reached the Basic 
Telecommunications  Agreement  (BTA).
26 The  BTA  governs  the  liberalization  of 
basic telecommunications services among WTO Members that have signed it.
27 It 
took  effect  in  February  1998.
28 It  covers  ‘basic  telecommunications’,  which 
                                         
24 For a brief introduction of the negotiations on basic telecommunications, see M. Bronckers and 
P. Larouche, ‘Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization’, Journal of 
World Trade, vol. 31(3), (1997), 5; also, L. Sherman, ‘ “Wildly Enthusiastic” about the First 
Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications Services’, Federal Communications 
Law Journal, vol. 51, (1998), 61. 
25 A. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2002), p. 126. 
26 This agreement takes the form of a protocol to be attached to the GATS, and officially 
designated as the Fourth Protocol to the GATS. See, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/4prote_sl20_e.doc. For the background and 
negotiation process of the BTA, see, P. Spector, ‘The World Trade Organisation Agreement on 
Telecommunications’, International Lawyers, vol. 32, (1998), 217; P. Larouche and M. 
Bronckers, ‘Telecommunications Services and the WTO’, Journal of World Trade, vol. 31(3), 
(1997), 5; and L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61, pp. 64-71. 
27 For a comment on the BTA, see, L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61. For a more critical comment, 
see W. Drake and E. Noam, ‘Assessing the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications’, in 
G. Hufbauer and E. Wada, eds., Unfinished Business: Telecommunications after the Uruguay 
Round, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, (1997), 27. 
28 The signatories had originally agreed to implement the BTA on the 1
st January 1998. But the 
implementation date was delayed because fifteen of the signatories had not ratified the BTA by Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 162 
includes  local,  long  distance,  and  international  services,  for  public  and  non 
public uses, offered through any technology, such as cable, satellite, wireless, 
on a facilities basis or by resale. It aims to provide an additional measure in the 
telecommunications sector within the GATS. This purpose is illustrated by the 
last sentence of § 1 of the BTA, which expressly stipulates: ‘this Annex provides 
notes and supplementary provisions to the Agreement [GATS]’. Thus, the BTA is 
not a free standing WTO agreement but a series of commitments that compose 
part of the GATS.
29 It is only binding on the WTO Members who signed it. 
 
2.1.1.2  The Reference Paper 
During the early stage of the negotiations of the BTA, the negotiators recognised 
that it was necessary to set up competitive safeguards against anticompetitive 
practices.
30 The reason behind this recognition is that most telecommunication 
regulations and laws did not foster competitive markets and had been dominated 
by state owned companies.
31 The purpose of such competitive safeguards would 
be to ensure monopolies or former monopolies of basic telecommunications not 
to exploit their monopolistic position to impede the ability of competitors to 
supply networks or services for which commitments would be made. In addition, 
the negotiators also recognised the need for establishing independent regulators 
for  telecommunications  sectors  whose  function  was  separated from  the basic 
telecommunications operators.
32 Based on this recognition, the US convened a 
meeting of selected delegates to initiate a dialogue on regulatory objectives in 
December  1994.  This  group  met  regularly  to  draft  what  later  became  the 
Reference  Paper.  A  draft  of  the  Reference  Paper  was  circulated  to  all 
participants of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications in December 
                                                                                                                             
the 30
th November 1997, the target date established by the WTO. After further negotiations in 
January 1998, signatories agreed to implement the BTA on the 5
th February 1998. 
29 L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61, p. 64. 
30 See, WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications - Review of Outstanding Issues - 
Note by the Secretariat, TS/NGBT/W/2, 8
th July 1994, para. 15. 
31 L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61, p. 80. 
32 See, WTO, TS/NGBT/W/2, note 30, para. 16. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 163 
1995
33 and January 1996.
34 
 
During the negotiations, a number of ways were considered in order to make the 
Reference  Paper  binding  obligations  and  subject  to  WTO  dispute  settlement 
system. One of the options is to amend the text of  the GATS to include the 
Reference  Paper.  However,  it  is  far  from  easy  to  do  that  because  such 
amendment needs ratification by two thirds of WTO Members.
35 Thus, the most 
feasible way to ensure the Reference Paper to be binding is to include it as 
‘additional commitments’ permitted by Article XVIII of the GATS. As a result, it 
was agreed to include the Reference Paper in their Schedules in the additional 
commitments  column.
36 Consequently,  the  Reference  Paper is  only  binding  on 
the WTO Members which include the Reference Paper in their Schedules in the 
additional commitments column. 
 
The purpose of the Reference Paper is: (i) to provide the requisite safeguards in 
domestic law for market access and foreign investment commitments to be truly 
effective; and (ii) to anchor these safeguards in the WTO system. It lays down six 
guiding principles: competitive safeguards, interconnection, universal services, 
public availability of licensing criteria, independent regulation, and allocation 
and use of scarce resources.
37 The principle of competitive safeguards aims to 
prevent  anticompetitive  practices  in  the  telecommunications  sector.
38  It  is 
                                         
33 WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications - Report on the Meeting of 15 December 
1995, S/NGBT/11, 22
nd December 1995, para. 5. 
34 WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications - Report on the Meeting of 26 January 
1996, S/NGBT/12, 14
th February 1996, para. 6. 
35 See the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter the 
Marrakesh Agreement), Art. X. The Marrakesh Agreement is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
36 See, WTO, TS/NGBT/W/2, note 30, para. 15. For a brief description of the negotiation history of 
the reference paper, see, L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61, pp. 71-87. For the comments on the 
Reference Paper, see, M. Bronckers, ‘The WTO Reference Paper on Telecommunications: A 
Model for WTO Competition Law?’ in M. Bronckers and R. Quick, eds., New Directions in 
International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, (2000), 371; M. Bronckers and P. Larouche, (1997), note 24, 5. 
37 The Reference Paper, Sections 1 to 6. 
38 The Reference Paper, Section 1. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 164 
designed to impose pro competitive regulatory principles on some WTO members 
by  being  incorporated  into  WTO  Members’  special  commitment  schedules.  In 
particular,  Section  1  of  the  Reference  Paper  is  designed  to  have  a  pro 
competitive function, as illustrated by its title, ‘Competitive Safeguards’. 
 
2.1.2 Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld argues: ‘because the history of telecommunication services 
had been heavily based on monopolies—indeed many thought of telephone and 
related services as natural monopolies—major attention had to be paid to the 
rules of competition’.
39 Thus, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper aims to prevent 
anticompetitive  practices  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  which  is  clearly 
expressed  in  its  title,  ‘Prevention  of  Anti competitive  Practices  in 
Telecommunications’. It provides: ‘Appropriate measures shall be maintained for 
the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier 
from engaging in or continuing anti competitive practices’. Section 1.2 of the 
Reference  Paper  gives  a  list  of  anticompetitive  practices  which  includes:  (a) 
engaging in anti competitive cross subsidization; (b) using information obtained 
from competitors with anti competitive results; and (c) not making available to 
other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential 
facilities and commercially relevant information which is necessary for them to 
provide services.  
 
Compared to Section 1 of the Reference Paper, the original US proposal was a 
more  detailed  set  of  competitive  safeguards.
40 According  to  the  US  proposal, 
dominant carriers were prohibited from cross subsidizing non regulated services. 
Certain dominant carriers were required to adopt structural separation or cost 
accounting  safeguards.  A  dominant  carrier  was  required  to  make  publicly 
available network information which was necessary to facilitate interconnection 
or  the  supply  of  competitive  telecommunications  services.  However,  these 
proposals were not accepted and the idea underling the Reference Paper is to 
                                         
39 A. Lowenfeld, (2002), note 25, p. 126. 
40 For the original US proposal, see WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications- 
Communication from the United States- Pro-competitive Regulatory and Other Measures for 
Effective Market Access in Basic Telecommunications Services, S/NGBT/5, 9
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establish broad principles to regulate telecommunications. Thus, the negotiating 
countries agreed to a general competitive principle rather than a fairly detailed 
set of competitive safeguards.
41 
 
In  Mexico-Measures  Affecting  Telecommunications  Services  (Mexico-Telecoms), 
the Panel claimed: ‘Section 1 is a voluntary, additional commitment to maintain 
certain  “appropriate”  measures,  which  reserves  a  degree  of  flexibility  for 
Members  in  accepting  and  implementing  such  an  additional  commitment’.
42 
However, a Member will lose its certain regulatory autonomy in regard to the 
telecommunications  sector,  once  it  accepts  the  Reference  Paper.  The  WTO 
Members  which  have  accepted  the  Reference  Paper  must  both  enact 
competition related legislation and effectively enforce such legislation in order 
to maintain ‘appropriate measures’ ‘for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone  or  together,  are  a  major  supplier  from  engaging  in  or  continuing  anti 
competitive practices’ in telecommunications sectors. Laura Sherman, however, 
argued:  ‘Failure  to  adopt  or  maintain  measures  that  would  prevent 
anticompetitive conduct could be cause for dispute settlement, but failure to 
enforce those measures would not’, because the language used in Section 1.1 of 
the  Reference  Paper  was  ‘very  different  from  that  used  in  other  contexts  in 
which  positive  measures  have  been  required  in  order  to  ensure  particular 
results’.
43 It is true that the language used in Section 1.1 is not exactly the same 
as other contexts in which positive measures have been required in order to 
ensure particular results, such as Section 2 of the Reference Paper which uses 
the language ‘will be ensured’. However, Section 1.1 clearly provides that the 
purpose of maintaining appropriate measures is to prevent ‘suppliers who, alone 
or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti competitive 
practices’.  In  Mexico-Telecoms,  the  Panel  reaffirmed  that  such  appropriate 
measures should be ‘suitable for achieving their purpose’ of ‘preventing a major 
supplier  from  engaging  in  or  continuing  anti competitive  practices’.
44 If  such 
measures  were  not  effectively  implemented,  how  could  the  purpose  of 
                                         
41 WTO, S/NGBT/11, note 33, para. 5. 
42 Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico-Telecoms), 
WT/DS204/R, adopted 1 June 2004, DSR 2004:IV, 1537, para. 7.267. 
43 L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61, p.77. 
44 Panel Report, Mexico-Telecoms, note 42, para. 7.265. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 166 
‘preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging 
in or continuing  anti competitive practices’  be  achieved?  Moreover,  failure to 
implement  such  measures  will  have  the  similar  result  of  the  lack  of  such 
measures. Thus, failure to enforce the measures that prevent anticompetitive 
practices could be cause for dispute settlement. 
 
In sum, adopting appropriate measures is the first step to implement Section 1.1 
of the Reference Paper. Without the existence of competition related legislation, 
it would not be possible for WTO Members to maintain the appropriate measures 
to combat anticompetitive practices. For the WTO Members that have included 
the Reference Paper into their Schedules in the additional commitments column 
but have not adopted appropriate competition related measures. Therefore, the 
first task is to enact competition related legislation in order to fulfil their WTO 
commitments. Such legislation can be a general competition law which applies 
to the telecommunications sector or sector legislation in the telecommunications 
sector  which  prohibits  anticompetitive  practices.  For  the  WTO  Members  that 
have  included  the  Reference  Paper  into  their  Schedules  in  the  additional 
commitments  column  and  have  adopted  appropriate  competition related 
measures, the obligation is to enforce such measures effectively.  
 
2.2 Case Study: Mexico-Telecoms
45 
2.2.1 The Facts
46 
Telmex,  a  Mexican  telecommunications  company,  is  the  biggest  basic 
telecommunications  provider  in  Mexico.  The  Rules  for  the  Provision  of 
International  Long Distance  Service  To  Be  Applied  by  the  Licensees  of  Public 
Telecommunications  Networks  Authorized  to  Provide  this  Service  (ILD  Rules) 
entered into force on the 12
th December 1996. It grants Telmex, alone among 
                                         
45 For details of this case, see B. Wellenius, J. Galarza and B. Guermazi, ‘Telecommunications and 
the WTO: the Case of Mexico’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3759, 
November 2005. 
46 For a brief description of the background of this case, see, R. Rosenthal, ‘United Stated v. 
Mexico: The First Telecommunications Challenge Confronting the World Trade Organisation’, 
CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communications Law and Policy, vol. 10, (2001), 315, pp. 
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Mexican basic telecommunications service suppliers, the authority to negotiate 
the  charge  that  foreign  basic  telecommunications  suppliers  must  pay  their 
Mexican counterparts to interconnect telephone calls originating abroad. By law, 
all Mexican basic telecommunications suppliers must incorporate this connection 
rate  in  their  interconnection  agreements  with  foreign  cross border  basic 
telecommunications service suppliers and therefore cannot make independent 
decisions on the rates they charge. 
 
On the 17
th August 2000, the US requested consultations with Mexico in respect 
of Mexico’s commitments and obligations under the GATS with respect to basic 
and  value added  telecommunications  services.  On  the  17
th  April  2002,  the 
Dispute Settlement Body established a Panel at the request of the US to resolve 
the  dispute  between  the  US  and  Mexico  with  regard  to  the  dispute  in  the 
telecommunications sector. On the 26
th August 2002, the Panel was composed. 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, European Communities, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Japan, and Nicaragua joined as third parties in this case. The Panel Report 
of this case was circulated on the 2
nd April 2004 and adopted on the 1
st June 
2004. 
 
2.2.2 Key Arguments Regarding Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper 
One of the main allegations in this case is whether Mexico’s failure to maintain 
measures  to  prevent  Telmex  from  engaging  in  anticompetitive  practices  was 
inconsistent with its obligations under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper.
47 
 
The  US  claimed  that  Section  1.1  of  the  Reference  Paper  provided  for  the 
maintenance of appropriate measures to prevent major suppliers from engaging 
in or continuing anticompetitive practices.
48 It recalled that the purpose of those 
appropriate measures was to prevent anticompetitive practices by suppliers who 
‘alone  or  together’  are  a  major  supplier.
49 It  claimed  that  Mexico  failed  to 
                                         
47 Panel Report, Mexico-Telecoms, note 42, para. 3.1(b). 
48 See the United States’ first written submission in Mexico-Telecoms, para. 191.  
49 Panel Report, Mexico-Telecoms, note 42, para. 4.257. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 168 
implement its commitments under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper
50 because 
Mexico’s  ILD  rules  empowered  Telmex  to  engage  in  monopolistic  practices  in 
respect of interconnection rates for basic telecom services supplied on a cross 
border basis and to create an effective cartel dominated by Telmex to set rates 
for such interconnection.
51  
 
In response, Mexico argued that the obligation in Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper  was  to  maintain  ‘suitable  or  proper’  measures  with  the  object  or  the 
intention of preventing Telmex from engaging in anti competitive practices.
52 
Thus, it claimed that Section 1.1 should not be interpreted to mean that Mexico 
was  required  to  prevent  all  suppliers  from  even  engaging  in  or  continuing 
anticompetitive practices.
53 Instead, Section 1.1 should be interpreted to allow 
Mexico  a  large  measure  of  discretion  in  deciding  what  measures  would  be 
suitable or proper to accomplish the intended objectives.
54  It further argued 
that  Section  1.1  created  not  an  obligation  of  result,  but  an  obligation  of 
means.
55 This argument was supported by the EU.
56 
 
In  addition,  Mexico  also  argued  that  its  ILD  Rules  were  domestic  legislation. 
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper should not apply to anticompetitive measures 
implemented or maintained by a WTO Member.
57 The EU supported this argument 
by claiming that it was not possible for a Member to restrict competition where 
competition is not allowed.
58 Thus, it argued that the fixing of a uniform price 
and revenue sharing system were not anti competitive practices because they 
                                         
50 See the United States’ first written submission in Mexico-Telecoms, para. 31. 
51 Id., para. 206. 
52 See Mexico’s first written submission in Mexico-Telecoms, para. 201. 
53 Id., para. 202. 
54 Id. 
55 Id., para. 203. 
56 See European Communities’ third party written submission in Mexico-Telecoms, 22
nd November 
2002, para. 48, http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/december/tradoc_115023.pdf. 
57 Panel Report, Mexico-Telecoms, note 42, para. 7.241. 
58 See European Communities’ third party written submission in Mexico-Telecoms, note 56, para. 
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were mandated by law.
59 
 
2.2.3 Panel Finding in Regard to Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper 
One  of  the  key  findings  in  the  Panel  Report  was  that  Mexico  had  failed  to 
maintain  appropriate  measures  to  prevent  ‘anti competitive  practices’  in 
violation of Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper.
60 
 
In regard to the argument that the ILD Rules were domestic legislation and thus 
not  subject  to  Section  1.1  of  the  Reference  Paper,  the  Panel  reinforced  a 
longstanding international legal principle stipulated in Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties that a government must bring its domestic 
laws and regulations into conformity with the treaty obligations it undertakes. It 
noted that Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, along with other commitments 
under the GATS, was ‘designed to limit the domestic regulatory powers of WTO 
Members’.
61 It continued: 
In  accordance  with  the  principle  established  in  Article  27  of  the  Vienna 
Convention, a requirement imposed by a Member under its internal law on a 
major supplier cannot unilaterally erode its international commitments made 
in  its  schedule  to  other  WTO  Members  to  prevent  major  suppliers  from 
‘continuing anti competitive practices’. The pro competitive obligations in 
Section 1 of the Reference Paper do not reserve any such unilateral right of 
WTO Members to maintain anticompetitive measures.
62 
Thus, the Panel claimed that uniform settlement rates and proportional returns 
required Mexican operators to engage in practices that were tantamount to a 
cartel  and  hence  were  anticompetitive,  despite  the  fact  that  they  were 
mandated by Mexican law.
63 Therefore, the Panel found:  
Mexico  has  failed,  in  violation  of  Section  1.1  of  its  Reference  Paper,  to 
maintain  ‘appropriate  measures’  to  prevent  anti competitive  practices  by 
                                         
59 Id., para. 53. 
60 For other findings, see, Panel Report, Mexico-Telecoms, note 42. 
61 Panel Report, Mexico-Telecoms, note 42, para. 7.244. 
62 Id., para. 7.244. 
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maintaining  measures  that  require  anti competitive  practices  among 
competing suppliers which, alone or together, are a major supplier of the 
services at issue.
64 
 
2.2.4 Commentary 
This is the first case that Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper has been examined. 
The Panel Report was criticised by some academics due to the way in which the 
Panel  adopted  the  competition  concepts  in  international  trade.
65  However, 
neither Mexico nor the US disagreed with the Panel Report. They did not appeal 
to the Appellate Body. Consequently, the Panel Report was adopted on the 1
st 
June 2004. In practice, therefore, the Panel Report is not as controversial as 
some  academics  argued.  Ernst Ulrich  Petersmann  summarised  the  potential 
impact of Mexico-Telecoms on competition issues by claiming that this case: 
[C]ould trigger a large number of similar WTO disputes once the contested 
interpretation  of  the  GATS  commitments  has  been  clarified  through  WTO 
jurisprudence.  The  pro competitive  obligations  in  the  ‘Reference  Paper’ 
accepted  by  more  than  70  WTO  Members  include  open ended,  general 
obligations to prevent ‘anti competitive practices’ that are likely to lead—
similar to the broad competition rules in the domestic competition laws of 
many  WTO  Members—to  progressive  judicial  clarification  of  specific 
obligations to prevent price fixing, market sharing and other anticompetitive 
practices.
66 
 
In  respect  of  WTO  Members’  domestic  competition  law  and  policy,  the  most 
interesting and significant finding in this case is that the Panel reinforces that 
                                         
64 Id., para. 7.269. 
65 See, e.g., P. Marsden, ‘Trade and Competition: WTO Decides First Competition Case—With 
Disappointing Results’, Competition Law Insight, May 2004 Issue, 3; J. G. Sidak and H. Singer, 
‘Überregulation Without Economics: The World Trade Organization’s Decision in the U.S.-
Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services’, Federal Communications Law Journal, 
vol. 57(1), (2004), 1; D. Neven and P. Mavroidis, ‘El mess in Telmex: a Comment on Mexico—
Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services’, World Trade Review, vol. 5, (2006), 271. 
66 E.-U. Petersmann, ‘WTO Core Principles and Trade/Competition Roundtable’, in B. Hawk, ed., 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2003, New York: Juris Publishing 
Inc., (2004), 669, pp. 673-674. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 171 
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper imposes obligations on Members in respect of 
maintaining appropriate measures ‘for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone  or  together,  are  a  major  supplier  from  engaging  in  or  continuing  anti 
competitive practices’ by concluding that Mexico had the obligation to maintain 
appropriate  measures  to  prevent  Telmex,  a  major  supplier,  from  engaging  in 
‘ant competitive practices’. As mentioned previously, the majority of the WTO 
rules  focus  on  governmental  measures  rather  than  private  activities.  Like 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, however, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper 
clearly requires WTO Members to take action against private activities. In this 
case, Mexico was required to prevent Telmex, which is a company, from engaging 
in anticompetitive practices. 
 
2.3 Impact on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
When it joined the WTO in 2001, China accepted the principles of the Reference 
Paper by including the Reference Paper in its schedules of WTO commitments 
and thus made commitments to implement pro competitive regulatory policy in 
the telecommunications sector.
67 In other words, the Reference Paper is binding 
on China. 
 
2.3.1 2.3.1 Current Measures and Problems Regarding Preventing 
Anticompetitive Practices in China’s Telecommunications 
Sector 
 
                                         
67 See China’s WTO commitments in the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China, WT/L/432, 10
th November 2001; and the Report of the Working Party on the Accession 
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2.3.1.1  The Chinese Telecommunications Sector
68 
Although  general  economic  reforms  had  been  started  in  China  in  1978,  the 
Chinese telecommunications sector remained almost untouched until the early 
1990s. In 1993, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which was 
both the regulator and sole service provider, started to loosen its regulation by 
permitting the SOEs other than those under the MPT to provide a few value 
added  telecommunications  services.  In  1994,  China  Unicom,  the  second 
telecommunications company, was established in order to compete with China 
Telecom.  It  signalled  the  initial  introduction  of  competition  in  the  Chinese 
telecommunications sector. In 1997, the telecommunications and postal services 
were separated. In March 1998, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) was 
established by merging the MPT and the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI). 
Consequently, the MII replaced the MPT as China’s regulatory authority for the 
telecommunications sector. In 1999, China telecom was split into four companies: 
the New China Telecom, China Mobile, China Satellite and the Guoxin Paging Co., 
which was later merged into China Unicom. Again, the New China Telecom was 
split into two: China Telecom and China Netcom. In 2000, China Tietong was 
established.  Among  the  six  national  basic  telecom  service  providers,  China 
Telecom, China Netcom and China Tietong are fixed line service providers, China 
Mobile and China Unicom are licensed mobile communications service providers 
and China Satellite is the only company providing satellite based services. 
 
Upon its accession to the WTO in 2001, China agreed to a six year schedule in 
direct  foreign  participation  in  value added  and  basic  telecommunications 
services, and to establish an independent and transparent regulatory authority 
and pro competitive regulatory regime in the telecommunications sector. Under 
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, China should maintain appropriate measures 
for the purpose of preventing telecommunications suppliers in China with market 
power from engaging in anticompetitive practices, such as cross subsidization, 
                                         
68 For the evolution of the Chinese telecommunications sector, see, A. Young, S. Rahaju and G. Li, 
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concealing technical information and specifications about network and services. 
 
2.3.1.2  Current Measures 
On the 25
th September 2000 just before China completed its negotiations to join 
the WTO, the Telecommunications Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Telecommunications Regulation 2000) became effective.
69 So far, 
it  is  the  most  important  piece  of  legislation  regarding  the  Chinese 
telecommunications sector. China has been drafting a telecommunications law 
for more than nine years.
70 But at the end of July 2007, the draft was still not 
sent to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC). 
 
Article 17 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides ‘the dominant 
operator  in  telecommunication  service  shall  not  refuse  requests  for 
interconnection  by  other  operators  and  the  special purpose  net  operators’. 
Article 41 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides: 
Telecommunications  operators  shall  not  commit  the  following  acts  in  the 
course  of  providing  telecommunications  services:  (1) Restricting 
telecommunications  subscribers  in  any  manner  in  the  use  of services 
designated  by  them;  (2) Restricting  telecommunications  subscribers  to 
purchasing telecommunications terminal equipment designated by them or 
rejecting  the  use  of  telecommunications  terminal  equipment  with  which 
telecommunications  subscribers  have  equipped  themselves  and  for  which 
network  access  licenses  have  been  procured;  (3) Altering  without 
authorization or changing by means of disguise the fee rates, and increasing 
without authorization  or  increasing  by  means  of  disguise  the  fee  rates  in 
violation  of  the  provisions  of  the  State;  (4) Rejecting,  delaying  or 
terminating  the  provision  of  telecommunications  services  to 
telecommunications  subscribers  without  a  proper  reason;  (5) Failing  to 
perform undertakings made publicly to  telecommunications subscribers or 
carrying out false promotion that is easily misleading; (6) Causing difficulties 
for telecommunications subscribers by improper means or retaliating against 
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telecommunications subscribers who lodge complaints. 
Article 42 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides: 
Telecommunications  operators  shall  not  commit  the  following  acts  in  the 
course  of  conducting  telecommunications  businesses:  (1) Restricting 
telecommunications  subscribers  in  any  manner  in  selecting 
telecommunications services run by other telecommunications operators in 
accordance with law; (2) Cross subsidizing in an unreasonable manner the 
various  businesses  they  conduct;  (3) Engaging  in  improper  competition  by 
providing telecommunications businesses or services at a price lower than 
the cost. 
From these provisions, we can see that the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 
does include some pro competitive provisions.  
 
However,  the  Telecommunications  Regulation  2000  has  several  shortcomings. 
First,  some  of  its  provisions  are  drafted  loosely.  For  instance,  Article  43.3 
prohibits  ‘engaging  in  improper  competition  by  providing  telecommunications 
businesses or services at a price lower than the cost’. There are at least two 
problems  with  this  provision.  First,  the  term  ‘improper  competition’  is  used 
without any further definition. This term is not common language that is used by 
any major competition regime. In its further administrative legislations, there is 
no explanation of the term. It could be partly because China had not adopted a 
competition law when this regulation was formulated and there was no standard 
term for anticompetitive practices. Second, it is notoriously difficult to decide 
when the price is lower than the cost. And it is not very convincing that this 
provision will benefit consumers directly. These loosely drafted provisions make 
it  very  difficult  to  use  the  Telecommunications  Regulation  2000  to  combat 
anticompetitive practices in the telecommunications sector. 
 
Second,  some  provisions  in  the  Telecommunications  Regulation  2000  are  not 
consistent  with  the  Reference  Paper.  For  instance,  it  contains  a  number  of 
provisions which deal with the setting of telecommunications charges. Under the 
Regulation, telecommunications charges are divided into three types: market 
decided  price,  government guided  price  and  government fixed  price.
71  The 
government guided price and government fixed price could raise some concerns 
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from a competitive point of view. It is notoriously difficult for the government to 
decide when the price is fair. The price should be decided by the market rather 
than  the  government.  Moreover,  other  WTO  Members  could  bring  some 
complaints regarding the government guided price and government fixed price 
under the BTA and the Reference Paper. Due to these reasons, from October 2005, 
the Chinese government does not set prices for each telecommunications service 
but  sets  ceiling  prices  for  all  telecommunications  services  and  allow 
telecommunications carriers to set their own service prices. 
 
Third,  the  Telecommunications  Regulation  2000  lacks  well  designed,  self 
executing  and  reliable  enforcement  procedures  and  mechanisms.
72 Like  other 
existing competition related legislation in China, the liabilities and punishments 
under the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 against anticompetitive practices 
are  very  light.
73 They  range  from  condemnation  by  the  competent  regulating 
authority to the most severe measures, such as fines or suspension of operations. 
The  maximum  amount  of  fines  is  one  million  RMB,  which  is  equal  to  about 
£70,000. This is even less than the annual salary of a Chief Executive Officer in a 
multinational  company.  Thus,  these  punishments  are  too  light  to  prevent 
anticompetitive practices in the Chinese telecommunications sector. 
 
2.3.1.3  Problems 
China’s telecommunications sector has experienced changes for the last decade. 
China  has  taken  ‘appropriate  measures’,  such  as  dividing  up  the  old  China 
Telecom  and  adopting  the  Telecommunication  Regulation  2000,  to  prevent 
‘suppliers  who,  alone  or  together,  are  a  major  supplier  from  engaging  in  or 
continuing  anti competitive  practices’.  These  measures  have  promoted 
competition  in  the  telecommunications  sector.  Under  Section  1.1  of  the 
Reference  Paper,  the  Chinese  government  should  effectively  prevent  China’s 
telecommunications  carriers  with  market  power  from  engaging  in 
anticompetitive behaviour such as cross subsidy. Now the question is whether 
these measures are enough to prevent suppliers who, alone or together, are a 
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major supplier from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
Chinese telecommunications users had been subject to high telecommunications 
charges and a poor quality of service particularly during the time when China 
Telecom monopolized the telecommunications sector before it was broken up. In 
recent  years,  particularly  after  China’s  WTO  accession  in  2001, 
telecommunications charges (e.g., initial connection charges and rates for long 
distance telephone calls) have been significantly reduced and service quality has 
been improved by domestic telecommunications operators. In order to gain a 
larger share of the local market, however, some telecommunications operators 
have  resorted  to  anticompetitive practices,  such  as cross subsidy  of  different 
types  of  services  by  the  dominant  operators.  In  1999,  for  example,  a  local 
branch of China Unicom in Chengdu City lowered the price in mobile service in 
order to expand its local market share. In response, a local branch of the old 
China Telecom in the same city cut the charges for mobile network access from 
RMB 800 yuan (US$96) to RMB 10 yuan (US$1.2).
74 In 1999, the old China Telecom 
and  China  Unicom  were  the  only  two  suppliers  for  mobile  services.  And  the 
former was far bigger than the latter. That is one of the reasons why the branch 
of the old China Telecom was able to respond to the price cut of China Unicom in 
an aggressive way. The adoption of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 does 
help to address anticompetitive problems by prohibiting certain anticompetitive 
practices in the telecommunications sector. However, the Telecommunications 
Regulation  2000  alone  is  far  from  enough  to  effectively  curtail  all 
anticompetitive practices in the Chinese telecommunications sector due to its 
shortcomings.  Currently,  the  telecommunications  sector  in  China  is  still 
dominated by a few SOEs.  
 
In sum, there has been no well established and coherent competition legislation 
in the telecommunications sector to safeguard competition with the result that 
cross subsidy, distorted tariffs, and highly concentrated markets are significant 
barriers to entry for potential foreign competitors. Thus, the existing legislation 
on the telecommunications sector in China is not enough to prevent ‘suppliers 
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who,  alone  or  together,  are  a  major  supplier  from  engaging  in  or  continuing 
anticompetitive  practices’  in  the  sector.  A  gap  exists  between  the  existing 
Chinese  legislation  on  anticompetitive  practices  in  the  telecommunications 
sector and the obligation under 1.1 Section of the Reference Paper. Rui Kang and 
Xiaoju Feng argued: 
[B]ecause  China  is  still  in  a  transitional  period,  moving  from  a  central  
planning mechanism towards a pro competitive market orientation, it is not 
surprising that there exists a large gap between the present reality and the 
principles in the WTO Reference Paper.
75 
 
2.3.2 Impact of Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper on the 
Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
As  demonstrated  above,  the  existing  measures  in  the  Chinese 
telecommunications sector, such as the Telecommunications Regulation 2000, are 
insufficient  as  appropriate  measures  ‘for  the  purpose  of  preventing  suppliers 
who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti 
competitive practices’ in the Chinese telecommunications sector. Thus, further 
measures are needed for China to implement its obligation under Section 1.1 of 
the Reference Paper. To this end, one of the actions that China is taking is to 
adopt  a  national  telecommunications  law.  Currently,  however,  the  process  of 
formulating  the  Telecommunications  Law  is  very  slow  and  no  draft  has  been 
deliberated by the NPC Standing Committee. In fact, no plan has been set for 
the NPC Standing Committee to deliberate a draft telecommunications law. 
 
Now the questions are whether a competition law could help China to implement 
the  obligation  under  Section  1.1  of  the  Reference  Paper,  and  if  so,  how  the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by Section 1.1 of 
the Reference in order to accommodate such a purpose. 
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2.3.2.1  Could A Competition Law Help China to Implement the Obligation 
under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper? 
In Mexico-Telecoms, the Panel held: 
The word ‘appropriate’, in its general dictionary sense, means ‘specially 
suitable, proper’. This suggests that ‘appropriate measures’ are those that 
are suitable for achieving their purpose – in this case that of ‘preventing a 
major  supplier  from  engaging  in  or  continuing  anti competitive 
practices’.
76  
From the Panel’s view, thus, a WTO Member’s national competition law could be 
considered  as  an  appropriate  measure  as  long  as  it  suitable  and  proper  to 
prevent ‘suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in 
or  continuing  anti competitive  practices’  in  the  telecommunications  sector. 
Moreover, in Mexico-Telecoms, Mexico’s Federal Law of Economic Competition 
(which  is  the  Mexican  national  competition  law)  and  Code  of  Regulations  to 
Federal  Law  on  Economic  Competition  were  listed  as  factual  aspects.
77 In 
addition,  the  Panel  in  Mexico-Telecoms  explained  the  reason  why  Mexico’s 
Federal Law of Economic Competition was not examined. It held:  
As Mexico has not claimed that its general competition law is applicable 
to the anti competitive practices mandated by the ILD rules, we do not 
consider it necessary to examine the broader issue of whether Mexico’s 
competition  laws  are,  in  general,  ‘appropriate  measures’  in  terms  of 
Section 1.1.
78  
From  the  view  of  the  Panel  in  Mexico-Telecoms,  therefore,  a  WTO  Member’s 
national competition law could be considered as appropriate measures ‘for the 
purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier 
from  engaging  in  or  continuing  anti competitive  practices’,  if  such  national 
competition  law  is  applicable  to  anticompetitive  practices  in  the 
telecommunications sector. Thus, an antimonopoly law could be an appropriate 
measure ‘for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a 
major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti competitive practices’ in the 
Chinese telecommunications sector. Therefore, the adoption of a competition 
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law  could  help  China  implement  the  obligation  under  Section  1.1  of  the 
Reference  Paper  as  long  as  such  legislation  is  applicable  to  the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
2.3.2.2  How Has the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 Been 
Influenced by Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper? 
The Telecommunications Regulation 2000 is an administrative regulation, while 
the forthcoming Antimonopoly Law will be a national law. Under the Legislation 
Law  2000,  ‘National  law  has  higher  legal  authority  than  administrative 
regulations,  local  decrees  and  administrative  or  local  rules’.  Thus,  the 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law will overrule the Telecommunications Regulation 
2000 if it is designed to be applicable to the telecommunications sector or does 
not provide clear exemption for the telecommunications sector. However, many 
WTO Members, such as Mexico, exempt their telecommunications sectors from 
the application of their national competition laws. Currently, China follows these 
practices  and  has  a  separate  regulation  in  regard  to  its  telecommunications 
sector.  Against  this  background,  thus,  it  is  not  easy  for  China  to  make  its 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law applicable to its telecommunications sector. It is 
not surprising that some Chinese telecommunications companies lobby strongly 
that the telecommunications sector should be exempted from the Antimonopoly 
Law due to the protection that they enjoy under the existing separate regulation. 
However,  China  has  the  obligation  to  maintain  appropriate  measures  for  the 
purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier 
from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices under Section 1.1 of 
the  Reference  Paper.  Although  China  could  implement  Section  1.1  of  the 
Reference  Paper  through  adopting  new  telecommunications  legislation  which 
provides some provisions combating anticompetitive behaviour in this sector, the 
current process of adopting a telecommunications law is behind the process of 
adopting  the Antimonopoly  Law. This  leaves  the Chinese  government  with  no 
option but to make its Antimonopoly Law applicable to its telecommunications 
sector  or  silent  on  such  matter,  at  least  before  the  enactment  of  new 
telecommunications  law.  Otherwise,  China  could  face  complaints  from  other 
WTO Members in respect of the implementation of Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper. As happened in Mexico-Telecoms, the WTO could force China to enforce 
appropriate  measures  in  order  to  prevent  anticompetitive  practices  in  the Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 180 
telecommunications  sector  if  China  failed  to  do  so  itself.  In  fact,  if  that 
happened,  China’s  argument  would  be  weaker  than  Mexico  since  its  existing 
measures  are  insufficient  to  prevent  suppliers  who,  alone  or  together,  are  a 
major supplier from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices. Thus, it 
is  wise  for  China  to  consider  combating  anticompetitive  practices  in 
telecommunications sector through its forthcoming Antimonopoly Law in order to 
implement its obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. In order to 
make sure that the enactment of China’s Antimonopoly Law can help China to 
implement Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, the Chinese government needs to 
be  aware  of  the  applicability  of  the  forthcoming  Antimonopoly  Law  to 
anticompetitive behaviour in the Chinese telecommunications sector. In Mexico-
Telecom,  Mexico’s  telecommunications  sector  is  exempted  from  Mexico’s 
national competition law. If China had followed Mexico’s practice and exempted 
its telecommunications sector from its new Antimonopoly Law, the adoption of 
the Antimonopoly Law in China would not have helped China to implement the 
obligation  under  Section  1.1  of  the  Reference  Paper.  Therefore,  China’s 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law has to be applicable to the telecommunications 
sector in China in order to help China to implement the obligation under Section 
1.1 of the Reference Paper. 
 
During the process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007, most drafts did 
not clearly exempt the telecommunications sector. For example, Article 2 of the 
June 2006 Draft provides: ‘As for monopolistic conduct prohibited by this Law, 
this Law does not apply where other laws or administrative regulations provide 
provisions’. On the one hand, this provision does not clearly exempt the Chinese 
telecommunications sector from the application of the Antimonopoly Law. On 
the other hand, it leaves such an opportunity open. China could still follow other 
WTO  Members’  practices  and  enact  a  separate  telecommunications  law  to 
regulate anticompetitive practices in the telecommunications sector after the 
adoption  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law.  Under  the  June  2006  Draft,  thus, 
anticompetitive practices in the Chinese telecommunications sector could only 
be  prohibited  by  the  Antimonopoly  Law  when  these  practices  were  not 
prohibited by any future telecommunications law in China. Before it adopts a 
national  telecommunications  law  which  provides  the  exemption  from  the 
application  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law,  therefore,  China  can  argue  that  its 
competition law is a measure ‘for preventing suppliers who, alone or together, Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 4, 181 
are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti competitive practices’ 
in the Chinese telecommunications sector, since the June 2006 Draft does not 
clearly provide the exemption for the telecommunications sector.  
 
However, this provision changed in the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Article 2 of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide a blank exemption as some drafts do, 
such as Article 2 of the June 2006 Draft. It stipulates:  
This Law is applicable to monopolistic conduct in economic activities within 
the territory of the People’s Republic of China; This Law is applicable to 
monopolistic conduct outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China 
that have eliminative or restrictive effects on competition in the domestic 
market of the People’s Republic of China.  
During the process of drafting the Antimonopoly Law 2007, similar provision only 
appeared  in  the  2004  Submitted  Draft.
79  Article  2  of  this  draft  provides: 
‘Monopolistic behaviours in market transactions in the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China shall be governed by this Law’. Compared to previous drafts, 
thus, this is a great change. It makes it difficult for any further sector legislation 
in the telecommunications sector to exempt the telecommunications sector from 
the application of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This change makes it possible 
that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 can help China to implement the obligation 
under  Section  1.1  of  the  Reference  Paper.  Thus,  this  change  illustrates  the 
impact of Section 1.1 on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
3  Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  examined  the  WTO’s  impact  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 from the second aspect of the WTO’s impacts on the 
development of WTO Members’ domestic legislation. In general, the WTO does 
not establish general obligations for its Members to create internally competitive 
markets, nor require them to take affirmative action or provide remedies against 
private operators engaging in restrictive practices that affect the trade of other 
Members.  However,  Articles  VIII  and  IX  of  the  GATS  and  Section  1.1  of  the 
Reference  Paper  are  exceptions  of  this  general  assumption.  They  establish 
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general obligations for Members to affirmatively create internally competitive 
markets and require them to take affirmative action or provide remedies against 
private operators engaging in restrictive practices that affect the trade of other 
Members. 
 
As a Member, China needs to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX 
of the GATS and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. Before the adoption of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, the relevant legislation in China was far from enough to 
combat the anticompetitive practices which are prohibited under Articles VIII 
and IX of the GATS and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. The adoption of a 
competition law could help China to implement the obligations under Articles 
VIII and IX of the GATS, and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. The formulation 
of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by the possibility of helping 
China to implement such obligations. As a result, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 can 
be used to help China to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of 
the GATS, and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. In the future, the Chinese 
competition enforcement authorities need to be fully aware of such potential 
benefits from adopting the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and make sure that this law 
is implemented in a way as to materialize such benefits. 183 
Chapter Five:                                       
The Impact of Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the 
TRIPS on the Formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 
 
This  chapter  examines  the  impact  of  Articles  8.2,  40,  and  31(k)  of  the  Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
1 on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (hereinafter  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007).
2 It 
neither explores comprehensively the interaction between competition law and intellectual 
property rights
3 nor argues whether it is justifiable for a country to prohibit intellectual 
property-related anticompetitive practices.
4 Instead, it examines whether Articles 8.2, 40, 
and 31(k) of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking to combat abuses of 
intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
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2 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
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3 For such discussions, see, e.g., OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy, Competition 
Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, Paris: OECD, (1989); T. Jorde and D. Teece, eds., 
Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness, New York: Oxford University Press, (1992); R. 
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www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; T.-L. Hwang, C. Chen, Z. Huang and J. Chen, eds., 
The Future of Development of Competition Framework, The Hague and London: Kluwer Law 
International, (2004), pp. 107 ff; and S. Anderman, ed., The Interface between Intellectual 
Property Rights and Competition Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2007) 
(examining the experiences of a number of countries in grappling with the problems of 
reconciling the two fields of competition policy and intellectual property rights). 
4 For such an argument, see, e.g., M. Khor, Intellectual Property, Competition and Development, 
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1  Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS
5 
The TRIPS was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
(1986 1994).
6 It  sets  down  minimum  standards  for  many  forms  of  intellectual 
property  regulation  while  allowing  each  Member  to  conduct  its  own  internal 
policy and implementation procedures. In particular, it contains requirements 
that domestic law must meet in the area of copyright, patents and trademarks. 
It is the ‘largest and most ambitious attempt to harmonize intellectual property 
rights on a world scale’.
7 
 
1.1 Competition and Intellectual Property Rights 
The interaction between intellectual property rights and competition has been 
widely  debated.
8 The  discussion is  legend, and it is  not intended  to  add any 
substance to it at this point. However, it is still necessary to provide a brief 
introduction of this interaction in order to explore the impacts of Articles 8.2, 40 
and 31(k) of the TRIPS on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Competition  concerns  arise  in  respect  of  intellectual  property  rights  because 
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6 For the drafting history of the TRIPS, see, D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History 
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7 P. Demaret, ‘The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade 
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intellectual property rights grant right holders the right to exclude others from 
using the intellectual property without permission. They could arise in all forms 
of intellectual property rights, including patents, trademarks, and copyrights. An 
abuse  of  a  dominant  position  could  occur  where  intellectual  property  right 
holders  are  in  a  position  to  exert  substantial  market  power.  In  Magill  TV 
Guide/ITP , BBC and RTE,
9 for instance, the BBC, IPT and RTE,
10 which held the 
copyright in the collection of their own television programme listings, denied 
Magill’s  request  to  license  the  listings  to  prepare  a  weekly  guide.  Magill 
complained  that  this  was  an  abuse  of  a  dominant  position.  The  European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of Magill. The BBC, 
IPT  and  RTE,  were  ordered  to  license  the  listings  to  Magill  for  a  reasonable 
royalty. 
 
Apart  from  these  abusive  practices,  competition  concerns  could  also  arise  in 
respect  of  restrictive  conditions  imposed  when  the  patented  technology  or 
product is licensed to others. These conditions may restrict the licensee’s pricing 
of the product, marketing outside a designated area and sub licensing of the 
patent.  Firms  could  cross license  their  patents  to  each  other  with  such 
conditions,  effectively  creating  cartel type  arrangements  without  an  actual 
cartel  agreement.
11 Other  competition restricting  clauses  in  patent  licenses 
include conditions requiring the licensee to purchase another product from the 
patent holder (tying), not to deal in rivals’ products or to use their technologies 
or  to  ‘grant  back’  any  improvements  in  the  patented  technology  or  product 
exclusively to the original right holder. 
 
1.2 Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS 
The  debates  on  the  relationship  between  intellectual  property  rights  and 
competition can go back to the First International Congress for the Consideration 
of Patent Protection held in Vienna in 1872, which stated: 
                                         
9 Cases T-69-/89 etc RTE v Commission [1991] ECR II-485, [1991] 4 CMLR 586, upheld by the 
ECJ Cases 241/91 P etc RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECR I-734, [1995] 4 CMLR 718. 
10 BBC is Britain’s national television and radio broadcaster. RTE is Ireland’s national television and 
radio broadcaster. 
11 See, infra DVD case. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 186 
We live no longer in the day of industrial action, which is strictly confined 
and is removed from foreign competition, and where slow communication 
prevents  or  delays  the  utilization  of  inventions.  We  live  at  a  time  of 
liberal  Customs  policy;  Steam  and  Electricity  have  newly  united  once 
isolated seats of industry in a way undreamt of; and the mutual exchange 
of goods shows today a magnitude which a generation ago one could not 
have imagined. Under such altered relations the Patent granted for an 
invention in one country becomes in fact a restriction unprofitable and 
obstructive, if the same invention without limitation or increase in price, 
becomes in an adjoining country common property.
12  
Such  debates  were  also  at  the  heart  of  the  negotiations  during  the  Uruguay 
Round.
13 During the negotiations, developing countries expressed their concerns 
in  respect  of  the  potential  anticompetitive  effects  of  intellectual  property 
rights.
14 Thus, they proposed to incorporate provisions addressing these potential 
anticompetitive effects. As a result, the TRIPS includes at least three provisions 
which  expressly  address  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive 
practices.
15 
 
Article 8 of the TRIPS setting out the principles of applying the TRIPS clearly 
recognises  the  necessity  of  applying  competition  rules  to  anticompetitive 
practices in the area of intellectual property rights.
16  As one of these principles, 
Article 8.2 of the TRIPS provides: 
                                         
12 Quoted in A. Yusuf, ‘TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions’, in C. Correa and A. 
Yusuf, eds., Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement, (1998), 3, p. 
7. 
13The Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP), 
Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/99, 
(1999), para. 1. For the drafting history of the TRIPS, see, D. Gervais, note 6, (2003). 
14 See, e.g., Communication from India of 10 July 1989 MTN.GNG./NG11/W/37 sub.2 and VI. 
15 Most commentators agree that the PRIPS provisions dealing with competition issues refer to 
Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k). See, e.g., H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, pp. 404-405; F. Abbott, 
(2004), note 5, 687, pp. 689-691. However, Marco Ricolfi argued that Articles 67 and possibly 
66(2) were also competition-related provisions. See, M. Ricolfi, ‘Is There An Antitrust Antidote 
Against IP Overprotection within TRIPS?’, Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, vol. 
10(2), (2006), 305, pp. 310-313. 
16 Article 8 of the TRIPS entitles ‘Principles’. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 187 
Appropriate  measures,  provided  that  they  are  consistent  with  the 
provision  of  this  Agreement,  may  be  needed  to  prevent  the  abuse  of 
intellectual  property  rights  by  right  holders  or  the  resort  to  practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology. 
Thus,  it  expressly  recognises  the  legitimacy  of  invoking  national  competition 
laws  by  WTO  Members  in  order  to  combat  intellectual  property related 
anticompetitive practices. In other words, it clearly allows a WTO Member to 
take  appropriate  measures  in  order  to  ‘prevent  the  abuse  of  intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect the transfer of technology’, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the other provisions of the TRIPS. Marco Ricolfi 
claimed:  
There is no question that this provision enables the prevention and control 
not only of bilateral and multilateral dealings—agreements between two 
or  more  parties—but  also  of  unilateral  behaviour,  including  refusals  to 
deal and other forms of exercising IP [intellectual property] that may be 
deemed to constitute abuse.
17 
Article 8.2 of the TRIPS does not define the measures which are appropriate in 
order  to  prevent  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive  practices. 
However, it seems clear that national competition law cannot be considered as 
inappropriate  measures  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  intellectual  property 
related anticompetitive practices. 
 
The ‘Principle’ provided in Article 8.2 is given greater specificity in Part II of the 
TRIPS,  entitled  ‘Standards  Concerning  the  Availability,  Scope  and  Use  of 
Intellectual  Property  Rights’,  in  which  Section  8  deals  with  ‘Control  of  Anti 
Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses’. Section 8 of Part II of the TRIPS 
consists of only one provision, Article 40, which is addressed to anticompetitive 
licensing  practices  or  conditions.  Articles  40.1  and  40.2  cover  matters  of 
substance, while Articles 40.3 and 40.4 deal with matters of procedure. This 
manner  closely  parallels  paragraphs  1  and  2  of  Article  IX  of  the  General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
18 
                                         
17 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 311. 
18 The GATS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 188 
 
Article  40.1  recognizes  that  the  terms  of  a  licensing  contract  could  restrict 
competition  or  impede  technology  transfer.  It  provides:  ‘Members  agree  that 
some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights 
which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede 
the transfer and dissemination of technology’. It does not describe the behaviour 
that may be subject to competition law. Instead, it clarifies the rationale under 
which  the  WTO  may  approve  of  its  Members’  legal  intervention  to  restore 
competition. Thus, it ‘is strikingly philosophical’.
19 
 
Article  40.2,  entitled  ‘appropriate  measures  to  prevent  or  control  such 
practices’, expressly envisions that WTO Members have the right to specify their 
licensing practices or conditions in their legislation that may in particular cases 
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights that has adverse effects on 
competition in the relevant market. In addition, it contains a non exhaustive list 
of practices that may be outlawed or controlled by Members’ legislation. Such 
anticompetitive practices may include exclusive grantback conditions, conditions 
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of 
the  relevant  laws  and  regulations  of  that  Member.
 20 This  list  is  drawn  from 
clauses  usually  found  in  domestic  legislation,  such  as  in  the  EU  technology 
transfer regulation.
21 This list implies that WTO Members appear free to opt for 
per se rules. 
 
Articles 40.1 and 40.2 are concerned with the abusive exercise of intellectual 
property rights and with certain licensing practices and conditions. Unlike Article 
8.2, thus, Articles 40.1 and 40.2 cannot encompass unilateral behaviour, such as 
a refusal to deal or discriminatory behaviour because the control and prevention 
are limited to licensing practices and conditions. In addition, they are viewed 
narrowly in scope. From the legislative history and the examples given in Article 
40.2, they focus primarily on the licensing and transfer of technology rather than 
                                         
19 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 310. 
20 The TRIPS, Art. 40.2. 
21 Such as, Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements (EC 
Commission Regulation on Technology 1996), OJ L 031, 9 February 1996 P. 0002-0013 
(reference to unadjusted EC Treaty numbering). Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 189 
on trademark or copyright licensing.
22 
 
Article  31  of  the  TRIPS,  entitled  ‘Other  Use  Without  Authorization  of  Right 
Holder’,  lays  down  the  conditions  for  compulsory  licensing.  It  recognises 
anticompetitive practices as one of the grounds for compulsory licensing. Article 
31 (k) of the TRIPS clearly acknowledges that compulsory licensing is a remedy 
available to combat abuses of patents. Article 31 provides:  
Where the law of a Member allows for other use
23 of the subject matter of 
a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by 
the  government  or  third  parties  authorized  by  the  government,  the 
following provisions shall be respected: (k) Members are not obliged to 
apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use 
is  permitted  to  remedy  a  practice  determined  after  judicial  or 
administrative  process  to  be  anti competitive.  The  need  to  correct 
anticompetitive practices may be taken into account in determining the 
amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have 
the  authority  to  refuse  termination  of  authorization  if  and  when  the 
conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur. 
This provision illustrates that the TRIPS ‘clearly permits the use of compulsory 
licensing as a legal remedy for practices that are deemed to be anti competitive 
in the context of the Agreement’.
24 It ‘does not define the basis on which a 
practice might be held to be anticompetitive  a situation which possibly calls for 
further  guidance,  in  some  form,  at  an  appropriate  stage’.
25  Unilateral 
anticompetitive behaviour can be prohibited by the WTO Members’ rules that 
have been adopted in conformity with Article 31(k). However, Article 31 (k) can 
only  apply  to  anticompetitive  practices  in  patents  rather  than  the  whole 
intellectual property area. 
 
From the above examination, it can be seen that, first, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) 
                                         
22 However, Hanns Ullrich argues that Articles 40.1 and 40.2, together with Article 8.2, are ‘broadly 
applicable to restrictive practices relating to all the different intellectual property rights that the 
TRIPS Agreement covers’. See, H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, p. 405. 
23 ‘Other use’ refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30. 
24 R. Anderson, (2003), note 5, 235, p. 241. 
25 Id. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 190 
of the TRIPS are not competition rules themselves in their natures. They do not 
introduce their own rules of competition law. They do not define measures which 
could be treated as abuses or set out standards that could be used in evaluating 
particular  anticompetitive  practices.
26 As  Debra  Valentine  claimed,  the  TRIPS 
was ‘not a competition rule, but simply an acknowledgement of each country’s 
right to use its competition laws to protect against anticompetitive practices 
involving the use of intellectual property’.
27 
 
Second, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS are not mandatory because WTO 
Members are by no means under a legal obligation to adopt them.
28 Instead, they 
are  enabling  clauses  that  expressly  recognize  the  legitimacy  of  invoking 
competition  law  to  curtail  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive 
practices by adopting relevant domestic legislation. In other words, they provide 
WTO Members with discretion in the development and the application of their 
national  competition  laws  to  combat  intellectual  property related 
anticompetitive  practices.
29 Thus,  they  do  not  oblige  WTO  Members  to  take 
actions against abuses of intellectual property rights. This is very different from 
the WTO rules examined in Chapter Four, such as Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper,  which  require  WTO  Members  to  take  action  against  anticompetitive 
                                         
26 Except Article 40.2 which lists some anticompetitive practices. 
27 D. Valentine, speech, ‘WTO Core Principles and Trade Competition Polices’, in Barry Hawk, ed., 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law (2003), New York: Juris Publishing 
Inc., (2004), pp. 712-713. 
28 It has to be clear that express refusal or unjustified failure to enter into the consultations provided 
for by Articles 40.3 and 40.4 may constitute a breach under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System. But they are not directly relevant to the purpose of this chapter. 
29 Frederick Abbott claimed: ‘the TRIPS Agreement in its present form provides substantial 
discretion to WTO Members in the formulation and application of competition rules regulating 
intellectual property’. See, F. Abbott, (2004), note 5, 687, p. 687; also see, F. Abbott, ‘Are the 
Competition Rules in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Adequate?’, in E.-U. Petersmann, ed., Reforming The World Trading System: 
Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2005), 
317, p. 322. However, Aditya Bhattacharjea argued that the current competition-related 
provisions in the TRIPS were not enough to prevent anticompetitive practices in the area of 
intellectual property rights, see, A. Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on 
Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, 
vol. 9, (2006), 293, pp. 301-303, particularly p. 302. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 191 
practices. 
 
1.3 Could Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) Enhance the Case for 
A WTO Member Seeking to Combat Abuses of 
Intellectual Property Rights?  
As enabling clauses, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) expressly recognize the legitimacy 
of  invoking  national  competition  law  to  curtail  intellectual  property related 
anticompetitive practices by employing domestic legislation. It is entirely at the 
discretion of an individual WTO Member to decide whether or not it adopts the 
measures permitted in Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. Now, the question 
is whether Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) could enhance the case for WTO Members 
seeking to combat intellectual property related anticompetitive practices.  
 
Marco Ricolfi claimed: ‘if a Member abstains from enacting provisions providing 
for  the  prohibition  and  control  of  IP related  anti competitive  practices,  this 
legislative  option  is,  in  principle,  unobjectionable  and  cannot  lead  to  a 
complaint’  under  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  System.
30 Hanns  Ullrich argued 
that  the  TRIPS  promoted  ‘a  globally  harmonized  intellectual  property  regime 
while leaving competition policy to the sovereign determination of Members’.
 31 
Robert Anderson claimed that Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS provided 
‘clear but qualified international legal authority for countries that wish to take 
measures to protect themselves against anti competitive abuses of specific types 
of intellectual property rights’.
32 From a legal point of view, their arguments are 
correct due to the nature of Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) as enabling clauses. In 
practice, however, under what circumstance could a WTO Member act in a way 
permitted in these articles?  
 
The EU argued: 
In general, the TRIPS Agreement would appear to enhance the case for 
countries seeking to protect themselves against anticompetitive abuses of 
                                         
30 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 316. 
31 H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, p. 404. 
32 R. Anderson, (2003), note 5, 235, p. 241. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 192 
intellectual property rights, to enact a competition law and establish an 
independent and effective competition authority.
33  
Marco  Ricolfi  also  expressed  a  similar  opinion  by  claiming:  ‘the  enabling 
character of TRIPs is apt to expand rather than to restrict the lawmaking powers 
retained by Members at the intersection between IP [intellectual property] and 
antitrust’.
34 These arguments might be true if we only look at the practices by a 
few rich and powerful WTO Members, such as Canada, the EU, Japan, and the 
US.
35 So far, most developed WTO Members have adopted legislation in respect 
of dealing with intellectual property related anticompetitive practices. In this 
sense, therefore, Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the TRIPS could have and in fact 
have already enhanced ‘the case for countries seeking to protect themselves 
against anticompetitive abuses of intellectual property rights’.  
 
However, other WTO Members, particularly poor WTO Members have not used 
the  discretion  given  by  Articles  8.2,  40  and  31(k)  of  the  TRIPS  and  adopted 
legislation  prohibiting  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive  practices. 
The reasons for this fact can vary across those WTO Members. Some could argue 
that this was because it was neither necessary nor urgent for those Members to 
have such legislation due to the lack of abuses of intellectual property rights in 
their domestic markets. It could be the case for some of these WTO Members. 
However,  it  cannot  be  the  reason  for  all  the  WTO  Members  which  have  not 
adopted some measures for combating abuses of intellectual property rights. As 
mentioned before, some developing countries expressly raised concerns about 
the  adverse  effects  of  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive  practices 
during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round.
 And that is why Articles 8.2, 40 
and 31(k) were brought into the TRIPS. If they did not feel that it was necessary 
and urgent to combat intellectual property related anticompetitive practices in 
their markets, some poor countries would not propose such articles during the 
                                         
33 WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/99, note 10, para. 6. 
34 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 316. 
35 For a review of the role of competition law vis-à-vis intellectual property rights in Canada, the EU, 
Japan and the US, see, R. Anderson, ‘The Interface Between Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property in the Context of the International Trading System’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, vol. 1(4), 655, (1998). For the study on EU experience on the application of 
competition law in relation to the exercise of intellectual property rights, see, WGTCP, 
WT/WGTCP/W/99, note 11, paras. 26-42. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 193 
Uruguay  Round.  Thus,  there  must  be  other  reasons  why  some  WTO  Members 
choose not to act in ways permitted under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. 
 
Frederick Abbott argued: 
The presence of discretion from a legal standpoint does not assure that 
developing  Members  will  not  come  under  pressure  from  developed 
Members should they choose to exercise it. Developed Members with some 
regularity assert political and economic pressure on developing Members 
not to act in ways permitted under WTO agreements.
36 
This  argument  unveils  one  of  the  most  significant  reasons  why  some  WTO 
Members  have  not  adopted  the  measures  prohibiting  abuses  of  intellectual 
property rights, although they are permitted to do so under the TRIPS.  
 
The TRIPS was proposed by some developed countries, particularly the US. Peter 
Gerhar argued that developing countries agreed to the TRIPS not ‘because they 
could  gain  from  intellectual  property  rights  but  because  of  their  overriding 
interest in continued access to the United States market’.
37 Abdulgawi Yusuf also 
expressed a similar opinion by claiming that the reason why developing countries 
entered the TRIPS was not due to ‘a conviction that the strengthening of IPR 
protection would continue to the liberalization of international trade, but as a 
bargaining chip for the access of developing countries’ products to the markets 
of  industrialized  countries’.
38  Carlos  Correa  claimed  that  the  TRIPS  was  a 
product  of  the  pressure  the  developed  countries  placed  upon  developing 
countries to negotiate an agreement with ‘the clear objective of universalizing 
the  standards  of  IPRs  protection  that  [the]  former  had  incorporated  in  their 
legislation’.
39 These arguments were proved by a recent study by the World Bank, 
which  concluded  that  the  developed  WTO  Members  would  be  the  major 
beneficiaries of the enhanced intellectual property rights under the TRIPS, while 
                                         
36 F. Abbott, (2004), note 5, 687, p. 693. 
37 P. Gerhart, ‘Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory- TRIPS as A Substantive Issue’, Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 32, (2000), 357, p. 368. 
38 A. Yusuf, (1998), note 12, 3, p. 8. 
39 C. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: the TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options, London and New York: Zed Books, (2000), pp. 7-8. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 194 
the developing WTO Members would be the ‘net loser’.
40   
 
Although developing countries concerned about the adverse impact of abuses of 
intellectual property rights on trade, developed countries championed by the US 
tried  hard  to  make  sure  that  the  purpose  of  protecting  intellectual  property 
rights  was  not  diluted  during  the  negotiations  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  Thus, 
developed countries agreed to add Articles 8.2, 40, and 31 (k) into the TRIPS as 
enabling clauses rather than mandatory clauses, like the rest of provisions of the 
TRIPS. Hanns Ullrich claimed:  
‘This  reservation  in  favour  of  Members’  sovereign  competition  policy 
represents a concession that the industrialized countries made in response 
to an earlier effort by developing countries to enact a Code of Conduct 
for the Transfer of Technology.’
 41  
One of the reasons why these rich countries were in favour of enabling clauses 
rather than mandatory ones was that they could put pressure on the countries 
which wished to act in ways permitted in such enabling clauses. For example, 
Article 40.2 of the TRIPS expressly states that ‘nothing in the Agreement shall 
prevent member countries from specifying in their national legislation licensing 
practices  that  may  constitute  an  abuse  and  prevent  such  anti competitive 
practices’. In practice, however, WTO Members that act in ways permitted by 
Article 40.2 are often subject to unilateral pressure, when their rules displease 
large  trading  partners.  Such  pressures  are  felt  by  developed  as  well  as 
developing WTO Members. However, developing WTO Members could feel more 
difficult to resist such pressures due to their weak trading position. 
 
In practice, therefore, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS have not always 
enhanced the case for a WTO Member seeking to combat intellectual property 
related anticompetitive practices. They could only enhance the case for a WTO 
                                         
40 Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, Report of Common Intellectual 
Property Rights, September 2002, p. 32, 
www.iprcommission.org/papers/text/final_report/reportwebfinal.htm. 
41 H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, p. 404. For a similar opinion, also see, T. Cottier, ‘The Prospects 
for Intellectual Property in GATT’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 28, (1991), 383, pp. 409 
ff.; P. Roffe, ‘Control of Anticompetitive Practices in Contractual Licenses under the TRIPs 
Agreement’, in C. Correa and A. Yusuf, eds., (1998), note 12, 261, pp. 278 ff; and D. Gervais, 
(2003), note 6, sub. 2.48, 2.182 et seq. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 195 
Member seeking to combat abuses of intellectual property rights if it is strong 
enough to resist pressures from other WTO Members.  
 
1.4 Limitation of the Discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 
31 (k) of the TRIPS 
Under Article 8.2 of the TRIPS, WTO Members are authorized to develop their 
own  competition  policy  regarding  intellectual  property related  restrictive 
practices,  only  if  this  is  done  consistently  with  the  TRIPS.  This  provision  is 
different from Article 8.2 of the Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay  Round  of  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations,  Trade Related  Aspects  of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (hereinafter 
the Brussels Ministerial Text),
42 which provided: 
Appropriate  measures,  provided  that  they  do  not  derogate  from  the 
obligations arising under this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the 
abuse  of  intellectual  property  rights  by  right  holders  or  the  resort  to 
practices  which  unreasonably  restrain  trade  or  adversely  affect  the 
international transfer of technology. 
Thus, it can be seen that Article 8.2 of the Brussels Ministerial Text uses a ‘do 
not  derogate  from  the  obligations’  text,  while  the  final  Article  8.2  adopts 
‘consistent with the provisions of’ text as the control mechanism. This change 
illustrates  that  the  restriction  on  Members’  discretion  regarding  intellectual 
property related  anticompetitive  practices  has  been  relaxed.  Despite  this 
relaxation, WTO Members’ discretion is not open ended but restricted. Article 
8.2  of  the  TRIPS  limits  WTO  Members’  sovereign  power  to  prescribe  national 
competition  law  and  policy  by  requiring  that  measures  adopted  to  control 
abusive or anticompetitive practices must be ‘consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement’. Hanns Ullrich claimed: 
This  requirement  of  TRIPS consistency  represents  more  than  a  mere 
limitation on remedial action, which is always subject to a principle of 
proportionality.  Rather,  the  consistency  requirement  concerns  the 
                                         
42 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 
MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, 3
rd December 1990. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 196 
substantive scope of IPR related competition rules.
43 
He continued: 
[T]his provision must be read as a caveat against an excessive exercise of 
competition  policy,  which  the  TRIPS  Agreement,  by  its  purpose  and 
express wording, otherwise leaves Members free to define. It means that 
they  may  not  use  antitrust  regulation  as  a  pretext  to  undermine  the 
protection of IPRs as guaranteed by the TRIPS Agreement.
44 
This constraint implies that ‘competition policy must remain true to its purpose 
and keep within the bounds of safeguarding competition’ and ‘may not outlaw 
uses  and  forms  of  intellectual  property  that  the  TRIPS  Agreement  seeks  to 
safeguard’.
45 
 
Like  Article  8.2  of  the  TRIPS,  Article  40.2  of  the  TRIPS  also  requires  that 
appropriate  measures  adopted  by  Members  for  the  purpose  of  combating 
intellectual property related anticompetitive practices must be consistent with 
the other provisions of the TRIPS. In addition, the ‘in particular cases’ language 
in Article 40.2 is also intended to limit the discretion provided by Article 40.2, 
although it is acknowledged to represent less than  ideal drafting.
46 It implies 
that  Members  shall  define  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive 
practices on the basis of competitive merits, rather than in an overly abstract 
manner. 
 
In  sum,  the  discretion  provided  by  Articles  8.2,  and  40  of  the  TRIPS  is 
constrained by the requirement that relevant provisions in national competition 
laws  must  be  consistent  with  the  TRIPS.  These  restrictions  are  mandatory 
components of the TRIPS, and thus, must be taken seriously.
47 This implies that 
the flexibility of WTO Members in connection with the shaping of their laws in 
regard to combating intellectual  property related  anticompetitive  practices  is 
far from being unfettered. 
                                         
43 H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, p. 410. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An Authoritative and 
Practical Guide to the TRIPS Agreement, Cambridge: University of Cambridge, (2005), p. 558. 
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2  The Status of China’s Legislation on Abuses of 
Intellectual Property Rights before the Adoption 
of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and Articles 8.2, 
40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS 
As a WTO Member, China is authorized to adopt measures for the purpose of 
combating abuses of intellectual property rights under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) 
of the TRIPS. However, did China use this discretion fully before the adoption of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
 
2.1 The Status of China’s Legislation on Abuses of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The Chinese system of protecting intellectual property rights did not re emerge 
until  the  early  1980s.
48 Internationally,  China  has  acceded  to  a  number  of 
international  conventions  on  the  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights.
49 
Domestically, legislation on the protection of intellectual property rights has also 
been adopted in the areas of trademark, copyright and patent. This has led to 
the creation of a comprehensive legal framework to protect both domestic and 
foreign intellectual property rights. Prior to and immediately after its accession 
to the WTO, China made conscientious efforts to amend its copyright, patent, 
and trademark laws while introducing new implementing regulations and judicial 
interpretations.
50  Although  there  are  still  some  provisions  in  the  Chinese 
                                         
48 After the establishment of the Communist government in China in 1949, intellectual property 
rights were not protected. 
49 China became a member of the World Intellectual Property Organisation in 1980, an official 
member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1985, and a member 
of the Madrid Agreement for the International Registration of Trademarks in 1989.  
50 Between 2000 and 2002, China amended its major pieces of national intellectual property rights 
legislation and their implementing rules. For highlights of such amendments, see, Y. Li, ‘The 
Wolf Has Come: Are China’s Intellectual Property Industries Prepared for the WTO’, UCLA 
Pacific Basin Law Journal, vol. 20, (2002), 77, pp. 84-86. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 198 
intellectual property legislation which are not in line with the TRIPS,
51 ‘most of 
the laws required under the TRIPS are already on the books’.
52 
 
Currently, China’s legal framework for protecting intellectual property rights is 
built on three national laws passed by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s  Congress  (NPC):  the  Patent  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China 
(hereinafter the Patent Law 2000),
53 the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (hereafter the Trademark Law 2001),
54 and the Copyright Law of the 
People’s  Republic  of  China  (hereinafter  the  Copyright  Law  2001).
55 A  great 
number of regulations, rules, measures and policies have been made by the NPC 
Standing  Committee,  the  State  Council  and  various  ministries,  bureaux  and 
commissions. The circulars, opinions and notices of the Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) also form part of the legal framework of protecting intellectual property 
rights. 
 
Article 48 of the Patent Law 2000 prohibits one type of intellectual property 
related anticompetitive practices. It provides:  
Where  any  entity  which  is  qualified  to  exploit  the  invention  or  utility 
model  has  made  requests  for  authorization  from  the  patentee  of  an 
invention or utility model to exploit its or his patent on reasonable terms 
and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time, the patent administrative organ under the State Council may, upon 
the application of that entity, grant a compulsory license to exploit the 
patent for invention or utility model.  
It is the only provision within the three major pieces of intellectual property 
rights legislation which prohibits any type of abuse of intellectual property rights. 
                                         
51 Y. Li, (2002), note 50, 77, p. 88. 
52 P. Yu, ‘Still Dissatisfied after All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO China, and the 
Avoidable Cycle of Futility’, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 34, 
(2005), 143, p. 146. 
53 The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, amended on the 25
th August 2000, an English 
edition is available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws4.htm. 
54 The Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, amended on the 27
th October 2001, an 
English edition is available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws11.htm. 
55 The Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, amended on the 27
th October 2001, an 
English edition is available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws10.htm. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 199 
 
On the 30
th November 2004, the SPC issued the Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s  Court  on  Certain  Issues  of  Application  of  Law  in  Cases  Involving 
Technology  Contract  Disputes  (hereinafter  the  Interpretation  of  Technology 
Contract  2004).
56 The  Interpretation  of  Technology  Contract  2004  came  into 
force on the 1
st January 2005. It is based on the Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter the Contract Law 1999),
57 the Patent Law 2000, 
and  the  Civil  Procedure  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China.
58 Under  the 
Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004, a clause in the technology contract 
is invalid if the following all situations exist: 
1. Restraining the other contracting party from conducting research and 
development  on  the  basis  of  the  contractual  technology  or  restraining 
that party from using improvements of the technology, or creating non 
reciprocal conditions for exchange of improvements, such as requiring the 
other party to share improvements that result solely from the efforts of 
the other party, or transferring improvements to the supplying party on 
non reciprocal  basis,  or  exclusively  or  jointly  holding  the  intellectual 
property rights to the improvements without compensation. 2. Restraining 
the other party from acquiring technologies similar to or in competition 
with  that  of  the  supplying  party.  3.  Preventing  the  other  party  from 
actualizing  the  contractual  technology  in  a  reasonable  manner  as 
demanded  by  the  market,  including  unreasonably  restricting  quantity, 
variety,  price,  distribution  channels,  and  export  markets  of  products 
produced or services provided. 4. Requiring the technology transferee to 
accept  additional  conditions,  which  are  unnecessary  for  utilizing  or 
applying the technology, including purchasing unnecessary technology, raw 
materials,  products,  equipment,  services,  or  accepting  unnecessary 
personnel.  5.  Unreasonably  restraining  the  technology  transferee's 
channels or sources of procuring raw materials, accessories, products, or 
                                         
56 The Interpretation on Certain Issues of Application of Law in Cases Involving Technology 
Contract Disputes, a Chinese edition is available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=87711. 
57 The Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, an English edition is available at 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws2.htm. 
58 The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, an English edition is available at 
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equipment. 6. Prohibiting the technology transferee from filing opposition 
on  the  validity  of  the  intellectual  property  rights  to  the  contractual 
technology, or imposing additional conditions on those who files such an 
opposition.
59 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law, the Interpretation of Technology 
Contract 2004 was the most comprehensive legislation regarding certain types of 
abuses of intellectual property rights. It played a significant role in preventing 
anticompetitive practices in technology development and technology transfer, 
and  the  maintenance  of  competition  in  the  technology  market  and  optimal 
allocation of technology resources. 
 
2.2 Did China Fully Use the Discretion under Articles 8.2, 
40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS before the Adoption of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
Since the start of China’s intellectual property legislation, the purpose of such 
legislation has always been to protect intellectual property rights rather than 
combat intellectual property related anticompetitive practices. This trend was 
continued when China applied to join the WTO. The protection of intellectual 
property rights was one of the major concerns of other WTO Members during the 
negotiations of China’s accession to the WTO.
60 After China’s accession to the 
WTO, the protection of intellectual property rights is high on the policy agenda 
of the Chinese government. China has strengthened its legal system to protect 
intellectual property rights since its accession to the WTO.  
 
The  adverse  effects  of  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive  practices 
were not fully recognised or addressed in the Chinese legal system until recent 
years. Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, very few 
provisions in the Chinese legislation prohibited abuses of intellectual property 
rights. Except refusing to grant a patent licence under reasonable conditions,
61 
                                         
59 The Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004, Art. 10. 
60 For examinations on how China amended its intellectual property right laws according to the 
TRIPS, see, C. Zheng, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property Protection in China’, 
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, vol. 9, (1998), 219. 
61 The Patent Law 2000, Art. 48. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 201 
abuses of intellectual property rights are not prohibited under the Patent Law 
2000, the Trademark Law 2001 and the Copyright Law 2001. As the major piece 
of competition related legislation at the national level before the adoption of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the Anti Unfair Competition Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter the LAUC 1993) made no mention of intellectual 
property related anticompetitive practices.
62 Thus, it is not clear whether the 
LAUC  1993  is  applicable  to  intellectual  property related  anticompetitive 
practices. Since it came into force on the 1
st December 1993, however, the LAUC 
1993 has not been applied to any abuse of intellectual property rights. Before 
the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, China’s legislation was 
insufficient  to  combat  abuses  of intellectual  property  rights. This  inadequacy 
was exposed in the following case. 
 
On the 28
th December 2004, two Chinese DVD manufacturers, Wuxi Multimedia 
Ltd  and  Orient  Power  (Wuxi)  Technology  Ltd,  filed  a  lawsuit  against  the  3C 
Patent Group (including the Sony Corporation, Philips Electronics, LG Electronics 
and the Pioneer Corporation) in the US (the DVD case). They accused 3C Patent 
Group  of  price  fixing,  unlawful  tying  of  essential  and  non essential  patents 
together, group boycott and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act.
63 China had no legislation dealing with this abuse 
when this dispute emerged. Thus, these two Chinese companies were unable to 
bring  a  complaint  to  a  Chinese  court  in  2004.  This  clearly  demonstrated  the 
inadequacy  of  the  Chinese  legislation  regarding  certain  types  of  abuses  of 
intellectual property rights. 
 
The adoption of the Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was certainly 
helpful  to  deal  with  restrictive  conditions  attached  to  licensing  agreements 
regarding intellectual property rights. However, it only partially addressed the 
problem of the lack of legislation on abuses of intellectual property rights in 
China because it is only applicable to six types of anticompetitive practices in 
the  area  of  patent  rights.  It  could  not  be  used  to  prevent  anticompetitive 
                                         
62 An English version is available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306. 
63 ‘Chinese Firms File Lawsuit on DVD Patent’, China Daily, 20
th January 2005. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/20/content_410667.htm; also ‘Chinese DVD 
Player Manufacturers Take Patent Owners to Court’, 20
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practices in the areas of trademarks and copyrights. Moreover, its legal effect is 
much lower than national laws.
64 Most developed countries, such as the US, use 
their national competition laws to combat abuses of intellectual property rights. 
Thus, the Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was not an ideal solution 
for China to combat abuses of intellectual property rights. 
 
Despite its shortcomings, the Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was the 
only national legislation which prohibits six types of anticompetitive practices in 
regard to technical contracts before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
Its significance was illustrated in the following case. Dongjin Telecom Technology 
Co.  Ltd,  a  Chinese  company,  sued  the  American  company,  Intel  Corporation 
(Dongjin v. Intel).
65 This was heard before the Beijing First Intermediate Court 
on 28 July 2006. It has been described as China’s first competition law case. It 
involved the issue of a software license. Dongjin Telecom Technology Co. Ltd 
acquired  hardware  and  software  from  Intel  Corporation.  The  software  was 
subject  to  a  licensing  agreement,  which  specified  that  Dongjin  Telecom 
Technology  Co.  Ltd  could  only  use  the  software  in  combination  with  the 
purchased hardware from Intel Corporation. Dong Jin Telecom Technology Co. 
Ltd argued that the licence created an illegal monopoly in respect of technology 
and,  as  a  result,  was  void  under  the  Contract  Law  and  Article  10  of  the 
Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004. 
 
This case could not be argued under competition law, because the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 did not exist when this case was filed. Nevertheless, it has still been 
referred to as the first Chinese competition case. This case had been widely read 
in legal and academic circles in China as one having profound competition law 
                                         
64 Judicial interpretations issued by the SPC aims to clarify laws and bind all courts. An 
interpretation by the SPC may be provided in response to a specific question asked by a lower 
court, or it may be provided as a general explanation of the law. Once issued, an SPC 
interpretation becomes part of China’s law. Under Articles 78 and 79 of the Legislation Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Legislation Law 2000), national laws are only 
second to the Chinese Constitution 1982. Thus, the SPC’s interpretations have lower legal 
effects than national laws. 
65 This case was settled outside the court and consequently the court approved the request of 
withdrawing this case on 11
th May 2007. The Chinese version of the court decision is available 
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implications.  It  has  to  be  mentioned,  however,  without  the  Interpretation  of 
Technology  Contract  2004,  this  case  would  not  be  possible  to  be  filed  in  a 
Chinese court.  
 
This case illustrated that more and more people in business and legal circles in 
China were aware of the possibility of defending against, or bringing suit against 
anticompetitive practices in the area of intellectual property rights. Moreover, it 
also demonstrated the inadequacy of the Chinese legislation regarding abuses of 
intellectual property rights since it had to rely on a SPC’s interpretation rather 
than a national competition law.  
 
In sum, there were a few provisions in China prohibiting certain types of abuses 
of intellectual property rights before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
As  demonstrated  in  the  DVD  case  and  Dongjin  v.  Intel,  however,  China’s 
legislation on prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights were insufficient. 
This insufficiency illustrated that, before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007, China did not fully use the discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of 
the TRIPS.  
 
3  Have Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS 
Enhanced the Case for China Seeking to 
Combat Abuses of Intellectual Property Rights 
through the Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
As discussed above, some WTO Members with experience in the implementation 
of intellectual property rights have long used their national competition laws to 
combat intellectual property related anticompetitive practices. They maintain 
vigorous competition law agencies with broad and effective enforcement powers. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will be applicable to 
anticompetitive practices in the area of intellectual property once it comes into 
force on the 1
st August 2008.
66 However, it has not been an easy journey for 
China to finally include such a provision in the Antimonopoly Law 2007. China 
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only started to protect intellectual property rights in the 1980s. Its record of 
protecting  intellectual  properties  rights  is  still  subject  to  intense  complaints 
from some WTO Members. For example, the US has placed China on its ‘priority 
watch  list’  of  countries  failing  to  give  adequate  protection  to  intellectual 
property rights.
67 The EU has also issued a similar warning on China’s intellectual 
property rights.
68 In April 2007, the US filed a case to the WTO against China 
regarding  China’s  measures  affecting  the  protection  and  enforcement  of 
intellectual  property  rights.
69  Therefore,  China’s  attempting  to  regulate 
intellectual property related anticompetitive practices through its competition 
law  during  the  process  of  formulating  the Antimonopoly  Law  2007  has  raised 
concerns  from  other  WTO  Members  due  to  China’s  poor  record  of  protecting 
intellectual rights.  
 
Against this background, what follows examines whether Articles 8.2,  40 and 
31(k) of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking to combat abuses of 
intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 2007 by analysing the 
changes  of  relevant  provisions  during  the  process  of  formulating  China’s  first 
comprehensive competition law.  
 
3.1 Stage One (Before China’s Accession to the WTO): No 
Mention of Intellectual Property-Related 
Anticompetitive Practices 
During this stage, the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law made no mention of 
abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights.  For  instance,  the  1999  Draft  omitted 
mention  of  whether  the  Law  would  be  applicable  to  intellectual  property 
rights.
70 There  are  two  reasons  for  this  omission.  First,  during  that  period 
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http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2005/Apr/29-580129.html. 
68 ‘EU Takes Tough Line with China on Trade’, Financial Times, 25
th October 2006, p. 5. 
69 The Panel was established on the 25
th September 2007 and Panel Report is pending.  Japan, 
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70 An English version of this draft was prepared for an OECD-sponsored seminar held in Shanghai 
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intellectual  property related  anticompetitive  practices  were  not  as  serious  as 
they are now in China. In fact, anticompetitive practices in intellectual property 
rights were rarely heard of in China before China’s accession to the WTO, given 
the fact that competition related regulation itself was a new topic in China and 
the legal protection of intellectual property rights had only been recognised for 
just more than a decade during that time.
71 From the Chinese government view, 
thus,  it  was  not  very  urgent  to  regulate  intellectual  property related 
anticompetitive practices. The majority of Chinese scholars were also unaware 
of the adverse effects of intellectual property related anticompetitive practices 
on competition. 
 
Second, China was still in the process of negotiating its WTO membership during 
this period. One of the major concerns from the major players of the WTO, such 
as  the  US,  was  the  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights.  Thus,  all  the 
concerns of the Chinese government were focused on how to reform its regime 
on intellectual property rights in order to improve the protection of intellectual 
property  rights.  Combating  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  could  be 
considered  to  weaken  the  legal  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  in 
China and thus upset some major WTO Members, although they applied their 
competition laws to intellectual property related anticompetitive practices for a 
long  period.  In  order  to  join  the  WTO,  China  had  to  negotiate  bilateral 
agreements  before  it  started  multilateral  negotiations  regarding  China’s 
application  for  WTO  membership.
72 Thus,  it  was  very  important  for  China  to 
secure the key players’ agreements in order to become a WTO Member.  
 
3.2 Stage Two (Between 2001 and 2005): Starting to 
Include a Provision Prohibiting Abuses of Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Drafts of China’s Antimonopoly 
Law 
Since it joined the WTO in 2001, China started to regulate abuses of intellectual 
                                         
71 All the three major pieces of intellectual property right legislation were first adopted in early 
1980s. 
72 In regard to the procedure of joining the WTO, see Chapter One. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 5, 206 
property rights. The Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was an example. 
This  changed  attitude  led  China  to  include  a  provision  prohibiting  abuses  of 
intellectual  property  rights  in  some  drafts  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law.  The 
February 2002 Draft,
73 which was drafted just after China’s accession to the WTO, 
added  a  special  provision  entitled  ‘Acts  of  Exercising  Intellectual  Property 
Rights’. Article 56 of this draft provides: 
The reasonable acts of an operator of exercising rights in accordance with 
the laws protecting intellectual property rights such as the copyright law, 
the trademark law and the patent law shall not be restricted by this law. 
However, if the abuse of intellectual property rights results or may result 
in material restriction or exclusion of competition, this law shall apply.  
It  is  the  first  provision  which  shows  China’s  desire  to  regulate  abuses  of 
intellectual  property  rights  through  its  competition  law.
 On  the  one  hand,  it 
exempts intellectual property rights from the application of the Antimonopoly 
Law. On the other hand, it emphasises that the Antimonopoly Law is applicable if 
abuses of intellectual property rights exist. Similar language to Article 56 of the 
February 2002 Draft was maintained in Article 66 of the 2004 Submitted Draft
74 
and Article 56 of the April 2005 Draft.
75  
 
As foreign companies expand their investment in China,
76 the ability of Chinese 
legislation to protect intellectual property rights is a major topic of discussions 
even after China’s accession to the WTO. Therefore, it was not surprising that 
the  draft  provision  regarding  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  ‘received 
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74 An English edition of the 2004 Submitted Draft is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Questionnaire%20-%20final.pdf. 
75 An English edition of the April 2005 Draft is available at 
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more attention from the foreign business community than any other provision’.
77 
Such  a  provision  raised  significant  concerns  for  multinationals  over  the 
protection of their intellectual property rights and, in particular, whether the 
mere act of refusing to license intellectual property rights could trigger an abuse 
of  intellectual  property  rights and  lead to  compulsory  licensing  or  inefficient 
licensing negotiations under fear of compulsory licensing. These concerns are 
understandable  particularly  given  the  fact  that  China’s  record  of  protecting 
property rights is arguably not good.
78  
 
In sum, China started to introduce a provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual 
property rights in the drafts of the Antimonopoly Law during this period. There 
are three reasons for this change. First, during that period abuses of intellectual 
property rights were emerging in China. Cases related to such practices became 
high profile in the media’s view and the public were aware of such practices. 
Moreover,  these  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  also  demonstrated  the 
insufficiency of the existing Chinese legislation dealing with such practices. For 
example, the Chinese companies involved in the DVD case had to file a case in 
the US rather than China due to the lack of relevant legislation dealing with 
intellectual property related anticompetitive practices in China during that time.  
 
Second, both the Chinese government and Chinese scholars started to realise the 
adverse effects of abuses of intellectual property rights on competition. After a 
year  of  investigation,  for  example,  the  State  Administration  for  Industry  and 
Commerce (SAIC) published a report ‘The Competition restricting Behaviour of 
Multinational Companies in China and Counter Measures’ in 2004.
79 This report 
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indicated  that companies  that owned  rights  to  advanced  technology  or  other 
intellectual properties squeezed the market by refusing to sell their services or 
products  to  Chinese  companies.
80  Thus,  this  report  demonstrated  that  the 
Chinese government was expressly concerned that some multilateral companies 
might abuse their intellectual property rights in order to force out their Chinese 
competitors.  
 
Third, the Chinese government was encouraged by Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of 
the  TRIPS,  which  authorize  WTO  Members  to  adopt  legislation  to  combat 
intellectual property related anticompetitive practices. Before China joined the 
WTO, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS were not applicable to China. The 
enabling character of Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS had impacts on the 
inclusion of a provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights.  
 
However,  the  impact  of  Articles  8.2,  40  and  31  (k)  of  the  TRIPS  on  the 
formulation of China’s competition law was limited during this period due to two 
reasons. First, as a new WTO Member, China was still ‘learning the rules’ during 
this period, while old members were ‘playing the rules’.
81 Yongtu Long, the chief 
negotiator for China’s accession to the WTO, described the Chinese situation as 
‘a  blind  man  riding  a  blind  horse’.
82 Thus,  it  would  take  time  for  China  to 
understand  the  WTO  rules  and  exploit  them.  Due  to  the  lack  of  relevant 
expertises, it was difficult for the Chinese government to be fully aware of the 
discretion  under  Articles  8.2,  40  and  31  (k)  of  the  TRIPS  during  this  period. 
Second,  China’s  ability  of  resisting  the  pressure  from  other  WTO  Members  in 
order to act in the way permitted under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS 
was not very strong. In 2001, China was only the sixth biggest trading power with 
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Morning Post, 13
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the WTO.
83 This relatively weak position limited the impact of Articles 8.2, 40 
and 31 (k) of the TRIPS on the formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law.   
 
3.3 Stage Three (From 2005 to Present): Including a 
Provisions Prohibiting Abuses of Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
The language used in the February 2002 Draft, the 2004 Submitted Draft and the 
April 2005 Draft was changed in the July 2005 Draft.
84 This can be seen from the 
changes of the titles of the relevant provisions. While Article 56 of the February 
2002 Draft is called ‘Acts of Exercising Intellectual Property Rights’, Article 52 of 
the  July  2005  Draft  is  called  ‘Applicability  to  Abuse  of  Intellectual  Property 
Rights’. Article 52 of the July 2005 Draft provides: ‘This Law is applicable to 
undertakings which eliminate or restrict market competition beyond the laws 
and  administrative  regulations  on  intellectual  property  rights’.  This  change 
makes the purpose of this provision more specific than previous draft provisions 
by stipulating that China’s forthcoming competition law will be applicable to 
anticompetitive practices in the field of intellectual property rights. Some WTO 
Members and foreign companies were concerned that this change would allow 
trumped up anticompetitive charges to chip away at their profitable patents.
85 
 
Article 52 of the July 2005 Draft is still loosely drafted due to the words ‘beyond 
the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights’. This was 
improved in the November 2005 Draft.
86 Article 48 of the November 2005 Draft 
provides: ‘This Law is applicable to the conduct by the undertakings eliminating 
                                         
83 See, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review –People’s Republic of China- Report by 
the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/161/Rev.1, 26
th June 2006, p. 1. 
84 An English edition of the July 2005 Draft is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Draft%20of%2027%20July%202005.pdf. 
85 See, ‘China Antitrust Law Worries Foreign Interests’, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 26
th 
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author’s file. For an overview of this draft, see H. Harris, ‘The Making of An Antitrust Law: The 
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or  restricting  competition  by  the  abuse  of  the  rights  stipulated  by  the 
Intellectual  Property  Right  Laws  or  administrative  regulations’.  It  further 
improves the clarification of Article 52 of the July 2005 Draft by changing the 
words ‘beyond the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property 
rights’ into the language ‘the abuse of the rights stipulated by the Intellectual 
Property Right Laws or administrative regulations’.  
 
Like its equivalent provisions in previous drafts, Article 48 of the November 2005 
Draft was criticised by foreign governments and companies. In fact, some WTO 
Members and foreign companies were even more worried about this provision 
than  the  provisions  in  previous  drafts  because,  unlike  previous  drafts,  this 
provision does not provide that this law protects intellectual property rights at 
all. It only focuses on intellectual property related anticompetitive practices. 
Like the previous drafts, Article 48 of the November 2005 was criticised by some 
foreign experts. H. Stephen Harris, for example, criticised Article 48 as being 
inconsistent with the international norm of competition law.
87 He continued:  
The absence of any definition of what conduct may constitute such an 
abuse of IP [Intellectual Property] rights, and the possible imposition of 
compulsory licensing as a remedy, have engendered expressions of great 
concern,  especially  from  foreign  high  technology  companies  with 
substantial operations or sales in China.
88  
 
Despite the criticism that China faced from abroad in respect of its intention to 
include  a  provision  prohibiting  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  in  its 
competition law, this issue was not raised during China’s first trade policy review 
under  the  Trade  Policy  Review  Mechanism  (TPRM)  in  2006.
89  This  clearly 
illustrates that after many years of criticising China’s intention of prohibiting 
abuses of intellectual property rights, finally WTO Members accepted that China 
had the legitimate right to regulate abuses of intellectual property rights under 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. At least, they did not think it was wise to 
criticise China’s intention of combating such abuses during China’s first trade 
policy review due to the discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. 
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To  some  extent,  this  has  encouraged  China  to  use  such  discretion  fully  and 
include  a  general  ban  on  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  in  its  first 
competition law. 
 
Article 48 of the December 2005 Draft was changed in the June 2006 Draft.
90 
Article 54 of the June 2006 Draft provides: 
Undertakings  exercise  intellectual  property  rights  according  to  laws, 
administrative regulations related intellectual property rights, shall not 
be  applied  to  this  law;  however,  undertakings  abuse  the  intellectual 
property rights to eliminate or restrict competition, shall be applied to 
this law.
91 
Unlike Article 48 of the December 2005 Draft, Article 54 of the June 2006 Draft 
does not define the term ‘abuse of intellectual property rights’ according to the 
legislation  on  intellectual  property  rights.  Instead,  it  provides  that  this  law 
applies  to  ‘abuse  of  intellectual  property  rights  that  eliminates  or  restricts 
competition’. This change is necessary because none of the existing legislation 
on intellectual property rights provides a general ban on abuses of intellectual 
property rights. In addition, this article re introduced the words of protecting 
intellectual property rights, which were used in the February 2002 Draft, the 
2004  Submitted  Draft  and  the  April  2005  Draft.  This  reintroduction  aims  to 
reassure other WTO Members and foreign companies that intellectual property 
rights  will  be  protected  in  China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  and  only  abuses  of 
intellectual property rights are prohibited.  
 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS helped to strengthen the argument of 
Chinese  law makers  who  were  in  favour  of  regulating  abuses  of  intellectual 
property rights through China’s Antimonopoly Law. During the 22nd session of the 
10
th  NPC  Standing  Committee  held  from  the  24
th  to  the  29
th  June  2006,  for 
instance,  Shiwei  Cheng,  vice Chairman  of  the  10
th  NPC  Standing  Committee, 
argued that the inclusion of prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights in 
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China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  was  of  significance.
92  He  recommended  further 
studying this issue.
93 During this meeting, no members of the 10
th NPC Standing 
Committee expressed any objection in regard to including a provision prohibiting 
abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights.  Thus,  it  seemed  that  all  members 
attending the meeting of the 10
th NPC Standing Committee in June 2006 agreed 
to  prohibit  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  through  China’s  forthcoming 
Antimonopoly  Law.  Article  54  of  the  June  2006  Draft  is  retained  in  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  Article  55  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  clearly 
provides  that  the  law  will  apply  to  undertakings  which  abuse  intellectual 
property rights to eliminate or restrict competition. 
 
China  finally  included  a  provision  prohibiting  abuses  of  intellectual  property 
rights  into  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  during  this  period.  There  are  several 
reasons for this. From the view of the TRIPS, the role played by Articles 8.2, 40 
and  31  (k)  of  the  TRIPS  should  not  be  underestimated.  Several  conditions 
contribute to the role played by Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS. First, 
China is increasingly gaining confidence to exploit WTO rules. By 2005, China had 
been a WTO Member for about four years. During these four years, China used its 
massive human resources to master WTO rules. In May 2002, for instance, the 
Chinese government set up a national training project to introduce WTO rules to 
provincial trade officials as well as management staff in companies.
94  
 
Second, with the increasing significance of its economy and trade in the world, 
China is in a stronger position than before to resist the pressure from some WTO 
Members. Since its accession to the WTO, China has dramatically increased its 
trading power. Now it is the third biggest trading member in the WTO after the 
EU and the US, while it was only the sixth biggest trading power when it joined 
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the WTO in 2001.
95 This change means that China is in a better position to resist 
pressures from some WTO Members when it is intended to act in ways permitted 
under Articles  8.2,  40,  and  31(k)  of the TRIPS.  With  the  increase  of  Chinese 
economic and trading power in the world, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS 
have enhanced the case for China seeking to protect itself against abuses of 
intellectual property rights.  
 
However,  it  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  is  far  from  easy  to  define  the 
borderline between the reasonable exercise of intellectual property rights and 
abuses  of  such  rights.  Further  administrative  rules  or  guidance  in  respect  of 
implementing  Article  55  is  needed.  The  Chinese  competition  enforcement 
authorities need to be aware of the discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) 
of the TRIPS when they formulate such rules or guidance. 
 
4  Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the impact of Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. As enabling clauses, Articles 
8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS expressly recognize the legitimacy of invoking 
WTO  Members’  national  competition  laws  to  combat  abuses  of  intellectual 
property rights. They do not impose obligations on WTO Members in respect of 
combating  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights.  Whether  an  individual  WTO 
Member chooses to act in ways permitted by these articles depends on various 
conditions. Put another way, these articles do not guarantee that WTO Members 
will adopt legislation dealing with intellectual property related anticompetitive 
practices in reality. WTO Members might choose not to act in ways permitted in 
Articles  8.2,  40  and 31(k)  of  the  TRIPS  due  to  the  pressure  from  other  WTO 
Members. Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS could only enhance the case for 
a WTO Member seeking to combat abuses of intellectual property rights, when it 
is strong enough to resist the pressures from other WTO Members. 
 
China  faced  huge  criticisms  regarding  its  attempt  to  prohibit  abuses  of 
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intellectual property rights through its competition law. Against this background, 
Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking 
to prohibit abuses of intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 
2007, with the increasing significance of China’s economy and trade in the world. 
There is no doubt that these articles are not the reasons why China needs to 
combat  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  through  the  Antimonopoly  Law 
2007. However, these enabling clauses have enhanced the case for China seeking 
to  prohibit  such  abuses  through  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  Without  these 
enabling  clauses,  it  would  be  very  difficult  for  China  to  include  a  provision 
prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights in the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
particularly considering the fact that some WTO Members, such as the US, do not 
think  China’s  record  of  protecting  intellectual  property  rights  is  good.  The 
changes of the provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights in the 
drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 illustrate how Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) 
of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking to combat intellectual 
property related anticompetitive practices through its competition law. 
 
Under  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  only  Article  55  prohibits  abuses  of 
intellectual  property  rights.  Therefore,  further  guidance  on  this  provision  is 
needed.  In  order  to  formulate  such  guidance,  the  Chinese  competition 
enforcement authorities need to be aware of the discretion under Articles 8.2, 
40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS. 215 
Chapter Six:                                         
The Impact of the Peer Review in the WTO— 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 
on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
Peer review refers to the method ‘by which countries can assess the quality and 
effectiveness  of  their  policies,  legislation,  policy  environments  and  key 
institutions’.
  1  It  provides  ‘a  forum  where  policies  can  be  explained  and 
discussed, where information can be sought and concerns expressed, on a non 
confrontational and non adversarial basis’.
 2 Peer review can be used in a broad 
range  of  areas.  Currently,  there  are  several  peer  reviews  in  international 
organisations, such as the peer review of Individual Action Plans in the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) System, the Organisation for Economic Co 
operation  and  Development  (OECD)  Country  Reviews  of  Regulatory  Reform 
(specifically the Competition Policy Reviews), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Country Surveillance Mechanism (Article IV Reports)
3, the IMF World Bank 
Financial Sector Assessment Program, and the TPRM. 
 
The TPRM is at the centre of the surveillance of national trade related policies 
which is a fundamentally important activity running throughout the work of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO).
4 It ‘is a unique element in the range of WTO 
                                         
1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Peer Review: Merits and 
Approaches in A Trade and Competition Context, 6
th June 2002, Paris: OECD, 
COM/DAFFE/TD(2002)4/FINAL, (2002), para. 2, p. 4. 
2 Id. 
3 For a brief description of the IMF Country Surveillance Mechanism, see, IMF, IMF Annual Report 
2001, Washington, D.C.: IMF, (2002). 
4 For a brief description of the TPRM, see, WTO, Trade Policy Reviews: Brief Introduction, 
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activities’.
5 The  reviews  take  place  in  the  Trade  Policy  Review  Body  which 
comprises all WTO Members. The reviews are therefore essentially peer group 
assessments, despite the fact that much of the fact finding work is done by the 
WTO Secretariat. This means that the TPRM is ‘the only focus for peer review of 
the full range of trade policies’.
6 
 
In general, literature on peer review is scarce.
7 It is even scarcer in the case of 
the TPRM.
 8 In particular, there is no literature on the impact of the TPRM on the 
development of domestic competition law and policy in WTO Members. Against 
this  background,  this  chapter  examines  the  impacts  of  the  TPRM  on  the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007)
9. It explores whether, and if so, how the TPRM could 
have contributed to the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, and to what 
extent its formulation has reflected such contributions. 
 
1  General Issues 
As an early result of the Uruguay Round (1986 1994), the TPRM was established 
on a provisional basis at the Montreal Ministerial Meeting in December 1988.
10 
The first review took place in 1989. Australia, Morocco and the United States (US) 
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International Economics, (1998), pp. 3 ff; P. Mavroidis, ‘Surveiliance Schemes: the GATT’s New 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism’, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 13, (1991), 374, 
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were the first countries reviewed under the TPRM.
11 Subsequently, the TPRM was 
incorporated  into  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  Establishing  the  World  Trade 
Organisation  (hereinafter  the  Marrakesh  Agreement)
12 ,  and  placed  on  a 
permanent footing as one of the WTO’s basic functions. The latest appraisal of 
the TPRM by the Trade Policy Review Body reaffirmed ‘the great importance that 
Members  attached  to  the  mission  and  objectives  defined  in  Annex  3  of  the 
Marrakesh  Agreement  for  the  TPRM,  this  being  the  only  multilateral, 
comprehensive evaluation of trade policies’.
13 The significance of the TPRM is 
reflected  in  the  seniority  of  the  Trade  Policy  Review  Body  —  it  is  the  WTO 
General Council by another name. Despite the significance of the TPRM, there 
are fewer research papers and books in the area of the TPRM than other areas 
within the WTO framework, such as the WTO dispute settlement system.
14 This 
could  be  the  reason  why  Donald  B.  Keesing  claimed:  the  TPRM  is  ‘a  little 
known … activity’ of the WTO.
15  
 
1.1 Purpose and Procedure 
1.1.1 Purpose 
The TPRM provides the regular collective appreciation and evaluation of the full 
range of individual WTO Members’ trade polices and practices and their impact 
on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. The purpose of the TPRM 
is to: 
contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and 
commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where 
applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother 
                                         
11 They were reviewed on the 12
th, 13
th and 14
th December 1989 respectively, soon after the TPRM 
had been established. 
12 See Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establish the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter 
the Marrakesh Agreement). The Marrakesh Agreement is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
13 WTO, Ministerial Conference - Sixth Session - Hong Kong, 13 - 18 December 2005 - Second 
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14 See note 8. 
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functioning  of  the  multilateral  trading  system,  by  achieving  greater 
transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of 
Members.  Accordingly,  the  review  mechanism  will  enable  the  regular 
collective appreciation and evaluation by the Ministerial Conference of 
the  full  range  of  individual  Members’  trade  policies  and  practices  and 
their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system.
16  
Thus, the purpose of the TPRM can be said: 
(a) to increase the transparency and understanding of countries’ trade policies 
and practices, through regular monitoring 
(b) to improve the quality of public and intergovernmental debate on the issues 
(c) to enable a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on the world 
trading system.
17 
Susan Hainsworth claimed that the TPRM, as a peer review, had a ‘secondary 
normative objective: it aims to promote domestic trade policy transparency, in 
recognition of its inherent importance to the furtherance of rule development 
and compliance’.
18 
 
1.1.2 Procedure
19 
All  WTO  Members  are  subject  to  trade  policy  review  under  the  TPRM.
20 The 
frequency of trade policy review for a WTO Member increases with the overall 
amount  of  that  Member’s  trade  in  the  world.  The  four  largest  trading  WTO 
Members are reviewed every two years.
21 Trading states ranking from 5th to 20th 
are  reviewed  every  four  years.
22 The  remaining  WTO  Members  are  reviewed 
every  six  years.
23 The  least developed  WTO  Members  can  have  even  a  longer 
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17 WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, 
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21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 219 
interim period.
24 Once a WTO Member is included in the process, its next review 
takes place according to this cycle, except that a leeway of six months may be 
allowed. The procedure of trade policy review can be divided into three stages. 
 
1.1.2.1  Stage One: The Investigation Stage 
In the investigation stage, two investigation reports are produced. The first is 
the  Government  Report  which  is  supplied  by  the  WTO  Member  whose  trade 
policies are under review. The second is the Secretariat Report which is prepared 
by  the  Secretariat  within  the  Trade  Policy  Review  Body.  In  general,  the 
Secretariat Report is more substantial than the Government Report. It assembles 
information  provided  by  the  WTO  Member  under  review  in  response  to  a 
questionnaire from the Secretariat. It also obtains information from interviews 
and consultations which are conducted when the Secretariat staff visit the WTO 
Member. In addition, it also gets information from a number of other sources, 
including publications of the government and organisations like the World Bank 
and the IMF. The Secretariat also has the discretion to consult reports of private 
agencies in the WTO Member. Then, the Secretariat submits its draft report to 
the  WTO  Member  for  verification  and  factual  content.  The  Secretariat  then 
revises its text in light of the comments of the WTO Member under review and 
finalises the report on its own authority. In order to preserve the independence 
of  its  evaluation,  however,  the  summary  observations  are  not  subject  to  the 
same  checking  process.  In  general,  the  Secretariat  Report  has  evolved  from 
‘largely  descriptive catalogues  of  countries’  protectionist  measures  into  more 
thorough, incisive and analytical surveys of trade policies and practices’.
25 
 
The structure of the Secretariat Report has evolved over time on the basis of 
some experimentation. Currently, the Secretariat Report contains a summary of 
observation  and  four  chapters.  Chapter  I,  Economic  Environment,  covers  the 
major features of the economy, recent economic developments, trade patterns 
in goods and services, evolution of foreign investment, and trade related aspects 
of  the  foreign  exchange  regime.  Chapter  II,  Trade  and  Investment  Regimes, 
covers  institutional  aspects  of  trade  and  investment  policy  making,  including 
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participation in multilateral and regional arrangements, as well as trade disputes 
and consultations. Chapter III, Trade Policies and Practices by Measures, deals 
with measures directly affecting imports, exports and production, while Chapter 
IV, Trade Policy by Sectors, looks at measures by sector. As Sam Laird pointed out, 
this standardised form helps to ensure consistency of treatment, and delegates 
have been found to value being able to find topics in the expected places across 
reports.
26  
 
1.1.2.2  Stage Two: The Examination Stage 
In the examination stage, the Trade Policy Review Body discusses the Secretariat 
Report and the Government Report. This process lasts about 10 months or even 
longer  if  one  takes  into  account  the  time  for  preparation.  But  the  review 
meeting  is  usually  held  over  two  days  in  Geneva.  It  occupies  two  morning 
sessions with a day for preparation in between. The WTO Member under review 
makes an introductory statement on the first morning. Then the two discussants 
chosen from the membership to act on their own responsibility rather than as 
representatives of their governments stimulate debate by comments. Typically, 
in  advance  of  the  meeting  they  circulate  an  outline  of  the  main  issues  they 
intend to raise. Subsequent to the discussants’ statements, other WTO Members 
may make statements and raise questions. These statements and questions from 
the participating WTO Members reflect concerns and challenges highlighted in 
the  reports.  This  gives  the  participating  WTO  Members  a  rare  opportunity  to 
question the WTO Member under review about its policies and practices directly 
affecting them. At the end of the first morning, the Chairperson draws an outline 
of the main themes raised at the meeting in order to assist the WTO Member 
under review with its preparation for the next session. The intervening day is 
spent preparing responses to the questions and comments posed on the first day. 
On the second morning, the WTO Member under review answers the questions 
raised on the first morning. These answers should be arranged along the lines of 
the main themes identified by the Chairperson and preferably be in writing. At 
the  end  of  the  meeting  the  Chair  presents  concluding  remarks  which  aim  at 
giving an assessment of the issues raised in the review. The Chair’s concluding 
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remarks formally end the review process. 
 
1.1.2.3  Stage Three: The Dissemination Stage 
In the dissemination stage, the following documents are published and are made 
available on the WTO website: the Secretariat Report, the Government Report, 
the minutes of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body, a first press release 
based on the Secretariat Report including a summary of the Secretariat Report 
and parts of the Government Report, and a second press release containing the 
conclusions  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Trade  Policy  Review  Body.  There  are  no 
formal  recommendations  on  actions  to  be  taken  by  the  WTO  Member  under 
review. 
 
1.2 Soft Persuasion Character of the TPRM and China’s 
Approach to International Matters 
1.2.1 Soft Persuasion Character of the TPRM 
1.2.1.1  Soft Persuasion Character 
Peer review does not have legal binding power. Instead, it functions through peer 
pressure which is a means of soft persuasion. As a peer review, the TPRM is no 
exception. Article A(i) of Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement explicitly provides 
that the TPRM ‘is not intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific 
obligations under the [WTO] Agreements or for dispute settlement purposes, or 
to impose new policy commitments on Members’. Thus, the TPRM is separated 
from the WTO dispute settlement system.
27 As Victoria C. Price summarized, the 
TPRM  ‘reflects  a  diplomatic  and  peer pressure  approach  to  the  enforcement 
                                         
27 More about the WTO dispute settlement system, see, P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, (2005), pp. 172-306; E.-U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
London, The Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International, (1997); E.-U. Petersmann, ‘The 
Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organisation and the Evolution of the GATT 
Dispute Settlement System Since 1948’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 31, (1997), 1157, 
pp. 1163-1165; M. Moore, ‘WTO’s Unique System of Settling Disputes Nears 200 Cases in 
2000’, Press/180, Geneva: WTO, (2000). Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 222 
problem’, while the WTO dispute settlement system is ‘a rule based approach to 
the problem of the “judge and bailiff”’.
28 This has been recognised in the Report 
to the Singapore Ministerial meeting, which noted that the TPRM’s specific de 
linkage from dispute settlement procedures was an essential feature which must 
be safeguarded.
29 The second appraisal of the Trade Policy Review by the Trade 
Policy Review Body in 2005 also reconfirmed:  
The TPRM had been conceived as a policy exercise and it was therefore 
not  intended  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  enforcement  of  specific  WTO 
obligations or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy 
commitments on Members.
30 
Similar  words  have  also  appeared  in  every  annual  report  of  the  Trade  Policy 
Review Body. 
 
Thus,  it  is  clear  that  the  TPRM  functions  through  peer  pressure  rather  than 
sanctions. Secretariat Reports and questions raised by other WTO Members do 
not have similar legal status that the rulings by the Panel and the Appellate Body 
have. Thus, a WTO Member is not obliged to carry out reforms of the policies 
which were exposed during the trade policy review.  Similarly, it has no legal 
obligation to adopt advisory opinions in the Secretariat Report.  
 
Because  it  is  up  to  individual  WTO  Members  to  decide  whether  or  not  they 
accept  the  advisory  opinions  from  the  Secretariat  Reports  and  address  other 
WTO Members’ concerns during their trade policy reviews, the effectiveness of 
the TPRM, as a peer review, relies on the influence of the persuasion exercised 
by the peers.
31 As Donald B. Keesing argued, the TPRM uses ‘sweet reason, not 
                                         
28 V. Price, ‘New Institutional Developments in GATT’, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, vol. 1, 
(1992), 87, pp. 100-101. It has to mention that in her article, Victoria C. Price referred to the 
improved dispute settlement system under the GATT rather than the WTO dispute settlement 
system. 
29 WTO, WT/TPR/27, note 5, para. 10. 
30 WTO, WT/MIN(05)/1, note 12, para. 4. Similar words can also be found in WTO, Ministerial 
Meeting-Appraisal of the Operation of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism-Report to Ministers, 
WT/MIN(99)/2, 8
th October 1999.  
31 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism: Process 
and Procedures’, African Security Review, vol. 11(4), (2002), 7, p. 8; also see, F. Pagani, 
(2002), note 7, 15, p. 16. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 223 
the threat of retaliation or the empowerment of some quasi judicial authority, 
to  induce  countries  to  liberalize’  their  trade related  policies.
32  Thus,  the 
sweeter the reasons are, the more the WTO Member under review is willing to 
accept  the  recommendations  from  the  Secretariat  Report  and  address  the 
concerns from other WTO Members. The TPRM can give rise to peer pressure 
through such Secretariat Reports, discussions during trade policy reviews, public 
scrutiny, the impact of the foregoing on domestic public opinion, policy makers, 
and other stakeholders. 
 
1.2.1.2  Merits of the TPRM’s Soft Persuasion Character 
There is no doubt that the TPRM, like other peer review, has a soft persuasion 
character because it functions through peer pressure. However, scholars differ in 
their views of the merits of the TPRM’s soft persuasion character. Some scholars 
have criticised the TPRM’s peer pressure approach. For example, John Jackson 
argued that such a peer pressure approach was a backward step for the rule 
oriented development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). He 
argued: 
these  reviews  are  not  likely  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  the 
implementation or effectiveness of the legal obligations contained in the 
variety of GATT treaties and protocols, including those that will come into 
effect at the end of the Uruguay Round. Indeed there are some risks that 
this review mechanism will divert attention from the legal norms in such a 
way  as  actually  to  decrease  the  pressure  on  Contracting  Practices  to 
observe those norms. To some degree, the [TPRM] is a concession to the 
view that GATT is primarily a ‘negotiating’ or ‘consulting’ organization, 
rather than one which tries to define and implement reasonably precise 
norms to help the standardization of world trading activities.
 33 
Despite  this  criticism,  he  did  recognise:  ‘These  reviews  could  indeed  be  an 
important addition to the GATT, providing information to many GATT members 
about  the  trade  policies  of  particular  Contracting  Parties,  and  offering  an 
                                         
32 D. Keesing, (1998), note 10, p. 6. 
33 J. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System, New York: Council on Foreign Relations for the 
Royal Institute of International, (1990), p. 80 Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 224 
opportunity for criticism of those policies’.
34 
 
Other scholars applauded the TPRM’s soft persuasion character. For example, 
Sam Laird pointed out: ‘one of the strengths of the TPRM is its role as a forum 
where policies can be explained and discussed, where information can be sought 
and  concerns  can  be  expressed  on  a  non confrontational  and  non legalistic 
basis.’
35 Fabricio Pagani argued that the soft persuasion character of peer review 
could be ‘an important driving force to stimulate the state to change, achieve 
goals and meet standards’.
36  
 
The soft persuasion nature of the TPRM proves better suited to encouraging and 
enhancing policy co operation and convergence than a traditional enforcement 
mechanism.  Particularly,  unlike  the  WTO  Panels  and  the  Appellate  Body,  the 
TPRM has the flexibility to take into account a WTO Member’s policy objectives, 
and to look at its performance in a historical and political context. Therefore, 
the  TPRM  assesses  and  encourages  trends  toward  trade related  liberalization 
even among relatively poorly performing WTO Members, while noting negative 
trends  in  the  WTO  Members  that  may  presently  have  a  higher  performance 
record. Susan Hainsworth pointed out: 
Consisting  of  a  pragmatic  peer  review  with  a  focus  on  discussion  and 
negotiation,  it  [the  TPRM]  has  the  added  effect  of  casting  light  on 
domestic policies and practices, and providing an opportunity for their 
appraisal  in  relation  to  the  contextual  international  norms.  While 
ostensibly  leaving  state  sovereignty  untouched,  the  principle  of 
submitting to peer review and criticism of policies does indeed smack of 
acknowledgement of an advanced degree of economic interdependence, 
and the consequent importance of channelling state policy making toward 
the  development  of common,  accepted  approaches  in  the  trade  policy 
arena.  Through  exposure  of  unacceptable  domestic  policies,  the  TPRM 
sets  parameters  within  which  it  encourages  adherence  to  accepted 
international norms.
37 
                                         
34 Id., pp. 79-80. 
35 S. Laird, (1999), note 26, 741, p. 743. 
36 F. Pagani, (2002), note 7, 15, p. 16. 
37 S. Hainsworth, (1995), note 18, 583, pp. 608-609. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 225 
 
In response to John Jackson’s criticism of the TPRM, Victoria C. Price argued: 
The  question  really  boils  down  to  an  assessment  of  whether  the  peer 
pressure  and  increased  transparency  generated  by  the  TPRM  will  have 
more than a marginal effect on the trade system, and whether the TPRM 
is  complementary  to,  rather  than  in  competition  with,  the  dispute 
settlement regime. Time will tell.
38 
After about 20 years of enforcement, what John Jackson was worried about the 
TPRM did not materialize. The TPRM has not diverted attention from the legal 
norms in such a way as actually to decrease the pressure on WTO Members to 
observe those norms, as predicted by Jackson. In fact, it has been praised by 
WTO  Members  through  the  Trade  Policy  Review  Body. 
39 The  Report  to  the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference, which was held in Singapore in December 1996, 
noted: ‘The TPRM occupies a unique place within the WTO in promoting non 
confrontational discussion of key trade policy issues’.
40 
 
1.2.2 China’s Approach to International Issues 
For about two thousand years, Chinese society was not ruled through laws as the 
ideal but an ‘order of traditional manners and customs’ based on Confucianism. 
Confucianism  advocates  the  state  of  non disputes,  non litigation  and  seeking 
harmony.  The  ideal  society  was  to  be  created  around  the  model  of  ethically 
exemplary  individuals,  and  not  through  perfect  laws.  Even  nowadays,  the 
prototype  of  an  ideal  Chinese  personality  is  highlighted,  as  in  the  case  of  a 
particularly faithful bus conductor in Beijing.
41 In contrast to the high numbers 
of lawyers in the US and the strong tendency of Americans to resort to the law 
and courts to resolve conflicts, Chinese prefer arbitration and compromise to 
direct confrontation.  
 
                                         
38 V. Price, (1992), note 28, 87, p. 101. 
39 See, e.g., WTO, Trade Policy Review Mechanism-Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 
2006, WT/TPR/192, (2006), para. 10. 
40 WTO, WT/TPR/27, note 5, para. 10. 
41 The bus conductor is called Shuli Li. The government promotes her as a role model of Chinese 
citizenship, see, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/33831/33841/2558043.html. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 226 
This traditional philosophy also affects China’s approach to international issues. 
Traditionally,  China  advocates  bilateral  consultation  and  negotiation.  It  has 
taken a sceptical, sometimes even negative, attitude towards dispute settlement 
mechanisms  of  international  judicial  and  semi judicial  bodies.  To  date,  for 
instance,  China  has  not  submitted  any  dispute  to  the  International  Court  of 
Justice (ICJ), despite the fact that China, as one of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council of the United Nations, has  the power to appoint one 
Chinese national as one of the fifteen judges of the ICJ.
42  
 
This attitude has not changed since China joined the WTO. Article 16.5 of the 
Marrakesh  Agreement  clearly  provides  that  no  reservations  may  be  made  in 
respect of any provision of the agreement. As a WTO Member, thus, China has 
subjected itself to an international judicial body, the WTO dispute settlement 
system, for the first time.
43 China has been involved in very few cases as either 
                                         
42 The ICJ is composed of 15 judges elected to nine-year terms of office by the United Nations 
General Assembly and the Security Council. The judges of the ICJ do not represent their own 
governments but are independent magistrates. See, http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/inotice.pdf. Traditionally, candidates from five permanent 
members of the Security Council have always been elected. After the United Nations passed 
Resolution No. 2958 to restore the seat of China in the UN in 1971, China claimed that it would 
not accept the declaration by the former Chinese Government ruled by the Nationalist Party of 
accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
43 The WTO Dispute Settlement System is modeled on domestic courts, despite that it is not even 
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complainant
44 or as respondent
45 since its accession to the WTO, though it has 
been involved in many cases as a third party.
46 This is contrast to most other 
frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement system. Under the WTO dispute 
settlement system, for example, the US and the EU complained 242 times which 
accounted for 28.3% of all bilateral disputes between 1995 and 2004.
47 During 
the  same  period,  they  were  involved  as  respondents  in  481  cases  which 
accounted  for  56.2%  of  all  bilateral  disputes.
48 Even  when it  is  involved  in  a 
dispute, China tries to solve the dispute at the consultation period and avoid 
bringing the dispute to a WTO Panel. On the 18
th March 2004, for instance, the 
US requested consultations in regard to China’s policy on refund of value added 
tax to  domestic industry  producing  integrated circuits.
49  Through  a  series  of 
consultations, China and the US finally came to an agreement. On the 14
th July 
                                         
44 By the end of September 2007, China was involved as complaint in two cases: United States- 
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US-Steel Safeguards), 
WT/DS252; and United States- Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, WT/DS368. 
45 By the end of September 2007, China was involved as respondent in eight cases: China—Value-
Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309; China—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts, WT/DS339; China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 
WT/DS340; China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS342; China—
Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other 
Payments, WT/DS358; China—Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions 
from Taxes and Other Payments, WT/DS359; China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362; and China—Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, WT/DS363. 
46 China has been an active third party participant in every dispute but one sine it joined the WTO. 
The only dispute in which China did not participate is European Communities—Conditions for 
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246. One of the possible 
reasons why China has involved in many WTO cases as a third party is that China considers 
this approach as the best way of understanding the WTO rules and the WTO dispute settlement 
system. 
47 See, H. Horn and P. Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2004: Some 
Descriptive Statistics’, 31
st January 2006, p. 5, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/HornMavroidisWTODSUDatabaseOverview.pdf. 
48 Id. 
49 China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 228 
2004, they signed the Memorandum of Understanding between China and the US 
Regarding China’s Value Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, which was notified to 
the  WTO  soon  afterwards.
50 Thus,  the  four month long  dispute  was  settled 
during the phase of consultation. This illustrates that, after its accession to the 
WTO, China still follows its traditional approach to international matters and 
prefers  to  solve  disputes  through  arbitration  and  compromise  than  direct 
confrontation. The soft persuasion character of the TPRM is suited to China’s 
traditional  approach  to  international  disputes.  China  is  apt  to  feel  more 
confident to use the TPRM than the WTO dispute settlement system due to the 
TPRM’s non confrontational and non legalistic characteristics.  
 
2  The Impact of the TPRM on the Formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Originally, the issues in respect of national competition law and policy were not 
officially part of the content of trade policy review when the TPRM was first 
established under the GATT in 1988. Initially, they were not part of trade policy 
review when the WTO was established in 1995. Increasingly, however, the WTO 
Secretariat and reviewed WTO Members were choosing to report their national 
competition  laws  and  policies  because  they  thought  that  their  national 
competition laws and policies were relevant to trade in goods and services and 
regulatory reform. Moreover, other WTO Members were also very keen to ask 
questions  related  to  national  competition  law  and  policy.  In  2001,  the  Trade 
Policy  Review  Body  formally  recognised  that  a  WTO  Member’s  national 
competition law and policy was one of the common themes of the Secretariat 
Reports of trade policy review of WTO Members.
51 Since then, a WTO Member’s 
national competition law and policy has always been examined in Chapter III 
‘Trade Policies and Practices by Measures’ of the Secretariat Report.  
 
When it joined the WTO in 2001, China was the seventh largest trading state in 
                                         
50 Id. 
51 WTO, Trade Policy Review Mechanism-Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 2001, 
WT/TPR/101, (2001), para. 12.  Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 229 
the  world.
52 Thus,  it  would  be  reviewed  every  four  years  by  the  WTO  Trade 
Policy Review Body.
53 Since 2004, however, it has become the third largest trader 
after the European Union (EU) and the US.
54 Consequently, the WTO decided to 
review  China’s  trade  policy  every  two  years  rather  than  every  four  years.
55 
China’s  first  WTO  trade  policy  review  was  carried  out  in  late  2005.  The 
Government  Report  and  the  Secretariat  Report  were  published  on  the  WTO 
website in early 2006. There are 12 paragraphs regarding China’s competition 
law  and  policy  in  the  Secretariat  Report  of  China’s  first  trade  policy  review. 
What  follows  examines  the  impacts  of  the  TPRM  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 by exploring several functions performed by the TPRM. 
 
Before doing so, it has to be accepted that the TPRM has limitations in respect of 
reviewing WTO Members’ domestic competition law and policy due to the fact 
that the TPRM is not designed for the purpose of reviewing national competition 
law and policy only. The content in regard to national competition law and policy 
is  limited in the  Secretariat  Report  because  it  is  not the  only  issue  that  the 
Secretariat Report deals with. The TPRM covers a wide range of trade related 
issues in addition to national competition law and policy and does not allow the 
necessary  time  and  degree  of  detail  which  an  effective  competition specific 
peer  review  warrants.  Thus,  the  TPRM  is  only  able  to  deal  with  the  general 
issues related to WTO Members’ competition law and policy under the current 
WTO  framework.  In  other  words,  the  TPRM  is  unable  to  deeply  and 
comprehensively examine the WTO Members’ national competition laws under 
the existing system. Compared to competition specific peer reviews, such as the 
one undertaken in the Competition Law and Policy Committee of the OECD,
56 
                                         
52 See, WTO, International Trade Statistics 2002, (2002), available at www.wto.org. 
53 The Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 3, Art. C (ii). 
54 In 2004, China’s share of world trade was increased to 6.7%. Thus, China overtook Japan (5.9) 
and became the third largest trader after the EU (14.5%) and the US (13.6%) in 2004. See, 
WTO, International Trade Statistics 2005, (2005), available at www.wto.org. 
55 ‘WTO to Review China’s Trade Policy Every Two Years’, Ministry of Commerce, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/significantnews/200410/20041000297431.ht
ml. 
56 Since 1998 the OECD has produced a number of reviews of national competition policies as part 
of a larger project on regulatory reform. Participation in these regulatory reform reviews is 
entirely voluntary. Each review has the same format and is based on background reports Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 230 
therefore, the contribution of the TPRM to the development of a WTO Member’s 
domestic  competition  law  and  policy  is  limited.  This  is  the  reason  why  WTO 
Members spent seven years discussing the possibility of setting up a separate 
peer review system which will be specially designed for reviewing WTO Members’ 
national  competition  law  and  policy.
57  Due  to  this  limitation,  the  possible 
contribution from the TPRM to the development of China’s Antimonopoly Law is 
limited. It is not possible for the TPRM to provide a comprehensive review of 
China’s competition law and policy due to the nature of the TPRM. Nevertheless, 
the TPRM provides the only official review, at the international level, of Chinese 
competition law and policy. Thus, it is very significant to examine the impacts of 
the TPRM on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
                                                                                                                             
prepared by experts from five different OECD directorates. One chapter assesses the 
macroeconomic context for regulatory reform, the strengths and challenges of regulatory 
reform, and the challenges confronting future regulatory performance. Three thematic chapters 
examine the quality of regulatory institutions and government processes, competition policy and 
enforcement, and the enhancement of market openness through regulatory reform. Each review 
also contains chapters on particular sectors such as electricity and telecommunications. The 
chapter on competition policy and enforcement covers: (i) the competition policy's historical 
foundations; (ii) substantive issues including content of the competition law; (iii) institutional 
issues such as enforcement structures and practices; (iv) limits of competition policy including 
exemptions and special regulatory regimes; (v) competition advocacy for regulatory reform; and 
(vi) conclusions and policy options. 
57 During the first WTO Ministerial Meeting which was held in Singapore in 1996, the WTO 
Members agreed to set up the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP), see, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, (1996), 
para. 20, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. The WGTCP 
has provided a forum for WTO Members to discuss the possibility to set up a competition-
specific peer review system in the WTO Competition Context. See, e.g., WGTCP, 
Communication from the European Community and its Member States - Dispute Settlement and 
Peer Review: Options for a WTO Agreement on Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/229, 
(2003); WGTCP, Communication from the United States - The Benefits of Peer Review in the 
WTO Competition Context, WT/WGTCP/W/233, (2003); WGTCP, Communication from Korea - 
Peer Review in the Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/235, (2003); 
WGTCP, Communication from Japan - Introducing a Model of Peer Review, 
WT/WGTCP/W/236, (2003); WGTCP, Practical Modalities of Peer Review in a Multilateral 
Framework on Competition-Communication from the OECD, WT/WGTCP/W/243, (2003); and 
WGTCP, Peer Review: Merits and Approaches in a Trade and Competition Context - 
Communication from the OECD, WT/WGTCP/244, (2003).  Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 231 
2.1 Providing Policy Advice 
In a study, the OECD claimed: ‘Peer review may offer advice and proposals on 
the relevant policy dilemmas of the country under review
’.
58  By doing so, ‘peer 
review  may  disseminate  the  prevailing  consensus  and  best  practice  to 
government and policymakers worldwide’.
59 As a peer review, the TPRM is no 
exception. In its first appraisal in 1999, the Trade Policy Review Body noted: ‘the 
TPRM can provide a valuable input into national policy making, serving as an 
independent,  objective  assessment  of  trade  and  economic  policies’.
60  It 
continued:  ‘The  TPRM…is  of  significant  value  in  providing  authoritative,  well 
founded analyses of developments in trade policies and practices.’
61 In its 2006 
annual report of trade policy review, the Trade Policy Review Body noted:  
By providing an overall picture of the institutional interaction in trade policy 
formulation and implementation and the effect of policies on different sectors, 
the reports have also served as an input to trade policy formulation in some 
cases.
 62 
Sam Laird also argued: Trade Policy Review ‘as an independent and objective 
analysis of trade policies… has … contributed to the development of national 
policies’.
63  Thus,  it  seems  clear  that  the  TPRM  could  contribute  to  the 
development  of  WTO  Members’  domestic  policies  by  providing  policy  advice. 
Since national competition law and policy is one of the common themes of the 
TPRM,  the  TPRM  could  contribute  to  the  development  of  WTO  Members’ 
competition law and policy through providing policy advice. 
 
There  are  many  associations,  such  as  the  American  Bar  Association,  and 
                                         
58 WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/243, note 57, para. 5. 
59 Id. See also, OECD, (2002), note 1, paras. 6-23. 
60 WTO, WT/TPR/27, note 5, para. 7. Similar words can also be found at the WTO, Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism-Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 1998, WT/TPR/59, (1998), 
para. 10. 
61 WTO, WT/TPR/27, note 5, para. 19. 
62 WTO, WT/TPR/192, note 39, para. 10. Similar words can also be found in previous annual 
reports of the Trade Policy Review Body, such as the WTO, Trade Policy Review Mechanism-
Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 2005, WT/TPR/173, (2005), para. 10. 
63 S. Laird, (1999), note 26, 741, p. 760. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 232 
organisations, such as the OECD have provided considerable advice during the 
process of the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007.
64 For China, however, 
none  of  them  can  rival  the  advisory  role  played  by  the  TPRM  due  to  its 
significance. China was advised during China’s first trade policy review that it 
needed to adopt a comprehensive competition law. The TPRM stated that China 
lacked  ‘a  modern,  comprehensive  competition  law  incorporating  broad 
provisions  to  deal  with  cartels,  anticompetitive  mergers,  and  abuses  of  a 
dominant  position’.
65  In  addition,  it  also  recommended  that  China’s 
Antimonopoly  Law  (1)  ensured  ‘non discriminatory  treatment  of  private 
enterprises versus state owned enterprises throughout China’; (2) addressed ‘the 
challenges  posed  by  administrative  and  state  monopolies  and  other  anti 
competitive  arrangements’;  and  (3)  ensured  ‘continuing  non discriminatory 
treatment of foreign corporations operating in China’.
66 
 
These recommendations have been accepted by China. This can be seen from 
the adoption and the content of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Before its first 
trade  policy  review,  China  had  spent  nearly  20  years  on  formulating  its 
Antimonopoly  Law.  However,  no  draft  was  deliberated  by  the  Standing 
Committee  of  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC).  After  China’s  first  trade 
policy review, the State Council approved in principle the June 2006 Draft on the 
8
th June 2006 for the first time.
67 At its 22
nd session, which was held from the 
24
th to the 29
th June 2006, the 10
th NPC Standing Committee deliberated the 
June 2006 Draft for the first time.
68 One year later, it deliberated the June 2007 
                                         
64 See Chapter Two. 
65 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review –People’s Republic of China- Report by the 
Secretariat-Revision, WT/TPR/S/161/Rev.1, 26
th June 2006, p. 139. 
66 Id. 
67 M. Dickie, ‘Chinese Cabinet approves anti-monopoly law’, Financial Times, 9
th June 2006, p. 9; 
‘Chinese government approves draft of anti-monopoly law’, 7
th June 2006, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-06/07/content_4659507.htm. An English edition of the 
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Draft.
69 Two month later, it adopted the Antimonopoly Law 2007.
70 These events 
clearly illustrated that the process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
was dramatically hastened after China’s first trade policy review. To some extent, 
therefore, they demonstrate the influence of the TPRM on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing policy advice. 
 
In addition, the content of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 also demonstrates the 
influence  of  the  TPRM  on  its  formulation  through  providing  policy  advice.  In 
particular, Article 7 could be seen as a response to the opinion on ensuring non 
discriminatory treatment of private enterprises versus State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) throughout China. It did not appear in the drafts before China’s first trade 
policy review. It was first proposed in the June 2007 Draft about one year after 
China’s first trade policy review. And it was finally included in the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. Chapter V of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 could be seen as a response 
to the opinion on addressing the challenge posed by administrative monopolies.
71 
Some  previous  drafts,  such  as  the  2004  Submitted  Draft
72 and  the  July  2005 
Draft
73, include one chapter which prohibits administrative monopolies. Under 
the November 2005 Draft
74, however, such a chapter was deleted and only one 
provision prohibits administrative monopolies. In response to the opinion on this 
issue  in  the  Secretariat  Report  of  China’s  first  trade  policy  review,  the 
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Antimonopoly Law 2007 finally includes a whole chapter and six provisions in 
total prohibiting administrative monopolies.
75  
 
2.2 Lending Intellectual and Moral Support 
To  some extent,  the function  of  lending intellectual  and  moral  support  is  an 
extension of the function of providing policy advice. By providing policy advice 
to the WTO Member under review, the TPRM can also lend intellectual and moral 
support to those who argue for similar policies. In its 2005 annual report, the 
Trade Policy Review Body noted that the Secretariat Reports ‘provide a factual 
and  independent  review  of  the  trade  policies  and  practices  of  individual 
Members under review’.
 76 In doing so, the TPRM lends intellectual and moral 
support to those within the WTO Member who favour liberalization.
77 This has 
been recognised by the WTO. In its Report to the Singapore Ministerial Meeting, 
for instance, the Trade Policy Review Body noted: 
Members  have  appreciated  that  such  reviews  help  them  take  stock  of 
their  policies  on  the  basis  of  independent  objective  assessment,  have 
strengthened the hand of domestic agencies promoting liberalisation and 
helped strengthen inter agency discussion and co operation in their own 
countries.
78 
Similar words can also be found in the 1998 annual report of the Trade Policy 
Review  Body.
79 Therefore,  the  TPRM  ‘can  sometimes  assist  governments  in 
pursuing  desirable  trade  policy  reforms’  by  lending  intellectual  and  moral 
support.
80 
 
In  the  case  of  adopting  China’s  Antimonopoly  Law,  the  Secretariat  Report  of 
China’s first trade policy review stated: 
Adoption of China’s pending new Antimonopoly Law will fill a significant 
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existing  gap  in  the  legislative  framework  for  the  establishment  of  a 
market  economy.  Competition  in  the  economy  is  at  present  enforced 
through a number of related laws, and appears not to be very effective.
81 
There is no doubt that these words provided a timely needed intellectual and 
moral support to those who argued that China needed a competition law.
82 Such 
a support would not be available if China were not a WTO Member. As mentioned 
above, the process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was dramatically 
hastened after China’s first trade policy review. This illustrates the impact of the 
TPRM  on  the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  through  lending 
intellectual  and  moral  support  because  important  legislation  usually  can  be 
adopted  through  the  legislative  process  very  quickly  in  China,  once  the 
leadership reaches consensus on such legislation, and there is no doubt that the 
intellectual and moral support provided through the TPRM helped the Chinese 
leadership to reach such consensus. 
 
2.3 Improving Transparency 
The significance of transparency in a peer review is clearly summarised by the 
OECD. It argued: 
One of the main assets of peer review is as a transparency mechanism. 
Transparency  is  key  to  the  adoption  of  good  economic  policies.  The 
concept of transparency can be traced back to the literature of public 
choice, which sets out the basic line of argument that elected officials 
and  civil  servants  may  become  influenced  by  vested  interests  (‘rent 
seekers’) to take decisions that help such groups and run counter to the 
promotion  of  general  public  welfare.  Transparency  is  said  to  lead  to 
better decision making by alerting the public at home to the potential 
costs  and  benefits  of  policies  as  well  as  signalling  potentially  harmful 
changes to trading partners.
 83 
In another document, it expressed a similar opinion by arguing that peer review 
could  ‘improve  policy making  through  heightened  transparency’.
  84    The 
significance  of  transparency  to  the  TPRM  is  emphasised  in  the  Marrakesh 
Agreement. Article A of Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement clearly provides the 
objectives  of  the  TPRM  as  being  to  contribute  to  improved  adherence  by  all 
Members to the WTO Agreements and hence to the smoother functioning of the 
multilateral  trading  system,  ‘by  achieving  greater  transparency  in,  and 
understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members’.  
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In  practice,  improving  transparency  has  proved  to  be  one  of  the  most 
appreciated functions of the TPRM. An appraisal of the TPRM by the Trade Policy 
Review Body placed special emphasis on this role by concluding that the TPRM 
‘had  a  valuable  public  good  aspect,  particularly  in  its  contribution  to 
transparency’.
85 In its annual reports of the TPRM, the Trade Policy Review Body 
also recognised the role played by the TPRM in improving transparency regarding 
WTO Members’ trade related policies. In its 2006 annual report of trade policy 
review, for instance, the Trade Policy Review Body noted:  
As envisaged in Annex 3, the TPRM continues to be a valuable forum for 
achieving transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and 
practices of Members, thus contributing to the smoother functioning of 
the multilateral trading system.
86 
 
During the trade policy review, the WTO Member under review has the chance to 
present and clarify national rules, practices and procedures, and explain their 
rationale. All of these are documented and available on the WTO website. In 
addition, the Secretariat Reports are also published on the WTO website. The 
combination  of  these  two  levels  of  enhanced  transparency—toward  WTO 
Members  and  toward  public  opinion—contributes  to  the  effectiveness  of  the 
TPRM.  Therefore,  the  TPRM  could  help  improve  transparency  and  thus  raise 
public awareness of WTO Members’ trade related policies. The World Bank and 
the IMF claimed: ‘the TPRM has contributed to increased transparency of trade 
regimes and through the publication of the reviews to better awareness of the 
issues among wider audiences.’
87  
 
Traditionally, Chinese legislation was considered as a national secret. This was 
changed when the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
the Legislation Law 2000) came into effect in July 2000.
88 It provides that, when 
drafting legislation, apart from laws enacted or amended by the NPC, opinions 
from  organizations  and  the  public  must  be  solicited,  through,  inter  alia, 
seminars,  appraisal  meetings,  and  hearings.  Since  China  joined  the  WTO, 
transparency in the process of legislation appears ‘to have been improved’.
89 In 
the case of the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the drafting process 
was even more transparent than previous Chinese legislation.
90 A few drafts were 
available  not  only  in  Chinese  but  also  in  English.
91  It  was  a  welcome 
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improvement.  However,  officials  were  still  reluctant  to  openly  express  their 
opinions regarding the Antimonopoly Law during the drafting process. Thus, the 
TPRM provided a rare opportunity for outsiders to view the process of drafting 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007. The Secretariat Report, the Government Report and 
questions asked by other WTO Members are openly available to the public and 
can be found on the WTO website.  
 
Due  to  the  improved  transparency  brought  by  the  TPRM,  the  process  of 
formulating  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  is  very  different  from  previous 
legislation  when  China  was  not  a  member  of  the  WTO.  For  example,  the 
formulation of the Anti Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the LAUC 1993)
92 was not an open process. The public had little 
involvement  in  the  process  of  formulating  the  LAUC  1993  due to  the  lack  of 
relevant information. Moreover, China was not obliged to open the process of 
drafting the LAUC 1993. Since it joined the WTO, the process of formulating the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 was under the spotlight particularly through the TPRM.  
 
Achieving  transparency  is  particularly  valuable  in  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. One of the main difficulties China faced in the process 
of drafting the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was the lobby by some industries against 
the adoption of an antimonopoly law. The disparity in industries and lobbying 
power  between  those  who  benefited  from  anticompetitive  environments  and 
those who would benefit from competitive environments delayed the adoption of 
an antimonopoly law.
93 As the Eminent Persons Group argued, an ‘essential first 
step  in  developing  support  for  better  trade  polices  is  public  awareness’.
94 
Therefore, the TPRM has helped China to mitigate the influence of these vested 
interests due to the public awareness raised through improved transparency. This 
can be seen from the changes of some provisions of China’s Antimonopoly Law 
during  the  drafting  process.  For  example,  Article  2  of  the  June  2006  Draft 
provides: ‘As for monopolistic conduct prohibited by this Law, this Law does not 
apply where other laws or administrative regulations provide provisions’. In fact, 
this provision routinely appeared in most of the previous drafts as well. Under 
this provision, the industries and sectors which have more lobbying power than 
others can pursue exemption from the application of antimonopoly law and thus 
their  interests  would  be  protected.  Therefore,  this  provision  is  helpful  to 
maintain the interests of the powerful industries and sectors which benefit from 
the  lack  of  competition  legislation  in  China.  However,  Article  2  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide that the Law is not applicable where 
other laws or administrative regulations provide provisions. Thus, no industries 
can be granted exemptions under Article 2 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This 
change  illustrates  the  impact  of  the  TPRM  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through improving transparency.  
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2.4 Providing A Chanel of Learning Experiences 
Canada argued that peer review could offer ‘an ongoing, long term education 
and information sharing experience… across legal cultures, developmental levels 
and  different  institutional  or  historical  settings’.
95 The  OECD  claimed:  ‘one 
major benefit of the TPRM process has been the development of an extensive 
source  of  material  on  trade  policies.’
 96 Sam  Laird  also  argued:  ‘the  reviews 
[under the TPRM]… provide all countries with an independent source of learning 
experiences with trade policy at all levels of development’.
97  He then argued:  
One aspect of the reviews [under the TPRM] has been a learning process 
about trade reforms and the linkages between trade and other policies. 
Thus, the lessons of trade reforms are being passed on to other countries 
within the WTO system.
’98   
A report by the OECD also claimed that peer review aimed to ‘improve policy 
making through … sharing of information and experience’.
99  
 
In particular, the inclusion of national competition law and policy descriptions in 
the TPRM has been identified as a valuable educative process. A US delegate in 
the  Working  Group  on  the  Interaction  between  Trade  and  Competition  Policy 
(WGTCP) stated that during the TPRM process the Secretariat had invested a fair 
amount of interest and resources in asking the US what was being done in the 
antitrust  area.  Thus,  he  argued  that  the  TPRM  had  been  a  useful  learning 
experience  for  the  US  because  it  highlighted  differences  in  approaches  and 
perspectives with other jurisdictions.
100  
 
It is necessary for China to learn from other WTO Members in respect of the 
development of competition law and policy due to its lack of experience in this 
area. This necessity was recognised and put into practices during the process of 
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drafting  the  Antimonopoly  Law.  In  order  to  learn  about  their  experience  on 
competition  legislation,  for  instance,  China  sent  numerous  officials  to  other 
countries  and  translated  many  pieces  of  competition  legislation  in  other 
countries  during  the  process  of  drafting  its  Antimonopoly  Law.  During  the 
meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body which was held on the 19
th and the 21
st 
April  2006,  the  Brazilian  delegate  asked:  ‘In  which  aspects  of  anti trust 
regulations  is  China  taking  into  account  the  experience  of  other  countries  in 
terms of setting up its own competition policy?’
101 In response to this question, 
the Chinese government stated: 
In the drafting, MOFCOM [Ministry of Commerce], the Legislative Affairs 
Office of the State Council and other departments held many seminars 
with anti monopoly law enforcement officials, experts on anti monopoly 
laws from the US, the EU and Japan, and domestic and foreign enterprises. 
On those occasions, relevant issues relating to China’s anti monopoly legal 
regime were discussed, and opinions from foreign experts were taken to 
the largest possible extent.
102 
 
The TPRM provides another channel for China to learn the experiences of other 
competition regimes. China could learn experiences from its own trade policy 
review under the TPRM. It could also learn experiences through participating in 
other WTO Members’ trade policy reviews. In regard to competition law, it could 
benefit enormously from other WTO Members’ trade policy reviews. First, some 
WTO  Members,  such  as  the  US  and  the  EU,  have  a  long  history  and  rich 
experience in regard to competition legislation and enforcement. Hence, China 
could learn from them through participating in their trade policy reviews under 
the TPRM. Second, some transitional and developing WTO Members which face 
similar economic difficulties to China could also provide valuable experiences to 
China on competition legislation, although their competition regimes are also 
relatively new.  
 
Through providing a channel of learning experiences, the TPRM has helped China 
to  formulate  some  provisions  in  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  For  example, 
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Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 provides exemptions to anticompetitive 
agreements prohibited by Articles 13 and 14. The criteria adopted in Article 15 
are in line with practice under German and EU competition regimes. However 
such criteria were changed several times during the process of drafting China’s 
Antimonopoly  Law.  This  illustrates  the  contribution  of  the  TPRM  to  the 
formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  through  providing  learning 
experiences. Moreover, in the future, the implementation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 could also benefit from the TPRM through its function of providing a 
channel of learning experiences. 
 
2.5 Providing A Forum for Policy Dialogue 
Peer review provides a forum for policy dialogue. During the process of peer 
review, the country under review and peer countries systematically exchange 
information, attitudes and views on policy decisions and their application. As one 
study claims: ‘This dialogue can be the basis for further co operation, through, 
for example, the adoption of new policy guidelines, recommendations or even 
the negotiation of legal undertakings’.
103  
 
As a peer review, the TPRM provides a forum for policy dialogue. Through the 
TPRM, WTO Members can raise their concerns, while the WTO Member under 
review can explain its policies. According to Sam Laird, ‘one of the strengths of 
the TPRM is its role as a forum where polices can be explained and discussed, 
where  information  can  be  sought  and  concerns  can  be  expressed  on  a  non 
confrontational  and  non legalistic  basis’.
104   In  other  words,  the  TPRM,  as  a 
forum  for  policy  dialogue,  provides  two  functions.  First,  the  TPRM  provides 
chances for WTO Members to raise their concerns on the policies of the WTO 
Member under review. During peer review, ‘[t]he reactions of the group engaging 
in peer review may provide a measure of the effectiveness or acceptability of a 
particular idea, opinion, or point of view.
’105 This implies that concerns raised by 
other WTO Members during the WTO trade policy review could have impacts on 
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the development  of new  policies  of  the WTO  Member  under  review. At  least 
these concerns raise the awareness of the WTO Member on relevant issues. 
 
Second, the TPRM provides chances for the WTO Member under review to explain 
its policies that raise concerns from other WTO Members, address the concerns 
from other WTO Members, and defend its policies where necessary. In its report 
to the Singapore Ministerial Meeting, the Trade Policy Review Body noted: ‘[i]n 
many cases… review meetings can provide a useful forum for governments to 
explain the development of policies’.
106 During the trade policy review, the WTO 
Member  under  review  needs  to  address  the  concerns  raised  by  other  WTO 
Members and sometimes reassure them on these issues. However, this does not 
imply that it has to agree with other WTO Members in regard to its policies. In 
the case where it disagrees with other WTO Members in respect of certain of its 
policies, it can defend them through the TPRM. As Donald B. Keesing claimed, ‘in 
cases where a country remains convinced of the correctness of its policies, the 
TPRM provides a forum where it can respond to critics and advance its own more 
favourable interpretation of its trade regime.’
107  
 
Through policy dialogue, the TPRM can ‘help Members to anticipate and defuse 
potential trade related conflicts’, although it is not intended to serve as a basis 
for the enforcement of specific obligations under the WTO Agreements or for 
dispute settlement procedures.
108 In other words, any potential complaints can 
be discussed and could be addressed through the policy dialogue provided by the 
TPRM. Sungjoon Cho pointed out: 
Trade disputes are not brewed overnight. Rather, trade frictions usually 
precede  the  outbreak  of  full fledged  disputes.  Once  a  dispute  is 
announced, registered, and adjudicated, it is very easy for it to escalate 
beyond the control of the parties. Therefore, if frictions can be diffused 
before they reach the level of disputes, much time, energy and expense 
will be saved. 
109 
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Economically, therefore, the policy dialogue function provided through the TPRM 
could reduce the costs of litigation. It also provides the chance to avoid direct 
political conflict and thus save face for the WTO Members involved. In addition, 
it provides the chance for WTO Members to avoid domestic political pressure 
caused by losing a WTO case. Thus, these economic and political benefits from 
the policy dialogue under the TPRM are attractive for China. This policy dialogue 
function  by  the  TPRM  is  also  consistent  with  China’s  traditional  approach  to 
international matters. 
 
China  organised  and  participated  in  numerous  seminars  and  conferences  in 
regard to its Antimonopoly Law during the drafting process. Compared to these 
seminars and conferences, the policy dialogue forum provided by the TPRM is 
unique due to the following reasons. First, many WTO Members participated in 
the discussions in regard to China’s competition law during China’s first trade 
policy review. Such large scale participation in China’s domestic legislation is 
unprecedented in China’s legislation history. Second, it is first time that China 
discussed its domestic legislation with other nations on a mandatory basis. In 
other words, it was China’s duty to discuss its competition law during China’s 
trade policy review. Third, the TPRM provided a rare opportunity for other WTO 
Members to get explanations regarding China’s competition law from high level 
officials in the Chinese government. Without the TPRM, it would not be easy to 
get such explanations. 
 
During China’s trade policy review, several WTO Members raised their concerns 
regarding China’s Antimonopoly Law.  For example, Chinese Taipei
110, Japan
111, 
and Turkey
112 asked about the drafting progress of China’s Antimonopoly Law. In 
response, the Chinese government stated that the Antimonopoly Law had been 
put on the legislation agenda of the 10
th NPC Standing Committee for 2006 and 
would be reviewed in August 2006.
113 In fact, the 10
th NPC Standing Committee 
deliberated the draft Antimonopoly Law in June 2006, two months earlier than 
                                         
110 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review-People’s Republic of China-Minutes of 
Meeting-Addendum, WT/TPR/M/161/Add.2, 11
th September 2006, p. 72. 
111 Id. 
112 Id., p. 73. 
113 Id., p. 74. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Chapter 6, 243 
the time it told the Trade Policy Review Body. This illustrated that China took the 
concerns seriously. 
 
The US asked how the most recent draft of China’s Antimonopoly Law ensured 
non discriminatory treatment for foreign companies.
114 In response, the Chinese 
representative stated: 
The Antimonopoly Law will also observe the national treatment principle, 
imposing no discriminatory treatment to foreign enterprises. The rights of 
all  market  entities  to  participate  in  fair  competition  in  China  will  be 
effectively protected by this competition legislation system.
 115  
 
The  term  ‘public  interest’  routinely  appeared  in  the  drafts  of  China’s 
Antimonopoly Law during the drafting process.
116 For example, Article 1 of the 
November  2005  Draft  provides:  ‘This  Law  is  enacted  for  the  purposes  of… 
safeguarding … public interest’. The inclusion of public interests as a test in the 
drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law brought concerns from other WTO Members 
during China’s trade policy review. For example, the EU asked the meaning of 
the public interest in the context of the Antimonopoly Law and how China would 
apply the public interest test.
117 In response, the Chinese government stated: ‘As 
for  public  interest  mentioned  in  the  draft  of  Antimonopoly  Law,  specific 
stipulations could be found in the future implementation regulation, rules and 
guidelines’.
 118 From this response, it can be seen that China intended to keep 
the term ‘public interest’ in its Antimonopoly Law rather than delete such term. 
However, China did reassure the EU by stating that further administrative rules 
and guidance on applying public interest test would be provided in the future. 
The  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  clearly  includes  ‘public  interest’  as  one  of  its 
objectives.
119 In  the  future,  thus,  some  guidance  or  administrative  rules  on 
implementing and interpreting the public interest are needed in order to address 
the concerns from other WTO Members. 
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The US,
120 the EU,
121 Canada,
122 and the Chinese Taipei
123 asked whether and how 
China’s  Antimonopoly  Law  would  be  applied  to  SOEs.
  In  reply,  the  Chinese 
government stated:  
China’s competition legislation system, including the coming Antimonopoly 
Law,  will  be  equally  applicable  to  all  market  entities  including  SOEs, 
enterprises  of  collective  ownership,  private  enterprises  and  foreign 
invested enterprises. It will neither grant exemption to SOEs, nor provide 
for  different  treatment  between  SOEs  and  private  enterprises  in  its 
application…The  rights  of  all  market  entities  to  participate  in  fair 
competition  in  China  will  be  effectively  protected  by  this  competition 
legislation system.
124 
One  year  after  China’s  first  trade  policy  review,  the  10
th  NPC  Standing 
Committee deliberated the June 2007 Draft in June 2007. Compared to the June 
2006 Draft, one of the changes of this draft is that it includes a new provision 
that  clearly  prohibits  big  SOEs  from  abusing  their  dominant  positions  and 
harming  consumers’  interests.
125 Such  a  provision  did  not  appear  in  previous 
drafts. This provision remained in the Antimonopoly Law 2007.
126 From this, we 
can see that the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced 
by the TPRM through providing a forum of policy dialogue. 
 
The US asked whether the monopolistic conduct of any sectors or industries, 
such as the energy sector, was exempted from the application of the most recent 
draft of the Antimonopoly Law.
127 In response, the Chinese government stated: 
The current draft of the Antimonopoly Law does not explicitly provide the 
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industries or areas that are exempt from its application. Therefore the 
law will be applicable to all industries and areas.
128  
However, this provision does provide a loophole through which some industries 
and sectors can be granted exemptions from the application of the Antimonopoly 
Law because it is not applicable where other laws or administrative rules provide 
provisions. Such language routinely appeared in most of the drafts during the 
process  of  formulating  the  Antimonopoly  Law.  However,  Article  2  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not include such words. Therefore, no industries 
can  be  granted  exemptions  under  Article  2  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007. 
Considering the fact that most of drafts provides: ‘this Law is not applicable 
where other laws or administrative rules provide provisions’, this change is very 
dramatic.  It  illustrates  the  impact  of  the  TPRM  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing a forum for policy dialogue. 
 
In  sum,  the  TPRM  has  played  a  significant  role  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing a forum for policy dialogue. China did 
not  address  all  the  concerns  on  its  Antimonopoly  Law  raised  by  other  WTO 
Members during its first trade policy review. However, it did address some of 
them. Without the forum for policy dialogue provided by the TPRM, it would not 
be easy for other WTO Members to raise their concerns and get explanations and 
reassurances regarding some draft provisions of China’s Antimonopoly Law. This 
dialogue forum provided by the TPRM also benefits China. Through the TPRM, 
China  has  addressed  such  concerns  which  otherwise  could  lead  to  serious 
complaints, such as the concern regarding the national treatment principle.
129 
Addressing such concerns lead to the changes in certain provisions of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law. These changes are examples of the impacts of the TPRM on 
the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  through  providing  a  forum  of 
policy dialogue. 
 
3  Conclusion  
Despite the fact that it is not specially designed as a competition specific peer 
review mechanism, the TPRM, as the only peer review on trade related policies 
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at the international level, could still contribute to the development of domestic 
competition law and policy in the WTO Members. Under the TPRM, the review 
regarding China’s Antimonopoly Law went beyond the boundary of the existing 
WTO rules on competition issues because the scope of the TPRM is not narrowed 
to trade policies only. Compared to the impact examined in Chapters three, four 
and  five,  therefore,  the  impacts  of  the  TPRM  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 cover more contents of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and 
thus are more comprehensive.  
 
This chapter has shown that the TPRM has contributed to the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing policy advice, by lending intellectual 
and  moral  support,  improving  transparency,  providing  a  channel  of  learning 
experiences from other WTO Members and providing a forum for policy dialogue 
where concerns can be expressed and policies can be explained. China will be 
reviewed under the TPRM every two years. The Secretariat Report of China’s first 
trade  policy  review  has  clearly  mentioned:  ‘[w]hile adoption  of  the  new  law 
[China’s Antimonopoly Law] will mark a significant further step in the evolution 
of China’s legislative framework, much will depend on its implementation’
130 In 
particular, it claimed: ‘Sound implementation of the new law in a transparent 
and non discriminatory manner will be vital to its effectiveness’.
131 In the future, 
therefore, it is no doubt that the implementation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
will be scrutinized under the TPRM. Thus, the Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities  need  to  be  aware  of  the  influence  of  the  TPRM  on  the 
implementation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 through the functions mentioned 
above. 
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Conclusion 
Graham Mayeda claimed: ‘[t]he accession of China to the WTO has opened a 
two way street along which influence will flow both from the WTO to China, but 
also from China towards the WTO and its members’.
1 He provided a study on how 
China could influence the international trading system.
2 By contrast, this thesis 
provides  an  example  to  how  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  influences 
China by examining the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007). 
 
1  A Significant Topic 
Over the last 60 years, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
its  successor,  the  WTO,  have  led  to  an  effective  reduction  of  governmental 
barriers  to  trade  through  trade  liberalization  policies.
3 Tariff  and  non tariff 
barriers as well as regulatory obstacles have been either reduced or eliminated. 
Today there is consensus that some anticompetitive practices could have adverse 
impacts  on  international  trade.
4 In  the  absence  of  an  effective  competition 
regime,  the  benefits  of  trade  liberalization  would  be  nullified  or  at  least 
reduced. Therefore, the WTO is very keen on the development of competition 
law  and  policy  in  its  Members.  Particularly,  this  is  illustrated  by  the  formal 
inclusion of national competition law and policy into the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) in 2001.
5 During China’s first WTO trade policy review, for 
instance, the development of China’s competition law and policy in general and 
China’s Antimonopoly Law in particular was examined. 
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China  started  its  Economic  Reform  and  Open  Door  Policy  in  1978.  The  main 
purpose of the Economic Reform is to transform the Chinese economic system 
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy where resources are 
located through market forces and competition. The Chinese Economic Reform is 
associated with the deregulation of prices and privatization of the State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). It has lead to some diminution in the direct role of the State 
in economic activity. Nowadays, market forces play a major role in the Chinese 
economy.
6 The  purpose  of  the  Open  Door  Policy  is  to  liberalize  trade  and 
investment. The advent of trade liberalization has witnessed far reaching trade 
policy  reforms  leading  to  a  considerable  reduction  in  governmental  trade 
barriers.
7 This  process  of  trade  liberalization  has  speeded  up  since  China’s 
accession to the WTO.
8  
 
With  the  introduction  of  the  Economic  Reform  and  Open  Door  Policy, 
anticompetitive practices by both domestic and foreign firms emerged in China. 
In order to combat these practices, China started to enact some competition 
related  legislation  since  1980.  Since  then,  it  has  enacted  several  pieces  of 
legislation dealing with anticompetitive practices, such as the Price Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Price Law 1997)
9 and the Anti Unfair 
Competition  Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (hereinafter  the  LAUC 
1993).
10  However,  the  competition related  legislation  in  China  before  the 
adoption  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  was  scattered  in  several  laws  and 
regulations. It lacked system and comprehensiveness. It did not provide some 
essential  components  of  what  would  be  considered  a  complete  set  of 
competition  policy  tools,  such  as  the  definition  of  an  abuse  of  a  dominant 
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position. Therefore,  it  could not  meet the  needs  of  the new environment as 
China’s economy shifted from a centrally planned system to a market economy. 
Thus,  the  demand  increased  for  the  enactment  of  a  systematic  and 
comprehensive competition law in China.  
 
After nearly 20 years of formulation, China adopted the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
on  the  30
th  August  2007.
11  The  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  aims  to  maintain 
competition  and  restrain  anticompetitive  practices.  It  bans:  (1)  monopolistic 
agreements  such  as  price  fixing  cartels  among  companies  in  a  competitive 
relationship  and  collusion  among  bidders;  (2)  abuse  of  a  dominant  market 
position, such as price discrimination and refusing or forcing transactions; (3) 
large scale mergers and acquisitions among firms that could lead to a de facto 
restriction of competition in relevant markets; (4) administrative monopolies. 
 
During the process of drafting China’s Antimonopoly Law, various factors could 
have  had  impacts  on  its  formulation.  According  to  the  source,  they  can  be 
divided into domestic and international factors. Examples of domestic factors 
are economic conditions and domestic market structure. During the process of 
drafting China’s Antimonopoly Law, China was aware of these domestic factors. 
In 2002, for instance, Peng Li, then Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
9
th  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC)  (1998 2003)  and  former  Prime  Minister 
(1988 1998)  claimed:  ‘China  must  formulate  an  antimonopoly  law  which… 
accommodates China’s economic development needs’.
12  
 
The international factors that could have had impacts on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007  include  the  influences  from  individual  countries  and 
international  organizations.  One  of  the  examples  of  the  influences  from 
individual countries is that China sent many representatives to other countries in 
order  to  learn  their  experiences  regarding  competition  legislation  during  the 
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process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law. In addition to the influences from 
individual countries, international organizations could also have played a role in 
the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law. This study examines the influences 
from one such organization, the WTO.  
 
A  WTO  Member’s  domestic  competition  law  could  have  an  impact  on 
international trade. In the case of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, such impacts 
could  be  even  bigger  due  to  China’s  sheer  economic  size  and  trading  power. 
Therefore,  the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  has  generated 
unprecedented interest from both the WTO and its Members. However, there is a 
lack  of  thorough  and  comprehensive  studies  on  the  WTO’s  impact  on  the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Against this background, this study 
examines the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
It focuses on three questions: (1) whether the WTO could have had an influence 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) if so, how the WTO could 
have had an influence on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; and (3) 
to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected the 
WTO’s influences.  
 
2  Key Findings in This Study 
There is a consensus both within and outside of China that the WTO could have 
had  impact  on  the  formulation  of  China’s  Antimonopoly  Law.  During  the 
discussions in  the  WTO  Working  Group  on the Interaction  between  Trade and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP), for instance, the Chinese delegate acknowledged: 
‘to meet the needs of its national economic construction and in implementing its 
commitment  made  during  its  WTO  accession  process,  China  has  been 
accelerating  its  work  in  drafting  its  Antimonopoly  Law’.
13 In  2002,  Peng  Li 
claimed: ‘China must formulate an antimonopoly law which is consistent with 
the international conventions and customs, especially the WTO Agreements’.
14 
Other  WTO  Members  also  argued  that  the  WTO  rules  were  relevant  in  the 
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formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law. For example, Tim Stratford, the US 
Trade  Representative  (USTR)  official  responsible  for  China,  said:  ‘The  United 
States  will  assess  whether  any  legislation  [the  Antimonopoly  Law]  violates 
China’s commitments to the World Trade Organization’.
15 
 
However, these comments only reflect one aspect of the WTO’s impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This study has shown that the WTO 
could have had impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in four 
aspects: 
(i)  consistency: the Antimonopoly Law 2007 needs to be consistent 
with the WTO rules; 
(ii)  obligation: the enactment of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 could 
help China implement its WTO commitments; 
(iii)  enabling: the WTO rules could have enhanced the case for China 
seeking  to  combat  anticompetitive  practices  through  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; 
(iv)  peer  pressure:  the  TPRM  could  have  contributed  to  the 
development of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
In particular, Chapter Three examines the WTO’s impact from the first aspect. It 
argues that the WTO national treatment principle matters to the WTO Members’ 
national competition laws. As a WTO Member, thus, China needs to make sure 
that  its  Antimonopoly  Law  is  consistent  with  the  WTO  national  treatment 
principle.  In  theory, therefore,  the  relevance  of  the  WTO  national  treatment 
principle could have had impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. In reality, however, it took China a few years to accept the relevance of 
the WTO national treatment principle in the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. This struggle has been reflected in the process of formulating the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  Through  analysing  the  changes  of  the  relevant 
provisions  in  different  drafts,  Chapter  Three  shows  that  the  WTO  national 
treatment principle has had impact on the formulation of the objectives and 
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exemptions of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Chapter  Four  examines  the  WTO’s  impact  from  the  second  aspect.  First,  it 
argues that Articles VIII and IX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)  not  only  prohibit  anticompetitive  practices  that  have  impact  on 
international  trade  in  services  but  also  oblige  WTO  Members  to  combat  such 
anticompetitive practices. Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, 
China’s  competition related  legislation  did  not  cover  all  the  anticompetitive 
practices prohibited under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. The adoption of a 
competition law could help China to implement its obligations under Articles VIII 
and IX of the GATS by providing a general ban on all anticompetitive practices. 
This possibility of helping China to implement the obligations under Articles VIII 
and IX of the GATS has strengthened the expectation that the Antimonopoly Law 
would provide a general ban on all anticompetitive practices during the process 
of  formulating  this  Law.  Second,  it  argues  that  Section  1.1  of  the  Reference 
Paper  on  Regulatory  Principles  of  the  Negotiating  Group  on  Basic 
Telecommunications  (hereinafter  the  Reference  Paper)  requires  Members  to 
maintain ‘appropriate measures’ for ‘the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone  or  together,  are  a  major  supplier  from  engaging  in  or  continuing 
anticompetitive  practices’  in  the  telecommunications  sector.  The  existing 
telecommunications  legislation  in  China  is  far  from  effective  to  prevent 
anticompetitive practices. A comprehensive competition law could help China to 
implement the obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper because it 
could be an ‘appropriate measure’ for preventing anticompetitive practices in 
the telecommunications sector. This possibility of helping China to implement 
the obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper has led to the changes 
of certain provisions in the drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in order to 
make such legislation applicable to the telecommunications sector. 
 
Chapter Five examines the WTO’s impact from the third aspect. It argues that 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights  (TRIPS)  authorize  WTO  Members  to  regulate  abuses  of  intellectual 
property rights. However, these enabling clauses could only enhance the case for 
a WTO Member seeking to combat abuses of intellectual property rights through 
domestic  measures  when  it  can  resist  pressures  from  other  WTO  Members. 
China’s  desire  to  prohibit  abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  through  its Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Conclusion, 253 
Antimonopoly Law was criticised by other WTO Members during the process of 
formulating this Law. With the increasing significance of China’s economy and 
trading  power,  however,  China  has  become  stronger  and  more  able  to  resist 
pressures from other WTO Members in regard to regulating abuses of intellectual 
property rights. Under these circumstances, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the 
TRIPS  have  enhanced  the  case  for  China  seeking  to  regulate  abuses  of 
intellectual property rights through its Antimonopoly Law. This is illustrated in 
Article  55  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  which  stipulates  that  the  law  will 
apply to undertakings which abuse intellectual property rights to eliminate or 
restrict competition. 
 
Chapter Six examines the WTO’s impact from the fourth aspect. It argues that 
the TPRM could have contributed to the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 by (a) providing valuable and independent policy advice; (b) lending moral 
and intellectual supports to those who are in favour of adopting an antimonopoly 
law; (c) increasing transparency; (d) providing a channel of learning experiences 
from  other  Members;  and  (e)  providing  a  forum  where  other  Members  can 
express their concerns and the Member under review can explain and defend 
their policies. Through analysing the changes of the relevant draft provisions, 
Chapter  Six  shows  that  the  TPRM  has  contributed  to  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
In sum, this study has found: 
(1) The WTO could have had impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007;  
(2) The  WTO  could  have  had  influences  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through four aspects: (i) consistency: the content 
of China’s forthcoming Antimonopoly Law needs to be consistent with the 
WTO  national  treatment  principle;  (ii)  obligation:  the  adoption  of  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  could  help  China  to  implement  obligations  under 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS and Section 1 of the Reference Paper; (iii) 
enabling: Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS could have enhanced the 
case  for  China  seeking  to  prohibit  intellectual  property related 
anticompetitive practices through the Antimonopoly Law 2007; and (iv) 
peer pressure: the TPRM could have contributed to the formulation of 
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(3) Through analysing the changes of some provisions in the drafts and the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  this  study  has  demonstrated  that  the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by the 
WTO in these four aspects. 
 
Needless to say, however, it should be borne in mind that there are limitations of 
the  WTO’s  impacts  on  the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  First, 
there is no overarching set of principles or interpretation of the WTO rules as 
they  apply  to  competition  issues.  This  makes  it  very  difficult  to  implement 
competition related WTO rules. It also makes competition related WTO rules less 
known outside of the world of academics. Second, the WTO does not require a 
WTO Member to adopt a national competition law. China is no exception. Article 
65 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the People’s Republic 
of China expressly mentioned that China was formulating an antimonopoly law.
16 
However, this provision is not included in the Protocol on the Accession of the 
People’s  Republic  of  China.
17 Therefore,  China  has  no  obligation  to  enact  a 
comprehensive competition law. Nevertheless, the limitations of the WTO on its 
Members’ domestic competition laws should not be interpreted as saying that 
the WTO has no impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. As has 
been  shown  in  this  study,  the  WTO  has  influenced  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 from four aspects. 
 
3  Recommendations 
The Antimonopoly Law 2007 will come into force on the 1
st August 2008.
18 The 
WTO not only has influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, but 
also could have impact on the enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In 
fact, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will really begin to matter to the WTO and its 
Members  when  it  is  implemented.  Moreover,  the  further  development  of  the 
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Antimonopoly Law 2007 is inevitable because the development of competition 
law in China is a process. Thus, the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is 
only the start of the WTO’s impacts on China’s competition regime. In the future, 
therefore, the Chinese competition enforcement authorities need not only to be 
aware of the WTO’s impact but also to understand precisely such impacts. Due to 
the lack of comprehensive studies on the WTO’s impact on competition law in 
general and the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in particular, however, 
it  is  far  from  easy  for  the  Chinese  competition  enforcement  authorities  to 
understand  precisely  the  WTO’s  legal  impact  on  China’s  competition  regime. 
Based  on  this  study,  therefore,  a  few  recommendations  are  provided  to  the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities. 
 
3.1 First Recommendation 
The  Chinese  competition  enforcement  authorities  must  make  sure  that  the 
enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is consistent with the WTO national 
treatment principle. At least, there should be no de jure discrimination against 
foreign  companies  through  either  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  or  further 
guidance  of  this  Law.  Any  such  discrimination  could  trigger  complaints  from 
other WTO Members and thus China could face unfavourable rulings from a Panel 
and  the  Appellate  Body.  In  particular,  the  Chinese  competition  enforcement 
authorities  need  to  be  aware  of  the  potential  violation  of  the  WTO  national 
treatment  principle  through  interpreting  and  implementing  the  terms  ‘public 
interest’ and ‘development of the socialist market economy’ under Article 1 of 
the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  In  practice,  de  facto  discrimination  is  generally 
related  to  the  enforcement  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  Although  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 will not come into force until the 1
st August 2008, it is 
still necessary for the Chinese competition enforcement authorities to be aware 
of the risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle. In particular, the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities need to be aware of the potential 
de  jure  discrimination  against  foreign  companies  when  it  interprets  and 
implements the exemption provisions under the Antimonopoly Law 2007, such as 
Article 15. 
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3.2 Second Recommendation 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS require WTO Members to take action or provide 
remedies against certain anticompetitive practices in trade of services. Before 
the  adoption  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  however,  China’s  competition 
related  legislation  was  insufficient  to  implement  such  WTO  obligations.  The 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 could help China to implement such WTO obligations 
because  it  provides  a  general  ban  on  anticompetitive  practices.  In  order  to 
materialise  this  benefit,  however,  the  Chinese  competition  enforcement 
authorities  need  to  make  sure  that  further  guidance  on  implementing  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 is formulated in a way as to accommodate the needs of 
implementing the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. 
 
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper clearly requires China to adopt appropriate 
measures for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a 
major supplier from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunications sector. In order to implement this obligation, China has at 
least three options: (1) amending the Telecommunications Regulation 2000; (2) 
adopting  a  new  telecommunications  law;  (3)  adopting  the  Antimonopoly  Law 
2007.  As  examined  in  Chapter  four,  the  first  two  choices  are  not  likely  to 
materialise in the near future, while the Antimonopoly Law will come into force 
on the 1
st August 2008. Realistically, therefore, it is wise for China to implement 
its  obligation  under  Section  1.1  of  the  Reference  Paper  through  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. The Antimonopoly Law 2007 could be applicable to the 
telecommunications  sector  because  it  does  not  grant  any  exemptions  to  the 
telecommunications  sector.  Therefore,  the  Chinese  competition  enforcement 
authorities need to be aware of the applicability of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
to  the  telecommunications  sector  and  enforce  this  Law  in  a  way  as  to 
accommodate the needs of implementing the obligation under Section 1.1 of the 
Reference Paper. 
 
3.3 Third Recommendation 
Articles  8.2,  40  and 31(k)  of  the TRIPS  expressly  recognize  the  legitimacy  of 
invoking  WTO  Members’  domestic  legislation  to combat abuses  of  intellectual 
property  rights.  They  have  enhanced  the  case  for  China  seeking  to  regulate Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Conclusion, 257 
abuses  of  intellectual  property  rights  through  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007. 
However,  Article  55  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007  only  provides  a  general 
provision by stating that it is applicable to abuses of intellectual property rights. 
Thus, further guidelines or administrative rules are needed in order to provide a 
detailed procedure and a set of criteria on implementing Article 55. During the 
process  of  formulating  such  guidelines  or  administrative  rules,  the  Chinese 
competition  enforcement  authorities  need  to  be  aware  of  the  discretion 
provided by Article 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS.  
 
3.4 Fourth Recommendation 
The  TPRM  has  contributed  to  the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007 
through  providing  policy  advice,  by  lending  intellectual  and  moral  support, 
improving  transparency,  providing  a  channel  of  learning  experiences  and 
providing a forum for policy dialogue. It will continue such influences on the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. For instance, China will be reviewed under the TPRM in 
2008 for the second time. There is no doubt that one of the concerns regarding 
China’s competition law and policy will be the enforcement of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 during China’s second trade policy review. In the future, therefore, the 
Chinese  competition  enforcement  authorities  need  to  be  aware  of  and 
understand the comprehensive impacts of the TPRM on the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. In particular, the Chinese competition enforcement authorities need to be 
aware that the implementation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will scrutinized by 
the WTO and other WTO Members through the TPRM. 
 
4  Further Studies 
4.1 Other  Potential  Impact  of  the  WTO  on  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007  
4.1.1 Potential Impact of Other WTO Rules on the Formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Although  the  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  WTO’s  impact  on  the 
formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  it  has  to  be  accepted  that  for Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Conclusion, 258 
reasons of space and time this thesis has only focused on the impacts of the WTO 
national treatment principle, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, Section 1 of the 
Reference Paper, and Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of  the TRIPS and the TPRM. 
There  are  dozens  of  competition specific  provisions  under  the  current  WTO 
system. And these competition specific provisions might have had a bearing on 
the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. For instance, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires standards be no more restrictive on 
trade  than  is  necessary.
19 Articles  3,  4  and  8  of  the  TBT  could  be  used  to 
challenge the use of proprietary standards to restrict competition, such as in 
cases where standards (such as computer software standards) limit competition 
in networked services. In addition, the principles of transparency and fairness 
could also have influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. All 
these  illustrate  that  there  is  a  need  for  further  studies  on  whether  these 
competition related  WTO  rules  could  have  influenced  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly  Law  2007,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected such influences. 
 
4.1.2 Potential Impact of the WTO on the Formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 from Non-Legal Perspectives 
This study explores the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 from a legal perspective. It is possible to look at this issue from other 
perspectives, such as an economic perspective. As mentioned in the Introduction 
of this thesis, there are some studies on the economic impact of the WTO on 
China.  However,  there  is  no  comprehensive  economic  analysis  on  the  WTO’s 
impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Therefore, it is worthy 
of further studies. 
 
4.1.3  Potential Impact of the WTO on the Implementation and 
Further Development of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This study focuses on the WTO’s impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. With the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, attention now turns 
to the implementation and further development of this Law. Therefore, further 
                                         
19 The TBT is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Conclusion, 259 
studies  are  needed  regarding  the  WTO’s  impacts  on  the  implementation  and 
further development of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
4.2 Potential  Impact  of  the  WTO  on  Other  Members’ 
Competition Laws 
After  the  WTO  General  Council’s  post  Cancun  Decision  (hereinafter  the  July 
Package)  which  excluded  competition  policy  from  the  Doha  Round  of  trade 
negotiations,
20 any potential agreement on competition within the WTO will not 
materialize in the very near future. Thus, attention now turns to how to use the 
existing competition related rules within the WTO rather than how to establish a 
new  competition  system  within  the  WTO.  This  change  makes  studies  on  the 
impact  of  the  existing  WTO  rules  on  national  competition  regimes  more 
significant  than  before.  For  the  WTO  Member  which  has  not  adopted  a 
competition law but is in the process of formulating a national competition law, 
such  studies  could  raise  the  awareness  of  the  relevance  of  the  WTO  in  the 
formulation  of  a  domestic  competition  law.  For  the  WTO  Member  which  has 
already  adopted  a  competition  law,  such  studies  could  help  the  competition 
authorities to be aware that the enforcement of the existing competition law 
must be consistent with the WTO rules. In addition, such studies could raise the 
awareness of the potential impact of the WTO on the further development of the 
existing  competition  law.  Therefore,  studies  on  the  WTO’s  impact  on  WTO 
Members’ domestic competition laws could be very helpful for WTO Members. 
However, there is a lack of such studies.
21 Although this thesis throws some light 
on this general issue by examining the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, further studies are needed in order to understand the 
WTO’s impact on WTO Members’ competition laws. Such studies could be more 
comprehensive than the studies on the impacts of the WTO on the formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 because they include more than one WTO Member.  
                                         
20 Paragraph 1 (g) of the July Package, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm. 
21 After July 2004 when the consensus was reached to exclude competition policy from the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations, there has been lack of studies on the competition issues under the 
WTO, not mention to the impacts of the existing WTO rules on WTO Members’ national 
competition laws. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Conclusion, 260 
 
5  Contributions of This Study 
This thesis has contributed to the policy making and the academic literature in 
at least three different areas. First, it has illustrated: (1) the WTO could have 
influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) the WTO could 
have influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in four aspects; 
(3) the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected such influences. 
Before this study, no research had been done regarding the WTO’s impacts on 
the  formulation  of  the  Antimonopoly  Law  2007.  To  some  extent,  the  lack  of 
studies on this topic illustrates how original this study is. It has thrown light into 
a  dark  area  where  there  was  no  intelligent  light.  From  this  sense,  the 
contribution of this study is that it fills the gap left by other scholars and helps 
policy  makers  to  understand  in  a  precise  way  the  WTO’s  impacts  on  the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007.  
 
Second, this study has exposed a new research area, the WTO’s impact on the 
development of WTO Members’ competition regimes in general and competition 
laws in particular, through analysing the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. T. L. Knutsen argued: ‘one does not ask of a theory 
whether it is true or false, rather one asks whether it is enlightening’.
22 If he is 
right, this thesis is certainly enlightening. It opens a new research area, the 
impacts of the WTO on WTO Members’ national competition laws. This study is 
the only research that has been carried out regarding this issue so far. One of the 
reasons why there is a lack of studies in this area could be the interdisciplinary 
character of this topic. It combines both international trade law, particularly 
WTO  law  and  national  competition  law  and  policy.  In  general,  WTO  law  is 
considered as part of public international law, while national competition law 
belongs  to  national  law.  There  are  not  many  scholars  with  expertise  in  both 
subjects. Thus, it is far from easy to bring these two subjects together. Despite 
this  difficulty,  this  thesis  has  demonstrated  that  studies  in  this  area  can  be 
carried  out  by  examining  the  WTO’s  impact  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
                                         
22 T. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 2
nd ed., Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, (1997), p. 1. Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008    Conclusion, 261 
 
Third, this study has developed and applied a structure of four aspects of the 
WTO’s impacts on domestic legislation: (1) consistency: the content of domestic 
legislation  needs  to  be  consistent  with  the  WTO  rules;  (2)  obligation:  The 
adoption of domestic legislation could help Members implement WTO rules; (3) 
enabling: the WTO rules could enhance the case for Members seeking to act in 
the way permitted by the WTO; (4) peer pressure: the WTO peer review system, 
the  TPRM,  could  contribute  to  the  development  of  WTO  Members’  domestic 
legislation. This structure could be used for further studies on the WTO’s impact 
on  WTO  Members’  domestic  legislation.  In  particular,  it  could  be  used  for 
carrying out further studies on the impact of the WTO on other WTO Members’ 
competition legislation.  
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The Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Adopted at the 29th session of the Standing Committee of the 10
th National 
People’s Congress on the 30
th August 2007) 
Translated by Jia Yuan 
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Chapter 1: General Provisions 
Article  1:  This  Law  is  enacted  for  the purpose  of  preventing  and  restraining 
monopolistic  conducts,  protecting  fair  competition  in  the  market,  enhancing 
economic  efficiency,  safeguarding  the  interests  of  consumers  and  the  public 
interest, promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy. 263 
Article  2:  This Law shall be applicable to monopolistic conducts in economic 
activities within the People’s Republic of China. 
This  Law  shall  apply  to  the  conducts  outside  the  territory  of  the  People’s 
Republic of China if they eliminate or have restrictive effect on competition on 
the domestic market of the PRC. 
Article  3:  “Monopolistic  conduct”  is  defined  in  this  law  as  the  following 
activities: 
(i)  monopolistic agreements among undertakings; 
(ii)  abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings; 
(iii)  concentration of undertakings that eliminates or restricts competition 
or might be eliminating or restricting competition; 
Article  4:  The  State  formulates  and  carries  out  competition  rules  which  in 
accordance  with  the  socialist  market  economy,  perfects  macro control,  and 
advances a unified, open, competitive and orderly market system. 
Article  5:  Undertakings  shall  through  fair  competition,  voluntary  alliance, 
concentrate  according  to  law,  expand  the  scope  of  operation,  and  enhance 
competition ability. 
Article 6: Undertakings of a dominant position shall be prohibited to abuse a 
dominant position, eliminate, and restrict competition. 
Article 7: For the undertaking in the state owned economy controlled industries 
to which are related to national economic lifeline and state security, and in the 
industries to which the state grants special or exclusive rights, the state protect 
their  lawful  operation.  The  state  also  lawfully  regulates  and  controls  their 
operation and the price of their commodities and services, safeguards interests 
of consumers, promotes technical progresses. 264 
Undertakings mentioned above shall lawfully operate, be honest and faithful, be 
strict  self discipline,  accept  social  supervision,  shall  not  damage  interests  of 
consumers using their dominant or exclusive positions. 
Article 8: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and regulations grant rights to administer public issues shall be prohibited to 
abuse administrative power, to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 9: The State Council establishes the Antimonopoly Commission, which in 
charge of organizing, coordinating, guiding antimonopoly works, performs the 
following responsibilities: 
(i)  study and draft related competition policies; 
(ii)  organize research, assess general competition situations in the market, 
issue assess report; 
(iii)  enact and issue antimonopoly guidelines; 
(iv)  coordinate antimonopoly execution works; 
(v)  other responsibilities stipulated by the State Council. 
The State Council stipulates composition and working rules of the Antimonopoly 
Commission. 
Article 10: Antimonopoly execution authorities are in charge of antimonopoly 
execution pursuant to this law. 
Antimonopoly execution authorities shall authorise the corresponded authorities 
of  provincial  government  or  government  in  an  autonomous  region  or  directly 
municipality to in charge of antimonopoly execution pursuant to this law, when 
needed. 
Article 11: Association of undertakings should intensify industrial self discipline, 
guide undertakings to lawfully compete, safeguard the competition order in the 
market. 265 
Article  12:  An  “undertaking”  in  this  law  refers  to  a  legal  person,  other 
organization  or  natural  person  that  engages  in  businesses  of  commodities 
(hereinafter “commodities” include services). 
A “relevant market” in this law refers to the territorial area within which the 
undertakings  compete  against  each  other  during  a  time  period  for  relevant 
products. 
Chapter 2: Monopoly Agreement 
Article 13: Any following agreements among the undertakings competed with 
each other shall be prohibited: 
(i)  fix, or change prices of products; 
(ii)  limit the output or sales of the products; 
(iii)  allocate the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets; 
(iv)  limit  the  purchase  new  technology  or  new  facilities,  or  the 
development of, new products or new technology; 
(v)  jointly boycott transactions; 
(vi)  other agreements identified by antimonopoly execution authorities. 
Agreements referred to this law are agreement, decision or concerted action 
which eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 14: Any following agreements among undertaking and counterparty are 
prohibited: 
(i)  fix the price for resale; 
(ii)  restrict the lowest price for resale; 
(iii)  another  monopoly  agreement  identified  by  antimonopoly  execution 
authorities. 266 
Article 15: Agreements among undertakings with one of the following objectives 
shall be exempted from application of article 13, 14 if 
(i)  agreements  to  improve  technology,  to  research  and  develop  new 
products; 
(ii)  agreements  for  the  purpose  of  product  quality  upgrading,  cost 
reduction and efficiency improvement, of unify standards, norms or 
specialise; 
(iii)  agreements  by  small  and  medium sized  enterprises  to  improve 
operational efficiency and to enhance their competitiveness; 
(iv)  agreements  to cope with economic depression,  to  moderate  serious 
decrease in sales volumes or distinct production surplus; 
(v)  agreements to achieve public interests, such as save energy, protect 
environment, relieve the victims of a disaster and so on; 
(vi)  agreements  to  maintain  legitimate  interest  in  the  cooperation  with 
foreign economic entities and foreign trade; 
(vii)  other situation stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
Undertakings pursuant to (i) to (v), and therefore exempted from Article 13, 14, 
must additionally prove, that the agreements can enable consumers to share 
impartially  the  interests  derived  from  the  agreements,  and  will  not  entirely 
eliminate the competition in relevant market. 
Article 16: Association of industry shall be prohibited to organize undertakings 
to conduct monopoly activities being prohibited by this law. 
Chapter 3: Abuse of a Dominant Market Position 
Article  17: Undertakings of a dominant market position shall not abuse their 
dominant market positions to conduct following conducts: 267 
(i)  sell commodities at unfairly high prices or buy commodities at unfairly 
low prices; 
(ii)  sell commoditiews at prices below cost without legitimate reasons; 
(iii)  refuse to trade with counterparty without legitimate reasons; 
(iv)  require  its  counterparty  to  trade  exclusively  with  it  or  trade 
exclusively  with  the  appointed  undertakings  without  legitimate 
reasons; 
(v)  tie products or require as unreasonable conditions for trading without 
legitimate reasons; 
(vi)  apply  dissimilar  prices  or  other  transaction  terms  to  equivalent 
counterparties; 
(vii)  other  conducts  identified  as  abuse  of  a  dominant  position  by 
antimonopoly execution authorities 
For  the  purposes  of  this  law,  “dominant  market  position”  refers  to  the 
undertaking(s) having the ability to control the price, quantity or other trading 
conditions  of  products  in  relevant  market,  or  to  hinder  or  affect  other 
undertakings to enter the relevant market. 
Article  18:  The  following  factors  will  be  taken  into  consideration  in  finding 
dominant market position: 
(i)  market share in relevant market, and the competition situation of the 
relevant market; 
(ii)  ability  to  control  the  sales  markets  or  the  raw  material  purchasing 
markets; 
(iii)  financial status and technical conditions of the undertaking; 
(iv)  the degree of dependence of other undertakings; 268 
(v)  entry to relevant market by other undertakings; 
(vi)  other factors related to find a dominant market position. 
Article  19:  Undertakings  that  have  any  of  the  following  situations  can  be 
assumed to be have a dominant market position: 
(i)  the  relevant  market  share  of  one  undertaking  accounts  for1/2  or 
above; 
(ii)  the joint relevant market share of two undertakings accounts for 2/3 
or above; 
(iii)  the joint relevant market share of three undertakings accounts for 3/4 
or above. 
Undertakings  with  a  market  share  of  less  than  1/10  will  not  be  deemed  as 
occupying  a  dominant  market  position  even  if  they  fall  within  the  scope  of 
second or third item. 
When the Undertakings assumed to have a dominant market position can prove 
that  they  do  not  have  a  dominant  market,  shall  not  be  assumed  to  have  a 
dominant market position.  
Chapter 4: Concentration of Undertakings 
Article 20: A concentration refers to the following situations: 
(i)  the merger of undertakings; 
(ii)  the acquisition by undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or 
assets, of control of other undertakings; 
(iii)  the  acquisition  by  contact  or  any  other  means,  of  control  of  other 
undertakings or of possibility of exercising decisive influence on other 
undertakings. 269 
Article 21:  A concentration falls under the notification criteria issued by the 
State  Council,  a  report  must  be  notify  in  advance  with  the  antimonopoly 
execution  authorities.  Without  notification  the  concentration  shall  not  be 
implemented. 
Article 22: A concentration refers to following situations, shall not notify to the 
antimonopoly execution authorities: 
(i)  one undertaking which is a party to the concentration has the power to 
exercise more than half  the voting rights of every other undertaking, 
whether of the equity or the asset; 
(ii)  one  undertaking  which  is  not  a  party  to  the  concentration  has  the 
power  to  exercise  more  than  half    the  voting  rights  of  every 
undertaking concerned, whether of the equity or the asset; 
Article  23:  Undertakings  which  notify  a  concentration  in  advance  with  the 
antimonopoly  execution  authorities,  shall  submit  following  documents  or 
materials: 
(i)  summary of notification; 
(ii)  the  effect  on  competition  on  the  relevant  market  of  the 
concentration; 
(iii)  agreement of concentration; 
(iv)  the  financial  reports  and  accounting  reports  of  the  proceeding 
accounting year of the undertakings concerned; 
(v)  other  documents  or  materials  stipulated  by  antimonopoly  execution 
authorities. 
The summary of notification shall record, name, residence, scope of business, 
expected  date  for  concentrating  and  other  items  stipulated  by  antimonopoly 
execution authorities of the undertakings concerned. 270 
Article 24: In case that the documents submitted by the notifying undertakings 
are not complete, shall submit the rest of the documents and materials with a 
set period stipulated by antimonopoly execution authorities. It will be taken as 
not  notified,  when  the  added  documents  and  materials  are  not  timely 
submitted. 
Article  25:  The  antimonopoly  execution authorities  shall  preliminarily  review 
the notified concentration and take the decisions whether to precede review and 
notify the undertakings in written form within 30 days, calculated from the date 
of receipt of the complete filing documents and materials referred to article 23 
submitted by the undertakings. 
Before  a  decision  taken  by  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities,  the 
concentration shall be not implemented. 
If  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  has  taken  decision  not  to  precede 
review or has not decided in case of expiring of the period, the concentration 
shall be implemented. 
Article 26: If the antimonopoly execution authorities has decided to precede the 
review, shall review and decide whether to prohibit the concentration and notify 
the undertakings in written form within 90 days, calculated form the date of the 
decision being taken. 
If the concentration is prohibited, the reasons shall be explained. Within the 
review period the concentration shall be not implemented. 
Under  the  following  circumstances,  the  time  limit  stipulated  in  the  first 
paragraph may be extended to add 60 days after notifying the undertakings in 
written form: 
(i)  the undertakings concerned agree to extend the time limit; 
(ii)  the  documents  or  materials  submitted  are  inaccurate  and  need 
verification; 
(iii)  other significant events occurred after notification. 271 
If the antimonopoly execution authorities have not decided in case of expiring of 
the period, the concentration shall be implemented. 
Article  27:  In  the  review  of  a  concentration  the  following  factors  shall  be 
considered: 
(i)  market share in the relevant market of the undertakings concerned 
and their ability to control the market; 
(ii)  concentrate degree of the relevant market ; 
(iii)  effect on the market entry and technology improvement; 
(iv)  effect on consumers and other undertakings; 
(v)  effect on national economical improvement; 
(vi)  other  factors  shall  affect  the  competition,  be  considered  by  the 
antimonopoly execution authorities. 
Article 28: If a concentration has or may have effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition,  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  shall  take  decision  of 
prohibition. However, if the undertakings can prove that the concentration bring 
more positive effect than negative effect on competition, or the concentration 
pursuant  to  public  interests,  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  shall 
decide, not to prohibit the concentration. 
Article  29:  The  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  shall  make  a  decision  of 
approval with restrictions and conditions where a concentration will reduce the 
negative effect on competition. 
Article 30: The antimonopoly execution authorities shall announce the decisions 
of prohibition or conditional concentration to public. 
Article 31: In case the acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign investors or 
other  manners  to  concentrate  referred  to  national  security,  besides  being 
reviewed  according  to  this  law,  shall  be  carried  out  national  safety  review 
according to related regulations. 272 
Chapter  5:  Abuse  of  Administrative  Power  to  Eliminate  or  Restrict 
Competition 
Article 32: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and  regulations  grant  rights  to  administer  public  issues  shall  not  abuse 
administrative power to limit or limit in a different form the organizations or 
persons to operate, purchase or use the products of any undertakings designated 
by them. 
Article 33: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and  regulations  grant  rights  to  administer  public  issues  shall  not  abuse 
administrative power to carry out following conducts, to hinder the free flow of 
the commodities between regions: 
(i)  create  discriminated  items,  carry  out  discriminated  standards,  or 
stipulate discriminated prices to nonlocal  commodities.  
(ii)  stipulate different technical requisition, test standards to nonlocal an 
local commodities, or conduct repeat testing, repeat certification and 
so on, in order to limit nonlocal commodities to enter local market; 
(iii)  specially  require  administrative  permit  to  counter  nonlocal 
commodities,  in  order  to  limit  nonlocal  commodities  to  enter  local 
market; 
(iv)  create burdens or other methods to limit nonlocal commodities enter 
or local commodities exit; 
(v)  other conducts which hinder commodities free flow between regions. 
Article 34: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and  regulations  grant  rights  to  administer  public  issues  shall  not  abuse 
administrative power to exclude or restrict nonlocal undertakings to participate 
local bids activities through the manners that they create discriminated quality 
requisitions, judge standards or not announce information according to law. 273 
Article 35: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and  regulations  grant  rights  to  administer  public  issues  shall  not  abuse 
administrative  power  to  exclude  or  restrict  nonlocal  undertakings  to  set  up 
branches through that they give unfair treatment to nonlocal undertakings. 
Article 36: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and  regulations  grant  rights  to  administer  public  issues  shall  not  abuse 
administrative power to force the undertakings to carry out monopoly conducts 
according to this law. 
Article  37:  Administrative  power  shall  not  abuse  administrative  power  to 
stipulate regulations including contents to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Chapter 6: Investigation of the Suspected Monopoly Conducts 
Article  38:  The  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  investigate  monopoly 
conducts according to law. 
Refers  to  antimonopoly  conduct,  any  organization  or  person  has  the  right  to 
report to the antimonopoly execution authorities. The antimonopoly execution 
authorities shall keep the secret for the reporter. 
If the report is submitted in written form and supplies related facts and proofs, 
the antimonopoly execution authorities shall conduct necessary investigation. 
Article  39:  When  conducting  investigations,  the  antimonopoly  execution 
authorities can take the following measures: 
(i)  enter the premise or other related places of the undertakings being 
investigated; 
(ii)  request  the  undertaking  concerned,  interested  parties  and  other 
relevant organizations or persons being investigated to explain related 
circumstances; 
(iii)  exam,  copy  related  documents  and  materials  of  the  undertakings, 
interested parties and other relevant organizations or persons being 274 
investigated,  such  as  certificates,  agreements,  accounting  books, 
letters and telegraphs of business, electronic data and so on; 
(iv)  seal up or detain related proofs; 
(v)  inquire  about  the  bank  account  information  of  the  undertakings 
concerned. 
Taking the measures stipulated above, shall be reported in written form to the 
chef  person  in  charge  of  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities,  and  be 
approved. 
Article 40: Investigating the suspected monopoly conducts by the antimonopoly 
execution authorities, the executors shall be not less than two persons, and shall 
show the papers of execution. 
The executor conduct inquiring and investigating, shall fabricate written notes 
which are signature by the inquired or investigated person. 
Article  41:  The  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  and  their  staffs  shall  be 
obliged to keep the secret which known in the execution. 
Article  42:  Undertakings  concerned,  interested  parties  or  other  related 
organizations  or  persons  being  investigated  shall  cooperate  with  the 
antimonopoly execution authorities by performing responsibility, shall not refuse 
or hinder the antimonopoly execution authorities to investigate. 
Article 43: Undertakings concerned, interested parties being investigated have 
the right to state opinions. The antimonopoly execution authorities shall verify 
the facts, reasons and proofs being given by undertakings concerned, interested 
parties being investigated. 
Article 44: After investigating and verifying the suspected monopoly conducts, if 
the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  believe  that  monopoly  conduct  was 
done, shall take decisions according to law and publish it. 
Article 45: In case of a suspected monopoly conduct being investigated by the 
antimonopoly  execution  authorities,  if  the  undertakings  being  investigated 275 
promise  that  they  will  conduct  concrete  measures  to  eliminate  the  negative 
effect of the monopoly conducts within a time limit being acknowledged by the 
antimonopoly  execution  authorities,  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities 
shall  decide  to  suspend  the  investigation.  The  decision  to  suspend  the 
investigation shall note what concrete was promised by the undertakings being 
investigated. 
If the antimonopoly execution authorities decide to suspend investigation, shall 
supervision the circumstances in which undertakings perform their promises. If 
the  undertakings  have  performed  the  promises,  the  antimonopoly  execution 
authorities shall decide to stop the investigation. 
Under the following circumstances, the antimonopoly execution authorities shall 
regain the investigation: 
(i)  undertakings have not performed the promises; 
(ii)  the  fact  being  applied  to  suspend  the  investigation  has  significant 
changed; 
(iii)  the decision to suspend the investigation is based on uncompleted or 
untruthful information being supplied by the undertakings. 
Chapter 7: Legal Liabilities 
Article 46: In case there exists monopoly agreement and is implemented by the 
undertakings  in  violation  of  this  law,  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities 
shall  order  the  undertakings  to  cease  such  act,  the  illegal  gains  shall  be 
confiscated, and a fine between 1% and 10% of the turnover in the preceding 
year shall be imposed; If the monopoly agreement is not implemented, a fine 
below 500,000 Yuan shall be imposed. 
If the undertakings actively report the circumstance of the monopoly agreement 
to  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities  and  supply  important  proofs,  the 
antimonopoly execution authorities shall reduce or remit the fines according to 
own judgement. 276 
If the association of undertakings organise undertakings of the branch to reach 
monopoly  agreement  in  violation  of  this  law,  the  antimonopoly  execution 
authorities shall impose a fine below 500,000 Yuan; and if the circumstances are 
serious, the social organization register administrative department shall dissolve 
the register. 
Article 47: In case there exists an act abusing dominant market position by the 
undertakings  in  violation  of  this  law,  the  antimonopoly  execution  authorities 
shall  order  the  undertakings  to  cease  such  act,  the  illegal  gains  shall  be 
confiscated, and a fine between 1% and 10% of the turnover in the preceding 
year shall be imposed. 
Article 48:  In case the undertakings concentrate in violation of this law, the 
antimonopoly  execution  authorities  shall  order  the  undertakings  to  cease 
concentration,  dispose  securities  or  assets  in  limited  time,  transfer  the 
operation and conduct other necessary measures to regain the status before the 
concentration, a fine below 500,000 shall be imposed. 
Article  49:  Referred  to  the  fines  of  article  46,  47,  48  of  this  law,  the 
antimonopoly execution authorities shall consider the nature, degree and time 
of duration of the violation, to decide concrete amount of fine. 
Article  50:  If  undertakings  carry  out  monopoly  conduct,  and  cause  losses  to 
others, shall bear civil liability according to law. 
Article 51: If administrative power by government and organisations to which 
laws and regulations grant rights to administer public issues abuse administrative 
power,  to  eliminate  or  restrict  competition,  shall  be  ordered  by  superior 
authorities to correct themselves; people in direct charge and people directly 
involved  shall  be  imposed  administrative  punishment.  The  antimonopoly 
execution authorities shall supply suggestion to related superior authorities to 
handle according to law. 
If  administrative  power  by  government  and  organisations  to  which  laws  and 
regulations grant rights to administer public issues abuse administrative power, 
to eliminate or restrict competition will be handled by another regulation, shall 
be applied to another regulation. 277 
Article  52:  In  reviewing  and  investigating  by  the  antimonopoly  execution 
authorities, if they refuse to supply related materials, information, or supply 
incorrect materials, information, or remove, hide or destroy proofs, or other 
conducts  to  refuse  or  hinder  investigation,  the  antimonopoly  execution 
authorities shall order the undertakings to cease such act, A fine not to exceed 
20,000 Yuan to individuals and 200,000 Yuan to organization may be assessed. If 
the circumstances are serious, a fine not to between 20,000 Yuan and 100,000 
Yuan  to  individuals  and  between  200,000  Yuan  and  1000,000  Yuan  to 
organization  may  be  assessed;  if  the  said  act  constitutes  a  criminal  offence, 
prosecution will be launched according to law. 
Article  53:  If  the  undertaking  does  not  accept  the  decision  made  by  the 
antimonopoly  execution  authorities  according  to  article  28,  29  of  this  law, 
he/she  shall  in  the  first  place  apply  for  administrative  review;  and  if  the 
undertaking still disagree with the decision of the administrative review, he/she 
may file a administrative lawsuit according to law. 
If  the  undertaking  does  not  accept  the  decision  made  by  the  antimonopoly 
execution authorities besides the decisions stipulated by first paragraph, he/she 
shall  apply  for  administrative  review  according  to  law  or  file  administrative 
lawsuit. 
Article 54: Any employee of the antimonopoly execution authorities who abuse 
his official power, neglect his duties, engage in malpractices or irregularities, or 
disclose  any  trade  secret,  constitute  a  criminal  offence,  prosecution  will  be 
launched according to law. Where the act is not so serious as to be prosecuted 
for criminal liability, he shall be imposed the administrative penalty according to 
law. 
Chapter 8: Supplementary Articles 
Article 55: Undertakings exercise intellectual property rights according to laws, 
administrative  regulations  related  intellectual  property  rights,  shall  not  be 
applied to this law; however, undertakings abuse the intellectual property rights 
to eliminate or restrict competition, shall be applied to this law. 278 
Article 56: Agricultural producers and rural economic organizations alliance or 
concerted  act  in  the  producing,  processing,  selling,  transporting  or  reserving 
agricultural products shall be not applied to this law. 
Article 57: This law is effective as of August 1, 2008. 
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